Posted December 21, 2015 by Ben Lilliston   

Image used under creative commons license from Twitter user weatherchannel.

When the text of a new global climate agreement reached by 195 governments was released this weekend, one word was conspicuously absent: agriculture. That doesn’t mean issues around how farmers produce food were entirely ignored; in fact, you can see agriculture’s shadow in nearly all parts of the Paris agreement—from national-level climate plans to climate finance to new initiatives on soil. But a clear path forward on how to limit agricultural greenhouse gas emissions and support more climate resilient agricultural systems is still too politically hot for governments to take on.

The decision to sidestep agriculture, at least temporarily, within the climate agreement was not surprising. Finding common ground on agriculture and food security is notoriously difficult in international settings (see long-stalled World Trade Organization negotiations). Much of the intransigence around agriculture lies in the enormous political and economic power held by an increasing small number of global agribusiness corporations, who have little interest in new rules that don’t fit with their current business model. There is strong resistance to new regulations for agribusiness sectors that are high greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters (particularly the big fertilizer and meat companies). After the Paris agreement was reached, the meat industry immediately put out a call to start aggressively lobbying governments to protect their interests.

This is an obstacle that will ultimately have to be overcome, as the global agriculture research consortium CGIAR estimates that one-third of global emissions are associated with the global food system. A report put out by Global Justice Now last week found that three agribusiness companies—Tyson Foods, Cargill and Yara—have a larger climate footprint than many countries.

Despite governments’ reluctance to take on agriculture issues directly, many elements of the agreement do have important implications for agriculture. In addition, the agreement sets up a framework where agriculture issues will be debated in the future. Here are a few key elements of the agreement particularly relevant to agriculture:

A stronger benchmark to reign in climate chaos: Countries agreed to not allow global temperatures to rise more than 1.5 C over pre-industrial levels—a stronger benchmark than previously discussed 2 C. Whether countries can reach this goal is questionable. National-level GHG reduction commitments outlined as part of the Paris agreement have the world on target for an estimated 2.7 -3.5 degree rise in the most optimistic scenarios. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) will use the 1.5 C reference point in its future scientific and policy assessments, and it will be used as a barometer of progress in national level GHG climate assessments.  For agriculture, which is already experiencing the effects of climate change, setting a stronger benchmark should benefit farmers trying to adapt to extreme weather events. This more ambitious goal will also require greater reductions in agricultural-related emissions in the very near future.

Ratcheting up non-binding national climate commitments: At the heart of the climate agreement are national level commitments to reduce GHG emissions by 2025 or 2030, known as Intended Nationally Determined Commitments (INDCs). These commitments submitted by 186 countries explain how much GHG emissions will be reduced by sector, and they identify policies to reach those goals. According to CGIAR, some 80 percent of INDCs include agriculture or food, policies that cover both agricultural related emissions, as well as adapting to climate change.

Current INDCs commitments don’t get us close to the 1.5 C goal and, perhaps more discouraging, they are voluntary, not binding. The deal does set up a framework to ratchet up INDC commitments over time. In 2018, there will be an assessment of progress incorporating the latest climate science. In 2020, countries can ratchet up their commitments for the next five year period, and continually ratchet up climate goals every five years going forward. The agreement sets a long-term goal of reaching zero net emissions sometime in the second half of the century. Zero net emissions doesn’t mean no emissions; instead, it means that emissions can be offset by land-based efforts to sequester carbon, either through forestry or agriculture. The net zero approach has been sharply criticized by civil society groups like ActionAid and the Stockholm Environment Institute as a way for polluting industries to avoid making real emission reductions, while relying on land-based offsets that are both unreliable and could result in a host of bad outcomes for farmers and communities tied to agriculture or forests, such as land displacement.

Falling short on climate finance: Another pillar of the agreement is finance, more specifically how developed countries, particularly those most responsible for greenhouse gas emissions, will financially support developing countries who are dealing most urgently with the effects of climate change. Approximately 48 developing countries have cited the need for additional climate finance to implement their INDCs. In 2009, developed countries agreed to contribute $100 billion a year to developing countries in climate related finance by 2020. In Paris, they reaffirmed the $100 billion target (but again, no binding commitments for specific countries) and agreed to revise that goal (with the $100 billion as a floor) by 2025. Climate finance commitments continue to be criticized for both not being enough, currently only about $2 billion annually to dedicated climate funds like the Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate Fund, and for double-counting previously committed development aid. According to the Overseas Development Institute, public finance currently committed to by developed countries for climate change will reach only $18.8 billion a year by 2020. Climate finance efforts continue to be hindered by the absence of clear standards for how funds will be counted and where they will be delivered.

Poorly performing carbon markets still favored: The agreement continues to support the creation and expansion of carbon markets as the primary climate policy lever by creating two ways for countries to meet their GHG reduction pledges. First, by 2020 it will build upon protocols for creating carbon credits previously established within the Kyoto Protocol to create a new centralized market mechanism (a global carbon market). Any country could participate in that global carbon market, though there are continue to be big questions about demand for such a market.  Second, it supports a decentralized cooperative approach, where countries can link together their national-level carbon markets. Bloomberg News reported that 17 countries, including the U.S., Japan and Germany, announced in Paris that they will work together to set common protocols for national and regional carbon markets in order to connect them in the future. China will launch what is expected to be the world’s largest carbon market in 2017—further entrenching carbon markets as the go-to climate policy.

Poorly designed carbon markets have largely failed to produce an adequate price on carbon to drive down GHG emissions. According to a recent study, up to three quarters of carbon credits established by an existing UN program may not have resulted in any emission reductions. In the case of agriculture, mostly viewed strictly as an offset for polluters, IATP has reported on five reasons why carbon markets won’t work for agriculture, and how such offset projects are not appropriate for small scale farmers and serve project developers more than participating farmers.

Voluntary soil initiative launched: Agriculture was included in several voluntary initiatives launched around the talks, known as the Lima-Paris Action Agenda. One of these voluntary initiatives was a much publicized French 4 pour 1000 initiative focused on sequestering carbon in the soil through agroecological and agroeforestry practices. We wrote about this largely research focused initiative when it was announced earlier this month. A number of countries, research institutes and NGOs have already signed up. But big questions remain about what the initiative will look like on-the-ground, the level of participation from farmer and civil society organizations and how it will be funded. French Agriculture Minister Stephane Le Foll said he hopes to have these pieces in place for the next UN climate meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco in November 2016.

Where next for agriculture and climate?: As many climate justice organizations have pointed out, the deal fails on many important fronts. It doesn’t bind countries to strong enough emission reductions, it doesn’t provide enough public money to countries that most need it, and it continues to promote a carbon market policy approach that has largely failed.

For agriculture, the global climate deal avoids the tough questions about how to reduce agriculture-related GHG emissions from industrial systems dependent on synthetic fertilizer use and large open pit manure lagoons linked to confined animal production, while transitioning toward more climate-resilient systems, including identifying what agricultural systems are most climate-resilient. As is the case with oil and coal companies in the energy sector, powerful agribusiness corporations will be at the table to protect their interests in future climate policy. At the same time, there is growing international support for the more farmer-centered approach of agroecology from both scientists and social movements like Via Campesina—an approach IATP has strongly advocated for.

The global climate deal in Paris has set the stage for an escalating debate about the way forward on agriculture in a climate chaotic world. We can expect this debate to happen at the national level as countries implement and strengthen their INDCs, and at the international level in discussions around climate-finance and food security. A climate-resilient focus for agriculture will ultimately have to be integrated within national farm programs like the U.S. Farm Bill, and regional and global trade rules which often limit climate policy. To meet the challenge climate change poses for farmers and agriculture, governments will have to become a lot bolder than they were in Paris.

Posted December 14, 2015 by     Timothy A. Wise

AgricultureWorld Trade Organization (WTO)

Used under creative commons license from Justin Kernogahn.

On the eve of their Nairobi ministerial, WTO members should remember it is not food procurement policies in developing countries like India but unfair US agricultural subsidies which threaten free trade and farmer livelihoods across the world

On December 15, the world’s trade ministers will gather in Nairobi, Kenya, for the tenth attempt to craft a new set of trade rules under the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The so-called Doha Development Round (DDR), launched in Doha, Qatar, in 2001, promised to right the imbalance in previous trade negotiations that had favoured the United States, European countries, and other developed nations. Reforming unfair agricultural practices were at the centre of the Doha agenda.

On the eve of the Nairobi ministerial, that agenda itself is under threat. The US, EU, and Japan have proposed jettisoning the Doha agenda and the progress made before negotiations broke down in 2008. They have dismissed commitments made two years ago in Bali, Indonesia, to resolve objections to India’s ambitious National Food Security Act as an unfair subsidy to farmers. Agriculture, it seems, is barely on the Nairobi agenda.

Going along with the West would be a costly mistake for developing countries. They may well be facing a new era of low crop prices in which highly subsidised crop production in the US and other rich countries creates overproduction and dumping of cheap goods on global markets. If ever there were a need for new agricultural trade rules, now would be the time.

Changing economic landscape

US negotiators claim that economic growth in China, Brazil, India and other emerging economies changes the basis for the Doha framework, but what has really changed since the progress in Bali is the fall in global crop and commodity prices. This puts farmers back in the same economic squeeze they experienced between 1997 and 2005, when costs regularly exceeded returns from sales, and rich-country governments stepped in with subsidy payments to make up the difference.

The other change since Bali is the passage of the 2014 US Farm Bill, which proposes to do just that. The bill expands support through subsidised crop insurance by adding a variety of additional insurance schemes designed to compensate farmers if prices or revenues fall below particular targets.

According to projections from University of Missouri researchers, these programmes are almost certain to exceed commitments on the table in the Doha negotiations and probably will put the US in breach of its current WTO subsidy limits as well. Payments are expected to exceed $12 billion in the current crop year, well above levels in recent years.

A history of dumping 

This low-price-high-cost scenario could well lead to a new era of agricultural dumping. The WTO commits nations not to export at prices below domestic prices or below prices in other export markets. Beyond this kind of discriminatory pricing, though, the WTO agreements also define dumping as exporting at below the costs of production.

This was common practice for the US before the recent rise in commodity prices. The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) in the US estimated that from 1997-2005 the US exported soybeans, corn, wheat, rice, and cotton at between 12% and 47% below farmers’ costs of production. A study of US dumping in Mexico estimated the costs to Mexican producers from the resulting depressed crop prices at nearly $13 billion over that nine-year period.

Unfair competition cost developing countries dearly, undermining local farm economies in favour of cheap imports. Since 2001, the world’s least developed countries (LDCs) have seen their agricultural trade deficits skyrocket from $4.6 billion to $22.3 billion in 2011 after crop prices shot up.

The WTO’s current Agreement on Agriculture proved particularly weak in preventing dumping. One successful case was brought by Brazil against the US for price suppression in cotton. Brazil won the right to take countervailing measures against US products, but the government never did so, in large part because US policies were deemed to be locked in by the previous Farm Bill. Brazil and the US formally settled the dispute last year based on changes to the cotton provisions in the new farm legislation.

A return to dumping?

New research suggests the US is already exporting corn at below the costs of production. Farmgate prices this year have been $19/ton below production costs, with US exports priced at $165/ton. With Farm Bill support prices at $179/ton, US corn farmers stand to receive some $6 billion in government payments this year.

New economic modelling by University of California researchers paints a particularly bleak picture for global cotton farmers. They find that the reforms in the 2014 Farm Bill to US cotton subsidies will not eliminate price suppression. They project that during the five-year life of the legislation, subsidies will average $1.5 billion per year, keeping 20% more land in cotton, increasing exports 29%, and lowering global prices 7%.

The estimated cost to other cotton producers is $3.3 billion per year due to lowered prices and lost markets. Indian producers would lose an estimated $800 million per year. The so-called Cotton 4 countries of Africa – Burkina Faso, Mali, Benin, and Chad – would collectively see $80 million per year in lost revenues, a heavy blow to small-scale farmers in small economies. These cotton-dependent countries have been promised relief in the WTO for more than 10 years.

WTO Nairobi needs to deliver on agriculture

Instead of sidelining agricultural negotiations, the Nairobi ministerial should be deepening discussions of fair trade in agricultural products. India’s food security programme should be declared a legitimate use of public procurement, not derided as an unfair subsidy. Developing countries need the kinds of protections proposed in the Doha Round – Special Safeguard Mechanisms to protect farmers from import surges, and Special Product designations for crops critical to food security and rural development.

But developing countries need much more as we enter a new era of low crop prices. They need meaningful protections against agricultural dumping by rich countries which can afford to subsidise their farmers.

Timothy A. Wise is Policy Research Director at Tufts University’s Global Development and Environment Institute and a Senior Research Fellow at the Political Economy Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. 

Posted December 11, 2015 by Ben Lilliston   

Image used under creative commons license from Twitter user GisellaLomax

Earlier this week, a leaked internal European Union document on climate negotiation priorities (posted by Corporate Observatory Europe) made clear that any global climate deal would not mention trade. Also this week, a group of concerned business associations (including the biotech industry) hurriedly wrote (subscription required) U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry warning him not to agree to anything that could impact trade rules established to protect intellectual property rights. Both documents show why powerful interests want to keep trade and climate agreements separate despite the numerous ways trade rules have not only facilitated climate change but limit our ability to set strong climate policy in the future.  

The trade-climate disconnect exists not only within the global climate treaty being negotiated here in Paris. The Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) does not include anywhere in its 5,000 plus pages the words “climate change.” The latest version of a U.S. Customs bill (subscription required) coming out of the House of Representatives forbids the President from considering climate impacts in future trade agreements.

The trade elephant in the climate room was something civil society groups, including IATP, raised at an official side event at the Climate Generations area yesterday here in Paris. Ilana Solomon from the Sierra Club outlined the history of the international trade regime as it has evolved at the World Trade Organization and now with the proposed TPP and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)—in particular how these trade deals impact energy policy. Pascoe Sabido of Corporate Observatory Europe outlined multiple instances of corporate influence within the UNFCCC negotiations, and how special rights established in TTIP and the EU-Canada trade deal would grant polluting corporations special rights that undermine efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Ronnie Hall of the Critical Information Collective talked about how trade rules are affecting forests, particularly driving woody biomass production that is damaging to the climate.

I talked about how trade rules:

  1. Drive an export-focused system of agricultural production that is high in greenhouse gas emissions from the heavy use of synthetic fertilizers and tied to large-scale confined animal operations;
  2. Promote agricultural dumping, which has forced farmers off the land (farmers who will be essential for knowledge-based agroecology); and
  3. Push intellectual property regimes that reinforce the power of multinational seed corporations instead of supporting farmers’ rights and the protection of genetic resources needed to adapt to climate change.

A big area of contention here in Paris is how much of the deal will be binding. Mostly at the request of the U.S., but also of other heavy polluting countries like China and India, there is a desire to make much of the agreement aspirational and non-binding—soft law as it is known internationally. But make no mistake, trade agreements are binding hard law, with their own legal enforcement mechanisms. If we are going to save the planet, we’re going to have to come to terms with the many ways the binding hard law of trade agreements conflicts with the soft law of climate policy.

Posted December 9, 2015 by Shefali Sharma   

TPPFree trade agreementsLabeling

Used under creative commons license from Fiona MacGinty-O'Neill.

This week the World Trade Organization (WTO) gave Canada and Mexico the right to impose over a billion dollars’ worth of sanctions per year unless the U.S. Congress repeals a common sense law, Country of Origin-Labeling (COOL) for meat (beef, pork and poultry). COOL informs consumers where animals were born, raised and slaughtered before turning into meat. The meat industry has spent millions of dollars lobbying legislators trying to repeal COOL since it was first enacted in 2002. So the WTO case, which has been consistently appealed by the United States Trade Representative since 2008, is a big victory for Big Meat because it gives legislators who are already in their pocket a “legitimate” reason to change the law in spite of overwhelming consumer demand for such labels.

In May of this year, we said that the WTO rulings on COOL confirm that free trade agreements undermine national and sub-national laws and regulations.  Now, as President Obama tries to convince Congress and the American public to support the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), the repeal of COOL by the Senate would send a clear message that common sense rules will be swept aside by trade commitments. TPP stands to impact all kinds of environmental, public health and food safety regulations—not only at the federal level, but also at the state and local levels, as a recently published IATP report demonstrates.

The Chair of the Senate Agriculture Committee, Pat Roberts (R-KS), is gung ho about repealing the law as soon as possible. However, Ranking Member Debbie Stabenow (D-MI), supports amending the law to make it “voluntary.” This would severely undermine consumers’ right to know and the thousands of cattle producers in this country who count on COOL’s enforcement to differentiate their grass-fed, high quality beef from the product that has been cobbled together in the cheapest manner by the global meat industry.

Groups representing farmers across the country are speaking out against the repeal of COOL:

This WTO decision is exactly why so many people opposed NAFTA 22 years ago and oppose the Trans-Pacific Partnership today. Consumers are demanding more information about where and how their food is produced, and farmers and ranchers strongly support the country-of-origin labeling. Why should the U.S. have to pay tariffs for requiring these simple labels?” said Mabel Dobbs, a rancher from Weiser, Idaho, on behalf of the Western Organization of Resource Councils.

In fact, even the economic grounds for challenging COOL have been debunked. This was reiterated yesterday by R-CALF USA (Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund, United Stockgrowers of America) which represents thousands of cattle producers on domestic and international trade issues:

The entire value of Canada’s live cattle imports in 2014 was $1.753 billion and this represented an historical high. It is absolutely impossible that Canada could be suffering an annual loss representing 45 percent of Canada’s record high imports. Mexico’s live cattle imports in 2014 were valued at $739 million and it is equally impossible that COOL has caused Mexico to lose 31 percent of the value of its record level of exports.

One thing is certain: if the Senate repeals COOL, the campaign to stop TPP becomes even stronger, given the sweeping impacts the trade deal will have on rules we care about.  

Posted December 8, 2015 by Dale Wiehoff   

 Mennonite boy in  Chihuahua, Mexico.

News coming out of the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua is most often about narco-traffickers but, in recent weeks, attention has shifted to farmers protesting increased cost of production and shutting down the importation lane at the El Paso and Ciudad Juarez crossing. And a little further south, severe drought is driving Mennonite farmers off the land. A closer look at the history of Mennonite migration reveals a pattern connected to drought and dry land farming for the last 150 years.

Near the tiny village of Santa Rita, 50 miles from Ciudad Juarez, Mennonite farmers are packing up their belongings and heading for Argentina. Mennonites have a history of migration brought on by persecution for their uncompromising pacifist religious beliefs, but this latest relocation is the result of a drought that has ravaged the region since 2012.

With predictions that water will run out in the next 20 years from overuse, all kinds of farmers will be moving out of Chihuahua and looking for land and water to grow the corn, beans, pecans, apples, dairy and other agricultural products that have been the mainstay of this arid part of northern Mexico.

Mennonites were originally a Dutch Anabaptist religious community, established in the Netherlands in the 1500s.  They moved east across Europe to escape religious harassment into the lush Vistula Delta of Prussia and then south into Russia, the Ukraine and the Crimea and eventually as far as Siberia and Turkestan before reversing course and going west to America.

A major Mennonite migration to the U.S. from Russia took place in the 1870s, in the midst of a worldwide period of intense drought, parallel to what is happening in Chihuahua today.

Over the decades, the Mennonites perfected dry land farming practices that helped turn Russia from a grain importing country into a grain exporter. But the exemption from military service provided by Czars as far back as Catherine the Great began to weaken and restrictive laws governing land ownership in Russia prevented Mennonites in the Ukraine from establishing new farms. The lack of access to land sent some Mennonites further east to Siberia and south to Turkey.

All these events were taking place in the midst of an El Niño driven drought and famine that, by some estimates, killed 60 million people world-wide between the 1870 and 1890.

Fortunately for the Russian Mennonites, the opening of the American west, along with the arrival of trains, led to a reversal of their easterly migration and a jump across the Atlantic to the Great Plains states. They brought with them their knowledge of dryland farming and grain production. And this was not just any grain but Turkey Red, or, as we call it today, hard red winter wheat. Their arrival and introduction of more resilient crops and practices came at a crucial moment.  The world-wide drought conditions hit the American west just as the Mennonites were getting off the train. In addition to no rains, the droughts unleashed hordes of grasshoppers in search of any and all plant life in a broad swath of land from Minnesota to Texas.

The combination of drought and locusts transformed the landscape to leafless trees and barren fields. Corn, the leading grain crop across Kansas and Nebraska, was wiped out in many places, creating demand for Turkey Red wheat that was planted in the fall and harvested in the early summer. By 1910, wheat had replaced corn as the leading crop in Kansas and remains so today.

The conversion of the great western prairies from grassland and grazing to farmland growing wheat was a massive ecological, economic and social development that contributed to the U.S. becoming a major world power. The expanded wheat harvest from the Great Plains came in time to meet the increased demands for grain brought on by World War I. The price collapse that followed the war led to the rise of the populist movement, and its insistence on fair prices for farmers set the stage for New Deal farm programs that followed.

The next period of drought in the Great Plains created the Dust Bowl of the 1920s and 30s. Thousands of farm families fled the devastation brought on by economic collapse and drought. By 1940, 2.5 million people had moved out of the Great Plains states.

At the same time, starting in the 1920s, thousands of Mennonite farmers who had settled in Canada as part of the 1870 migration out of Russia and Turkey, started moving to Mexico over disagreements with the Canadian government. The new colonies used their knowledge of dryland farming to build successful farms that have become known for a local cheese. Today there are 60,000 Mennonites in Chihuahua, where they have turned to drilling deep wells for irrigation, causing problems with neighbors and local authorities.

For Mennonites it is an old story that combines religious beliefs, farming practices and weather; all three seem to conspire to keep them wandering in search of a place to farm. But all farming practices that produce more and more without regard for the costs, including the cost of water, will only shorten the cycle between growing abundant crops and farmers going out of business.

For more on drought and the drivers of climate change, visit IATP’s


Posted December 7, 2015 by Ben Lilliston   


Used under creative commons license from Takver.

 Marche Mondial pour le Climat

Paris - After four years of negotiations, countries from around the world aim to complete a new global climate deal in the next week. A new 48-page draft text was circulated this weekend and there will be a lot of horse-trading and late nights in the coming week. Here are a few of the key issues we’ll be tracking:

Can national climate commitments become stronger?

The essence of a proposed Paris climate deal are national commitments, known as INDCs, made by governments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Those commitments were submitted prior to Paris and include how much each country will reduce emissions beginning in 2020 and continuing through 2030. They also describe national policies that will help achieve those reductions. Many of these include polices around energy, forests, agriculture and food security.

A clear weakness of these commitments is that they are voluntary, with no real accountability mechanisms in place—aside from public shaming. There is no roadmap for reviewing them and potentially ratcheting them up as the science and conditions change. Many countries and civil society groups are pushing for a five-year review process starting in 2020, known as a ratcheting mechanism.  Such a review would assess progress on current commitments and determine whether stronger commitments are necessary. The U.S. is pushing for a legally binding commitment to monitor, verify and report emissions to an international body, but there is some reluctance by developing countries who may not have the capacity to report emissions. IATP and other civil society groups want greater accountability and transparency in the reporting on those commitments—and a continuing ratcheting up of those commitments better aligned with historical contributions to climate change.

How strong of a commitment to food security?

While the draft text does not include the word “agriculture,” it does include the terms “food security” and “food productivity.” While “food security” is present in the Preamble and other parts of the text, the term “food production” is in the operative parts of the text (the specifics of what countries agree to). This is an example of how a few words can mean a lot within international negotiations. Calling to protect food production within the text is not the same as food security. We already produce enough food to feed the world, but many other factors, particularly extreme poverty, cause food insecurity. Food security is an established Sustainable Development Goal, agreed to in September, where countries agreed to eradicate hunger by 2030. The internationally agreed upon definition of food security comes from the UN World Food Summit in 1996: “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” The emphasis on “food production” is coming from Argentina, a major agricultural exporter, but likely also from agribusiness traders. Food production and distribution is more closely linked to agricultural business and trade, which is discussed at the World Trade Organization and multilateral trade partnerships. The food production framing serves global agribusiness companies, many of whom are major greenhouse gas emitters, according to a new report released earlier today by Global Justice.

How strong is the commitment to human rights?

Many countries and civil society groups feel it is essential that the agreement include strong references to the protection of human rights. Climate change related disruptions are already impacting human rights—the refugee crisis emerging from Syria is but one example. The UN human rights framework is a valuable realm of international law for assessing the impacts of climate change and an important tool for developing policy and actionable responses. Both Norway and the U.S. have been reluctant to include human rights as an overarching principle in the text. IATP signed a letter from U.S. groups calling on Secretary of State John Kerry to ensure that references to human rights remain strong in the climate text. The letter called on the U.S. to: “Explicitly recognize that human rights obligations apply when taking actions to address the impacts of climate change as well as actions to mitigate those impacts, thus ensuring the protection and promotion of human rights, including the rights of indigenous peoples, gender equality, inter-generational equity, just transition, food security, and ecosystem integrity.”

Who’s contributing money, how much, and where’s it going?

Essential to any global climate deal is money. Climate change is already causing enormous economic costs for the countries of the world. This is only expected to worsen. Additionally, countries need to begin to transition to cleaner energy and transportation systems, more resilient agricultural production and practices to protect forests and other natural landscapes. Discussions about finance quickly get into responsibility—who is responsible for historical emissions, who has benefitted from polluting economies and who should contribute the most to climate finance? In Copenhagen in 2009, countries agreed to a proposal by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to supply $100 billion annually in public and private climate related finance by 2020. Many developed countries, including the U.S., cite a recent OECD analysis of climate finance that found that countries had already risen to  $62 billion by 2014,  on track to get to that $100 billion. Britain, France, Germany and Japan among others have made additional contributions this week. But the OECD analysis is contentious—largely because, as the OECD admits, there is no internationally agreed upon definition of what climate finance is. The dispute is partially over whether this is really new aid, or is it just re-packaging of existing development aid for education, agriculture and health that countries had already committed to. Civil society groups and the government of India (which issued a scathing critique of the OECD report last week) have criticized some of what counts as finance, things like market-rate loans and export credits. A report by Adaptation Watch earlier this year reached similar conclusions.

Going forward, civil society groups want a Paris agreement to set up a system to define and account for climate finance that is open and transparent. As Timmons Roberts and Romain Weikmans : “developed countries report whatever they want, since no system exists to discern what counts and what doesn’t. Likewise we have no agreement about what types of private finance should be counted, and how much.”

Additionally, there is no clear plan to look beyond 2020 in terms of finance commitments. Developing countries and civil society groups, including IATP, would like to see climate finance emphasize climate adaptation within funds like the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund and the Least Developed Country Fund—all of which have a broad public mandate. Other important opportunities to generate climate-related finance that are not part of the agreement but supported by civil society groups include a financial transaction tax, and the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies; these efforts will continue at the national level after the Paris meeting.

There is guarded optimism here in Paris that a deal will be struck, though also a recognition that it will not be strong enough to meet the challenge of climate change. In such a wide-ranging agreement, the details will matter. Strong language that supports food security and human rights are essential to a meaningful agreement. As is a structure to continually ratchet up INDC commitments, as well as openly report on progress of those commitments. Finally, developed countries need to step up to the plate in terms of contributing more public money toward climate adaptation to better reflect their historic responsibility in causing the climate crisis. Participants seem hopeful that a Paris deal will be a first step of many on collective climate action and much-needed international cooperation. How big of a first step remains to be seen.

Posted December 7, 2015 by Juliette Majot    Hannes Lorenzen

Used under creative commons license from Josh Zakary.

On our way back home from the European Rural Parliament, where people from all over the Continent agreed to a Common Manifesto on the future of rural Europe, we were confronted with a very real human experience. Having left Schärding in Austria, where the citizens’ Parliament was held, we shared the crowded train from Passau to Munich with many refugees. We experienced the grace of heartfelt and practical kindnesses - the common humanity - offered to them by fellow European passengers and train personnel on the crowded journey.

Most refugees were totally lost - without European languages, without tickets, and sometimes even without a clear destination. Conductors patiently ascertained what languages they spoke, then helped by finding volunteer translators speaking Arabic and the many other languages needed. Cell phones were passed back and forth between refugees and other passengers, as refugees contacted friends and family. And always, between and among refugees and those reaching out to them, eye contact, smiles, the touch of a hand, the offering of comfort to people suffering months of flight and insecurity.

Schärding lies at the border between Austria and Germany. These days volunteers, rural communities and local authorities do their utmost to take care of the nearly 2000 refugees arriving every single day. Delegates from 40 European countries at the European Rural Parliament had already felt compelled to focus on the European refugee crisis, to considering what small towns and villages around rural Europe need, to help provide new homes and work for our newcomers.

The reality on the Austrian ground and on the train back to Munich underscored the urgency of this work.

And then the bombings in Paris, in Tunis, in Beirut, and the retaliatory bombings on Raqqa and other parts of war torn Syria. These hasty counter-attacks by global military powers with conflicting interests against Daesh is without any common plan for peacemaking in the region. The intensification of internal security and intelligence measures in our own societies comes without a plan for improved integration of marginalized people and disadvantaged communities, while also discarding basic civil liberties. Meanwhile we witness with the rise of the far right, a growing fear and rejection of millions of refugees fleeing from civil war in their home countries.

Misery compounding misery, all the while compelling the desperate migration we saw on the train.

If we imagine safety in mistrusting and locking others out, we will destroy not only our own unity and common values, but our humanity as well. We must reject, outright, nationalism, barely veiled racism and religious discrimination. We must reject the growing selection of supposed best choice refugees from among the masses as is currently done by the UK, Poland, the U.S. among others. Refugees seek refuge from dire situations. That is the common bottom line.

Peace in Europe, the U.S. and the Middle East cannot be preserved  through violence, or without ending the abuse of religious, economic and military power that continues to feed disparities and exclusion. It must emerge from many myriad civil initiatives giving all citizens a chance for a decent life.

The terrorism of 13 November in Paris is one of a long string of violent acts involving the loss of many invaluable lives. The Paris tragedy reminds Europeans that our open societies are vulnerable to global terrorism and to internal disparities and conflicts; it reminds us that we are part of a long history of violent relations with and within the Middle East; and it reaffirms our knowledge that peace in our own countries cannot be preserved without making peace within and beyond our own borders.

The reflex of many in Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere is to lock the door, close the borders, retaliate, declare more war, but on whom? For the millions of refugees fleeing war, closing borders means denying them shelter from civil war and terror. Is this not further destabilizing other neighbor countries and regions as well as our own societies?

As rural actors, we are very concerned about this turmoil. We are starting to realize that the refugee tragedy has roots in the natural resources and climate crisis. Spurred on and intensified by climate change, we’ve seen drought, crop failures, shortage and scarcity of water and land driving people into conflict. This fuels destructive relations between communities and countries in the Middle-East – and us.

How historically tragic that the area now controlled by Daesh in Iraq-Syria is also Upper Mesopotamia, cradle of civilisation itself and birthplace of agriculture 10,000 years ago. This was the Fertile Crescent.

And with what compelling circularity is it that world leaders are meeting in, of all cities, Paris, to try to address the climate crisis?

60 years ago European nations pacified their relations by pooling their natural resources beyond national borders – their coal, steel and farm products - through common policies. And now, after so many walls have come down, we see reappearing new fences and borders.

As European governments close their borders to desperate refugees, Europe - not just the EU – is losing common ground. Nationalism overruns democracy and solidarity. In the U.S. a growing number of state governors and presidential candidates are building their own barricades, calling for the rejection of all those who are themselves victims of a violent spiral that includes American military intervention across the Middle East. President Obama may plead for welcoming refugees, but he cuts a lonely, lame duck figure in a highly politicized and polarized debate.

What can we do as ordinary people about all this? Well, quite a lot. Above all, we should not withdraw in fear and despair. We must have the courage to speak out, to confront our own fears and biases. To overcome the frustrations and despair of people who feel excluded in our societies. To be ready, willing and able to meet and support refugees – to show practical solidarity, as so many are already doing. As we saw on that train from Passau to Munich.

Then, together, we can leave the spiral of violence. Let’s leave the last word to a famous European refugee, who himself grew up in Munich and was welcomed into the U.S. in 1932:

Peace cannot be kept by force; It can only be achieved by understanding. 
(Jewish Refugee Albert Einstein)

Hannes Lorenzen  Agricultural and Rural Convention Europe
Juliette Majot, Executive Director, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, US

Posted December 4, 2015 by Ben Lilliston   


Paris – The term “climate smart agriculture” (CSA) is popping up frequently in the official events of the global climate talks here in Paris. But what climate smart agriculture actually means seems to depend on who’s talking. In fact, the term has entered into an Orwellian space of meaning both everything and nothing simultaneously. This vacuum has created room for agribusiness and some governments to use “climate smart agriculture” as a convenient marketing slogan to describe business as usual practices that do little to address the unfolding climate crisis that is already deeply affecting the global food system.

The term “climate smart agriculture” is the product of clever political jockeying of previous climate conferences –first emerging in 2010 after the failed climate negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009. At that time, it was part of an effort pushed by the World Bank and a handful of countries such as the Netherlands and New Zealand to push developing countries to accept agriculture into global carbon markets. Since then, the poor performance of carbon markets (particularly in Europe) as well as the shift in global climate talks toward voluntary pledges to reduce emissions has at least temporarily taken the wind out of the sails for a global carbon market. But that hasn’t slowed the momentum of “climate smart agriculture,” whatever it means.

At a series of side events and announcements this week, CSA was variously described as including: climate-resilient genetically engineered seeds, more precise use of synthetic fertilizers and agroecological practices and organic agriculture. It was described as simply a framework for ideas and information sharing in one context and a bottom-up implementation program in another. The slippery definition of CSA, as well as the formation of the corporate-heavy Global Alliance for Climate Smart Agriculture (GACSA) last year, has been strongly criticized by civil society groups. In an open letter to GACSA earlier this year, civil society groups criticized the Alliance’s lack of social or environmental safeguards and failure to prioritize farmers’ voices, knowledge and rights.

Without clear definitions, global corporations such as Walmart; Syngenta; and the fertilizer company, Yara, have filled the void, branding themselves as “climate smart.”The World Business Council announced earlier this week a host of agribusiness initiatives branded as “climate smart.” Monsanto, also touting its climate smart agriculture approach, announced this week its new “carbon neutral program.”

The various sessions on climate smart agriculture here in Paris also provided insight into how different countries and regions are using the term. At a GACSA session hosted by the U.S. delegation, U.S. Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack touted both the agency’s soil health program and innovations in new drought and heat tolerant seeds (genetically engineered), greater efficiency in livestock production (referring to confined animal feeding operations) and precision agriculture (a term used to describe the more efficient use of inputs like fertilizers and pesticides in commodity crop production) as climate smart agriculture.

The Costa Rican Agriculture Minister, Luis Felipe Arauz Cavallini, had a different view. He emphasized the word “smart” in CSA—pointing out that this means it is a “knowledge-based” approach to agriculture. He highlighted efforts on agroecology, agroforestry and working within the local ecosystem to help farmers remain profitable while building climate resilience.

There were also sharp differences on how trade intersects with climate smart agriculture. Vilsack made the case, reinforced in a paper released by the agency this week, that increased trade from countries like the U.S. could help countries adapt to disruptions in agricultural production caused by climate change. (A new study by an MIT economist, also released this week, reached the opposite conclusion.) The Costa Rican Agriculture Minister, having been pressured earlier this year by the U.S. Trade Representative to drop his country’s ban on the cultivation of GMOs, stressed that advancing climate smart agriculture will require a re-thinking of trade rules—particularly the sharing of genetic resources. Many countries and the FAO have called for policies that integrate the sharing of genetic resources as an essential part of national climate plans. The Costa Rican minister urged the audience to read the 2013 UN Conference on Trade and Development report, Wake Up Before It’s Too Late, which called for a rethinking of trade rules as they relate to responding to climate change. (IATP contributed a chapter on trade liberalization, volatility and corporate concentration in agricultural markets.)

The absence of a clear definition and growing criticism by civil society of GACSA is starting to have an impact. At an event held about the African Climate Smart Agriculture Alliance, participants stressed that the initiative had nothing to do with GACSA. They described that effort as a bottom-up, implementation effort led by Africans. At the packed announcement of the French-led soil initiative we reported on earlier in the week, participants went to lengths to explain that this was not part of GACSA.

The larger concern with GACSA and “climate smart agriculture” is how it might be inserted within various climate policy mechanisms at the UNFCCC, the associated Green Climate Fund, the FAO and the World Bank—and various national and regional carbon markets. The U.S. Agency for International Development is already integrating “climate smart agriculture” within its programs.

Part of the push on “climate smart agriculture” seems to be an effort to drown out the rising support for agroecology coming from both scientists and social movements. Agroecology, with an established scientific grounding and general consensus of practice, also includes social elements and emphasizes the importance of farmers’ knowledge (particularly women) and community level empowerment. How agroecology and CSA might differ came up in multiple panels here in Paris. As a participant in the African discussion explained, “Agroecology is part of CSA, but not all of CSA is part of agroecology.”

One of the strengths of agroecology is that it has many other benefits besides climate resilience, including an emphasis on food sovereignty, food security and nutrition, and improving livelihoods of smaller scale farmers. Participants at an agroecology panel noted the inherent challenges of fitting the multidimensional aspects agroecology within the rigid, siloed UNFCCC framework of mitigation and adaptation. Climate smart agriculture doesn’t share that challenge. Without definition, it seems to fit anywhere. And that is the CSA's biggest asset for agribusiness—its branding opens the door for greenwashing while distracting from the more transformational changes that are needed to cope with climate change. 

Posted December 3, 2015 by Tara Ritter   


Global leaders are convening in Paris for the U.N. climate change conference. This two-week event is intended to result in a global climate agreement, with commitments from most of the world’s countries on how they will reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Closer to home, many rural communities in the U.S. are grappling with the same question of how to deal with climate change impacts. Rural America will be disproportionately impacted by climate change. On average, rural residents are more food and energy insecure and earn less than their urban counterparts, and rural communities are more likely to have natural resource-based economies than urban communities. However, rural America is home to a small enough percentage of the population that it’s often overlooked by policymakers.

In response to this problem, a group of rural organizations, leaders and experts in the U.S. outlined the challenges climate change poses to rural communities and a set of policy priorities. The document, entitled “Rural Climate Policy Priorities: Solutions from the Ground,” is endorsed by 23 organizations and outlines transformative and long-term policy approaches to climate change that encourage resilience, equity, democracy and local ownership and control.

The Rural Climate Policy Priorities outline climate solutions for multiple areas of rural communities and economies, including agriculture, conservation, education, energy, fisheries, forestry, health, infrastructure, recreation and tourism.

Although climate change impacts will challenge rural communities, rural America also holds the key to many of the climate solutions the world will depend upon. While only 18 percent of the U.S. population lives in rural areas, 84 percent of the country’s geography is rural. This means rural communities have the resources for renewable energy production; forests, farms and rangelands that can capture carbon when managed appropriately; and the people and ingenuity required for successfully transitioning to a low carbon economy.

Rural America has the potential to greatly benefit from climate change action if climate policy is inclusive of rural concerns. The Rural Climate Policy Priorities outline these concerns and put forth suggestions for climate policy that is inclusive of all communities.

The Rural Policy Priorities are available at: and

Posted December 2, 2015 by Ben Lilliston   

Paris – Yesterday at the global climate talks, France and about 30 other country leaders, research institutions and a handful of NGOs launched a much anticipated new initiative focused on researching and advancing efforts to sequester carbon in soil. The voluntary initiative, called 4 pour 1000, is not part of the official climate negotiations, which has largely ignored agriculture. And while the launch answered some questions about priorities – it left other important issues, like how the initiative will be financed and by whom, as well as the all-important questions of governance (particularly the role of farmers and civil society), for another time. 

France has been talking up the 4 pour 1000 initiative for much of 2015, meeting with NGOs (including IATP) and country representatives, and holding sessions at the Committee on World Food Security in and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification. The initiative has attracted growing interest because of the well-recognized need to focus on soil health in order to cope with climate-related impacts on agriculture. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) just completed a year’s worth of events around the International Year of Soils.

France has been playing a leadership role in a number of global agricultural issues – demonstrating support for a series of global symposiums on agroecology being held by the FAO, while also playing a leadership role within the much criticized, corporate-heavy Global Alliance on Climate Smart Agriculture (GACSA).

The heart of the 4 pour 1000 initiative is a research agenda focused on assessing carbon stocks and studying more deeply metrics and measurement of carbon sequestration. Initial funding is coming from the French Ministry of Research. French Agriculture Minister Stephane Le Foll said the next step would be around governance of the initiative, which should include farm groups, civil society, scientists and policy-makers. He hoped to establish a system of governance to oversee the initiative by the next UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP 22) in Marrakesh, Morocco in 2016. Le Foll also emphasized that the initiative could support countries in their climate pledges, (known as Intended Nationally Determined Contributions or INDCs), which are at the heart of a potential global climate deal. Around 80 percent of INDCs include references to agriculture – and Le Foll sees the 4 pour 1000 initiative as supporting agriculture-related projects and policies at the country-level.

Additional details of the 4 pour 1000 initiative were outlined by Francois Houllier, of INRA, the French scientific institute on agricultural research. Houllier emphasized the importance of tying soil health to food security. He stressed the need to integrate livestock production, agroforestry and water management. Improved soil quality could increase fertility and improve resilience against extreme weather. The 4 per 1000 name is derived from an estimate that some emissions from cars and land use could be offset through stopping climate damaging activities related to land use (i.e., deforestation), and increase our ability to sequester carbon in soils and forests. Houllier admitted that there is scientific uncertainty about what can be done with regards to both soil and forest sequestration – hence the need for more research through the initiative.

Frank Rijsberman of CGIAR – the global agricultural research consortium - expressed hope that this initiative could help put agriculture back on the map within the UNFCCC context, though he also acknowledged the considerable scientific challenges of measuring how carbon is stocked in agricultural soils and how long it will stay there. He announced that CGIAR will work with the international community over the next six months to develop research questions to better understand carbon in the soils.

One of the major questions about the initiative continues to be financing. At the initiative launch, the head of the Global Environment Fund, Dr. Naoko Ishii, said that GEF investments will support this initiative in the future. The GEF is the first financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, followed now by the Green Climate Fund. How this support from the GEF will be operationalized is unclear.

Other speakers at the initiative launch highlighted the need for better collaboration between researchers and farmers – but that has yet to happen. Instead, the initiative appears to have been developed largely from a scientific-research perspective – which typically reduces agriculture to narrow technical issues, rather than recognizing the realities for farmers and social and political issues around land use. Tim Groser, the Minister of Climate Change for New Zealand, typified this reductionist view. “We’ve seen agricultural scientists focus on increasing productivity,” commented Groser. “It’s only been over the last 10 years or so that we’ve asked them to integrate climate change into their work.”

Groser and Girish Sohani of BAIF Development Research Foundation did stress the need to integrate farmers into the initiative at the beginning of the process. But Sohani also emphasized that agricultural climate solutions will need to be appropriate for different locations – and deeply integrate traditional farmer knowledge from that location.   

Salah Lamouchi, of APAD in Tunisia, spoke of the challenges African farmers are facing from desertification and the need for a soil health investments that increase biomass and integrate livestock. The Agriculture Minister from Uruguay, Tabare Aguerre, gave a detailed presentation on how practices like managed grazing and rebuilding grasslands have restored degraded land, reduced emissions and sequestered carbon. He emphasized that more research was needed to better understand how to build soil health and sequester carbon.

One of the major questions about the French initiative has been whether it will fully support agroecology. Agroecology has seen growing support internationally by both scientists and social movements like Via Campesina – and includes not only agricultural practices but also social and political dimensions. Catherine Geslain-Laneelle, who is with the French Ministry of Agriculture, stressed yesterday that “agroecology is at the heart of this initiative.” Rijsberman of CGIAR also emphasized the important role of agroecology. But there was no mention of the social and political dimensions of agroecology at the 4 pour 1000 announcement.

Other country representatives attending the announcement and supporting the initiative included Germany, Australia, Poland, the United Kingdom, Mexico, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Japan, Estonia, and Slovenia. Other supporting institutions and NGOs at the event included the World Bank and the French research institute CIRAD, and International Federation of Organic Movements (IFOAM), the World Resources Institute, and the Center for Food Safety.

It’s worth noting several notable absences at the initiative announcement. The United States was not listed as a supporter of the initiative. While important soil health initiatives exist at the U.S. Department of Agriculture, they are woefully underfunded. It’s not clear why the U.S. has not supported the initiative, but it may have something to do with references to agroecology - a term the U.S. government appears to have concerns with.

Also notable was the absence of corporations, particularly agribusiness, which has played such a prominent role in developing the Global Alliance on Climate Smart Agriculture – and which has a notable presence here in in Paris.

The future success of the 4 pour 1000 initiative will likely hinge on how it sets up its governance structure (what real role will farmers and NGOs play?), and ultimately its relationship to carbon markets. Sequestering carbon dioxide in the soil through practices like no-till farming, cover crops and managed grazing have long been discussed within climate policy – but primarily within the context of carbon markets. As Carbon Market Watch outlined in a new report released this week, the inclusion of soil carbon offsets within carbon markets has a number of fundamental problems including: it’s difficult to measure precisely; it needs to be additional to what farmers were already doing; and the levels of carbon sequestered needs to be known long-term, and left permanently in the ground. IATP has reported in the past on 5 reasons why carbon markets won’t work for agriculture, and how such offset projects are not appropriate for small scale farmers and serve project developers more than participating farmers.

The policy intersection between agriculture and climate change is one we have to get right. Agriculture is already profoundly affected by climate change. It is also a major greenhouse gas emitter, and through agroecological practices, can help to sequester carbon. The 4 pour 1000 initiative is right to focus on the critical role of soil health in responding to climate change. But future success of the initiative will depend largely on who will lead it. Will it be primarily scientist-led, or will it have a shared leadership that recognizes farmer knowledge and civil society concerns around land rights? Ultimately, the initiative must embrace all the dimensions of agroecology, including its emphasis on farm and community power and control.

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