Christoph Rohloff

Paper presented at the 18^th General International Peace Research Association (IPRA) Conference, 5-9 August 2000, Tampere Finland

There is a growing syndrome-like complexity of transboundary problems that call for global attention and regulation. These global syndromes involve state- and diverse non-state-actors who interact diametrically across the classic intra- and interstate dividing lines of traditional policy analysis. In response to this increase in complexity, Global Governance is a frequently cited conceptual framework that links the local, national and international actors and levels of political action (CGG 1999, 1995; Messner/Nuscheler 1996: 19; Rosenau/Czempiel 1992). It claims to provide theoretical, empirical and normative dimensions (Mürle 1998: 6). Global Governance is attractive to both, IR-researchers and peace-theorists; it claims to capture the growing global disparities and contradictions, to reduce complexity, to accept and integrate the diverse actors and to advance the normative ethos of the "one world". In sum, these characteristics justify the aim of this article: to critically review the most prominent peace strategy within the community of peace- and conflict-researchers, i.e. the democratic peace-theorem, and, in this context, to consider the additional potentials and advantages of Global Governance as a comprehensive and global peace project. Two arguments will be developed: First, democratization on the one hand and global structure-building on the other are of equal, mutually supportive and complementary importance for a global peace strategy; and second, this complementary effect can only be reached by a strategy of common security that runs contrary to the current Western security and defense plans.

The starting point for the construction of Global Governance as a peace project is the assumption, that peace and security are the basis for any society's development. As such, peace and security need an accountable and reliable regulatory mechanism. Yet, the current structure for the maintenance of peace and security, i.e. the existing UN-system, is inapt to meet today's and the future's challenges and risks in an era of simultaneously growing global integration and disparities. This is not to suggest, that Global Governance had all the answers. A functioning Global Governance-architecture is but slowly emerging in the form of international regimes and world conferences. Besides the meager empirical evidence of global structure-building, the concept of global governance has open theoretical flanks, i.e. the uncertain democratic legitimacy of such an architecture and its speculative ability to generate and guarantee more social justice (Wolf 1999: 336).

Among many, three empirical findings shall be presented to substantiate the stated inadequacy of the current mechanisms for the maintenance of peace and security and to underline the need for fundamental improvements in the direction of global governing structures.

(1) Security threats for world peace in the twenty-first century will be different from those at the foundation of the UN in 1945. The main threat for peace will no longer come from aggressive nation states, which forms the security scenario of the realistic school of international relations (Morgenthau 1963, Waltz 1979), but rather from local and regional distributive conflicts over subsistence resources, migration and ethno-politicized and privatized violence, from organized crime, drug trafficking, epidemics and natural catastrophes (Wellershoff 1999). The policy fields, which are affected most by these threats, are children, women, education, nutrition, population, habitation, all topics of the series of world conferences that can be interpreted as the beginnings of a global governance architecture. Within the paradigms of the realistic school, they are still labeled "soft issues" and belong to the realm of "low politics". The argument is, that many of these "soft issues" will in time enter the so-called "high politics". Territorial integrity and political independence will in turn fall from the top positions of the international Westphalian-type security agenda. In the face of this growing discrepancy between an outdated conceptual security framework and diffusing international threat scenarios, Weidenfeld (1999: 8) rightly calls for a "farewell from Metternich" and urges the peace- and conflict researchers to come up with new concepts and strategies for a global peace regime.

(2) The occurrence of a series of world conferences in the 1990s is a laudable accomplishment of states and civil society pulling on one string. Yet, the conference declarations lack the teeth of a reliable international mechanism for the implementation and verification of the negotiated agreements (Hamm/Fues 2000: 201). These agreements will remain appellative in character as long as the "normative integration of the state-world" (Brock 1999: 340) in the field of peace and security lags so severely behind the regime-building processes in other transboundary policy fields. Seen from a functionalist perspective, a global peace- and security regime should work independently from the political system of both, the deviant and the rule-enforcing states. This does not revoke the need for further democratization of today's authoritative states. Democratic states are by empirical evidence better prepared to implement human rights norms and to practice good governance than authoritarian systems, and the drive for the universal codification of normative principles, rules and regulations comes by and large from the societies and administrations of Western-type democratic states. Yet, democratic states do not automatically implement international norms that were agreed on in world conferences. Especially the US as the only remaining superpower after the end of the East-West conflict is reluctant to be bound by international agreements and quasi-supranational institutionalization processes (Müller 2000: 45) and, e.g. in the case of adopting the Kyoto-protocol or the statute of the International Criminal Court, severely hinders the further evolution of global governing structures.

(3) The need for reform of the current global peace- and security-structures also becomes apparent in light of the re-marginalization of the UN Security Council after its short-lived renaissance at the end of the East-West conflict, and, in the case of NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the explicit disregard of the UN Security Council. This trend will not be stopped by simply appealing to the hegemon's good will (Debiel 2000: 35). The announcement by the US to end its resistance against a reform of the UN Security Council - contrary to its positive first-sight impression - may be just another indicator for its sharply reduced importance as a future conflict-resolver. Instead of strengthening collective and non-offensive security organizations like the UN or the OSCE, NATO-members try to build up their defense alliance into an umbrella organization to overarch various subordinated security arrangements, i.e. the emerging European Security and Defense Policy or the bilateral agreements of NATO- and EU-states with its Eastern European and Central Asian partners. NATO is thereby claiming its right to intervene beyond its own defense perimeter, if necessary without a UN-mandate.

Having sketched some deficits of peace- and security-regulation at the beginning of the twenty-first century, what are the offerings from current peace research?

Despite many monitions (Galtung 1996; Matthies 1996; Meyers 1996; Vogt 1997; Senghaas 1997), there is still no comprehensive peace strategy, let alone a peace theory with global dimensions and the claim to order, understand and explain the current changes in world politics after the end of the East-West conflict.

In this void, Schrader (2000: 208) takes on NATO's intervention into Kosovo and Serbia and describes it as a "deep incision in international politics". From a peace-theoretical point of view, the intervention, according to him, reveals the narrowness of the traditional theoretical approaches in IR, namely political realism and liberal institutionalism. These approaches remain one-sided and rely overly on the ordering effect of power and, respectively, law. As such, they are unable, for instance, to solve the inner contradictions of the democratic peace-theorem, that is based on the strict adherence of all members of the international system to the existing rules - in the case of Kosovo, the UN-Security Council's prerogative to mandate the use of force in international relations. Even an extensive interpretation of Article 2(4) of the UN-Charter would not necessarily come to the conclusion that, for the sake of human rights, the principle of non-violence in international relations should be sacrificed. Equally for the realist's paradigm, which revolves around the states' drive for power and prestige, the Kosovo war promised no spoils that would make a realist's argument sound plausible. Schrader ends his analysis with a call for a Galtung-like "peace through culture". Power and law will remain useful categories in the analysis of international relations and state behavior; yet, according to Schrader, they are no longer corner stones of a functioning international "peace-system" (Mitrany 1943).

This conclusion ties up to an equally fundamental demand put forward by Vogt (1995): He recalled the lack of a sufficient and incoherent theoretical founding of peace- and conflict research. According to him, it was the end of the East-West conflict, that signified the chance for peace researchers to fill the "theoretical void" that was caused by the four decades of the East-West conflict and its, in the very sense of the word, block-thinking. This void should be filled by re-discovering the "critical-emancipatory founding years of peace research in the 1960s and 70s" (Vogt 1995: 13). In the context of Elias' understanding of "civilizing processes" (Elias 1994), Vogt uses a process-oriented understanding of "civilization" and defines the term as a triad of reduction of violence, regulation of conflicts and structuring of peace. In sum, the aim is to end up with a "positive civilizational balance" (Vogt 1995: 29). As the decisive strategic tool to overcome the conceded civilizational contradictions - Nazi-barbarism as one example - Vogt offers old wine in new skins: demilitarization, development, democracy and the rule of law. His call for a critical and reflexive theory of civilizing processes that integrates the loose strings of peace theory-building received little attention so far (Vogt 1996: 72).

Another open question in the debate on civilizational processes is the transferability of the European integration project. Is it a unique historic experience, a coincidence, that was made possible only by the moral imperatives after two World Wars and under the US-American nuclear umbrella or is it a functional arrangement that can be repeated elsewhere merely under the condition of a sufficient economic growth? In this debate, Senghaas arranged six cornerstones of the European post-war peace project into a "civilizational hexagon". The six corners, which he derived from historical European experience, are the state monopoly on the use of force, the rule of law, democratic participation, social balancing and welfare, interdependencies and affective control as well as the emergence of a constructive conflict culture (Senghaas 1995: 40). Whereas this hexagonal construction of European peace-essentials is helpful to reflect on the long road to European peace and to detect regressive tendencies, it seems difficult to imagine an analogous transfer of one, some or all cornerstones to other world-regions or onto a global scale (Wellmann 1996). Even a negative and minimalist inversion of the hexagon in the form of protection from distress and chauvinism seems inadequate to unfold the theoretical richness and presriptivism needed for a global, supra-European peace-strategy. It remains to be seen whether the European integration - seen as a civilizational process - will come to an end once the Easter European states will have been fully integrated into the EU or whether the subsequent neighbors, e.g. the eastern and southern Mediterranean states or other world regions, like western, eastern or southern Africa will produce comparable zones of peace. The lessons to learn from the Stability-Pact for Southeastern Europe will provide some of the answers to the puzzle of exporting stability (Rohloff 2000: 146). Senghaas (1990) clearly rejects any cheeky eurocentrism in his writings; instead, he wants the European experience to be understood as an offer to other world regions. While the modernization and globalization processes will certainly lead to a more integrated world, the possible local and regional answers to reliable conflict resolution cultures will remain diverse. Yet, the need to find meta-rules for conflict resolution that fulfill those functions analogously to the European consensus is undisputed.

In the end, the cited civilizational theses are based on the assumption of an overall positive modernization process. The democratic peace-theorem is based on the same assumption, i.e. rationality, rule of law and political participation, the heritage of the 18^th century age of enlightenment. It is widely accepted within the community of peace and conflict researchers that the ability of a society to keep the inner and outer peace is closely related to its political system, i.e. to a successful western-type democratization. This democratization is interpreted as a part of a wider modernizing and civilizing process which, throughout the centuries, had been by and large violent and in opposition to the existing political regimes (Senghaas 1998). Despite the violent evolution of Western democratization processes, internal democratization is still believed to be causally linked to inner and outer peacefulness. The Janus-headed finding of war-prone or war-able democracies dampens this optimistic outlook. Democracies are able and willing, if provoked, to resort to war in as many cases as non-democracies (Pfetsch/Rohloff 2000). The democratic peace-theorem seems to holds true, at least in this crude form, only for inter-democratic conflicts - a phenomenon, that has been plausibly explained by the ability of democracies to stimulate reciprocally positive expectations and cooperative patterns of behavior (Risse-Kappen 1994; Debiel 1995).

The high hopes into global peace through democratization and civilizational evolutions seemed to be well justified at the end of the East-West conflict and in the light of the peaceful revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe and, more sporadic, in Africa. The democratic peace-theorem in the form of the European integration process has proven to be a flexible and reliable peace project for war-torn western Europe and its eastern periphery. It is as such no surprise that one of the biggest German peace research centers, the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), places the democratic peace-theorem in the center of its study program for the new millennium as the peace-strategic topos. Yet, the case, that democracy and peace in Europe after 1945 were not in a directly causal, but in a coincidental or contingent relation, remains off focus.

This line of thought leads to another open flank of the democratic peace-theorem, the existence of undemocratic regions of peace. In a study on democratization processes in Latin America, Brock concludes that "the international political implications of democratization are dependent as much on the domestic power play unleashed by democratization as on the international milieu in which democratization takes place" (Brock 1997:16). In other words, for a successful process of internal democratization, it is necessary, for the international system to be functioning and reliable. Its norms and principles should not be undermined or questioned by the leading members.

Yet, the rules and principles of the international system are increasingly endangered to be neglected or broken by exactly those democracies that wrote them into the UN-Charter in 1945. While it is true with Mearsheimer (1990) that the East-West conflict had an overall pacifying or restraining effect on the violent resolution of interstate conflicts (see figure 1), this positive tendency, that has continued from the end of the East-West conflict, could well be reversed in the future: Interstate violence could return and entangle Western democracies in their efforts to handle and fight organized crime, drug traffickers and private gang wars over precious resources, e.g. diamonds, or in order to end gross human right violations.

In addition to the inner contradictions of the democratic peace-theorem as outlined above, two of its central premises are changing, one as a consequence of globalization processes, the other as a consequence of the end of the East-West conflict.

The first premise concerns the decreasing range and efficiency of instruments at the hands of the state within the globalization process. In turn, this tendency undermines the states' democratic legitimacy and its traditional raison d'être. In the end, it has to be asked, whether the democratic peace theorem in its traditional and nationally limited form can still preserve its conflict resolution and legitimating functions in an era of internationalization and transboundary actors and problems. Besides the risks that globalization in general poses to the still relatively closed, territorially defined democratic political systems, they may equally be one of the causal factors of global syndromes and potentially violent conflict constellations. This is the case when problems and conflicts, that are difficult to communicate and that cause greater political costs at the expense of the voters' favor, are being externalized either into the future or into Third World countries. Democratic theory has since long pointed to this phenomenon. In the era of globalization, its potential as a cause for violent conflict constellations is probably underestimated.

The second premise of the democratic peace-theorem in the European context, that has changed with the end of the East-West conflict, relates to the actors' level of analysis, i.e. the decreasing relevance of the US for European security. In the Bosnian war between 1992 and 1995, the European Union was neither capable to engage in combat against the militias nor was it able to act as a power mediator at the negotiation table. In the end, the EU was grateful for the US-led NATO-intervention that stopped the Serb dominance on the ground and led to a negotiated agreement in Dayton. When war broke out over Kosovo, the EU perceived the US-led intervention quite differently; the EU-states complained about the military dependency from the US and quickly decided on a unified European command for the handling of future crises. Through its securitization, the EU is claiming to play the role of a military potent and responsible actor in global security politics. It is this shift from an economic union to a militarily potent guarantor of peace and security for a larger Europe, that bears great risks. The EU has diverted from its former decade-long functionalist logic that continuously led from economic to a closer political integration. This economic functionalism is now being undermined and possibly displaced by the logic of a common security community (Kamppeter 2000). By militarizing Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy, Europe takes the risk to expose itself to those security dilemmas that it had successfully overcome over the past five decades. Besides, the concept of Europe as a militarily secured fortress advances the division in European thinking about peace into an exclusive EU-peace and an rather arbitrary outside-peace.

In the light of the outlined discussion on the civilizational approach and the democratic peace-theorem, the revival of Kant's democratic peace-theorem at the occasion of its bicentennial in 1995 as Europe's central peace strategy might have been but a process of self-finding and re-orientation after the end of the East-West-conflict and in reaction to Europe's failure to prevent the outbreak of war. The hopes for a universal and perpetual peace, as envisioned by Kant in his "Perpetual Peace" as well as by many in the peace- and conflict research community in the early and mid 1990s, have not led to a realistic peace strategy, let alone an integrated peace-theory. If European thinking about peace remains bound to its own historical experience, i.e. the unidirectional strategy from internal to international peace, and if it ignores the possible complementary character of both international order and internal democratization, the consequences of a re-anarchizing international order in combination with the dissociative consequences of globalization may backlash to Europe and undermine and erode the foundations of its own peace project while many Third World regions remain as marginalized as before.

In a second step, I will now explore into some of the potentials of global governance as a framework for the building of a more comprehensive and relevant peace-strategy, i.e. common security.

The first question that arises concerns the understanding of security in the context of global governance. Proponents of global governance are convinced that globalization processes are relevant to security, and they doubt the explanatory potential of the traditional approaches in political science for the causes and consequences of globalization (Messner 2000: 88; Witte/Reinicke/Benner 2000: 176). In contrast, to the traditional approaches in political science, i.e. realism and liberal institutionalism, global governance as an analytical concept has not developed directly from peace-strategic or security-related concerns. Global Governance understands itself rather as a balancing, regulating and ordering framework for unforeseen or unwanted consequences of the, by and large, technological and economic globalization process. It wants to transform the manifold constructive and harmful dynamics of globalization into politically controllable norms and procedures. A charging of "globalization" as imminently relevant to security is not automatically implied by this (Siedschlag 1999: 1). A securitization of formerly low-key policy issues has occurred, for example, in the debate on the relations between environment, violent conflict and security (Carius/Imbusch 1998: 8f.). Yet, the use of an ever-broadening understanding of security and security-relevant issues, can be counter-productive: for theoretical purposes, it blunts the operational use of the word and, for practical purposes, it blurs the difference between everyday societal and political problems to be resolved within the given political system and existential threats that endanger the system itself.

How then should security be understood in the context of global governance? Where and how do issues of concern for global governance get on the security agenda? The proposition is, that global governance should not derive its relevance for security and peace from the construction of ever new threat scenarios deduced from the dynamics of globalization. This would put the case for a further securitization of politics. Instead, it should tap into its potential as a conceptual framework for those problems, that can no longer be solved at the national level. The threshold within global governance, where transboundary problems become relevant security issues, is at the point, where the capacity for international problem-solving is exhausted. Security and international peace are, in this sense, a function of negotiation-, cooperation- and problem-solving capacities at the international level.

This definition corresponds at the international level with the configurative logic of the aforementioned "civilizational hexagon" at the national level. Senghaas' hexagon molded its corner-stones at those points where the European societal and political conflicts reached a point that would either lead to civil war or to a consensus on a new meta-rule for conflict resolution, e.g. democratic participation as a meta-rule for political power conflicts or social welfare for class and working conflicts.

Which are, then, transboundary problems that could cause the current international system to sway? Where is the most urgent need for new meta-rules within a global governance framework? At least three fields of concern should be mentioned: First, the growing tension between the international guarantee of human rights standards and the principle of non-intervention guaranteed by the UN-Charter; second, the growing tension between economic growth needed for development and environmental degradation and global climate change; and third, the risks that follow from a neo-liberal free market strategy without fiscal and trade controls. Security in the line of Global Governance refers, to sum it up, neither to a deterrent concept based on the realist paradigm of power-seeking territorial states nor to normative concept in the sense of the liberal tradition that appeals to the rule of law and reason. It is rather the pragmatic attempt to delimit the risks that derive from a lack of meta-rules for an increasing number of transboundary and cross-level problems.

What are existing institutions and frameworks that could take on the security challenges as defined above? Since 1945, the main responsibility for the maintenance of international security and world peace lies by the UN Security Council. It understands itself not as a judicial or executive, but mainly a political organ. A consensus of its permanent members and, in consequence, the Council's ability to act, is dependent on their political will and structurally unstable. Even gross and systematic violations of human rights cannot automatically evoke a consensus among the permanent five members - despite the fact that the UN came about as an anti-Hitler coalition.

Despite the insufficient institutional regulation of "peace and security" as global policy fields, the practice of the five permanent members has led to a quasi-monopoly by the Security Council on mandates for peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions under Chapter VII of the UN-Charter. This mandating authority falls behind a true monopoly on the use of force which was envisioned in 1945 and which was brought up again by former Secretary-General Bouthros Ghali as stand-by forces in his "Agenda for Peace" (1992). The monopoly on mandates functioned mainly ex negativo, out of fear of one block-member to collide with the interests of one of the other block. This fear led to the practice that non-mandated interventions and internal conflicts of any of the permanent five members were, by the power of the veto, kept off the Council's agenda. On the positive side, the Council was able to cultivate the instrument of observer-, monitoring- and peace-keeping missions that reached, in terms of number of missions, people and resources involved, a climax in 1992. After the debacles in Somalia and Bosnia, the number of missions has dropped sharply and finally led to the reverse course in 1999, the self-mandating of NATO to bomb Serbian military targets. The end of the Cold War-peace (Mearsheimer 1990) and the related end to the existential constraint of coexistence during the nuclear arms race opened the possibility to undermine and circumvent the UN Security Council's monopoly on mandates. Although Kirste and Maull (1996) have shown by help of the role-theory that states, in their case Germany after its unification, do not necessarily recur to self-help and egoistic power accumulation, if the opportunity to do so arises, the US as the only and lonely superpower has in fact returned to the realistic expectation of a non-cooperative hegemon that rejects to be bound by international agreements. A reform of the UN Security Council to fulfill its originally envisioned role and to keep a hegemon from dominating the international system is, as of today, not in sight.

At the same time, many international conflicts have been regulated below and besides the UN Security Council. Corresponding to various political climates, the terms "peace and security" were functionalized to suit corresponding doctrines. In light of the prescriptive charging of international law through the UN Charter of 1945 towards world peace, justice, non-discrimination and human rights, this politicization of a formerly "neutral" international law is not surprising and at times desirably when it enables the further development of the peace-strategic potentials in the UN Charter.

The UN, for instance, took responsibility in the process of codifying and widening human rights standards by the General Declaration in 1948, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Annual reports by the signatory states are to ensure the implementation of the obligations. Besides the UN-based agreements, human rights have played a major role in regional integration projects and confidence-building measures, e.g. in the CSCE-process. Many of the topics, that are today still limited to world conferences and that lack the teeth of verifiable implementation and sanctioning mechanisms, will in the near future, as a prognosis, mature to full-fledged institutionalized and regulated international topics. On the other hand, human rights were repeatedly mobilized for certain political goals, e.g. by the US during the 1950s in the ideological confrontation between the superpowers, in the late 1970s during the Carter-administration as a re-orientation of American foreign policy standards after the Vietnam war debacle and, most recently, as a legitimation for NATO's war against Serbia.

The conclusion from this cursory overview must remain ambivalent: On the one hand, there is an increasing differentiation, codification, regulation and institutionalization at the international level for an increasing number of formerly ignored or low-keyed policy fields, especially in the fields of human rights and environment. This tendency could be used in support of the institutionalization of international policy fields along global governance structures, i.e. integrated multi-level regimes involving state- and non-state-actors alike. On the other hand, these structures are still fragile and incoherent; and they depend on the hegemon's will to cooperate.

Concerning the formation of a consensus on peace and security as a global policy issue, that can only in limited parts be delegated to regional organizations, the developments after the Kosovo-intervention are rather regressive. After the northern hemisphere has spent many of its material and intellectual resources to win the ideological battle of communism versus capitalism during the East-West conflict, the great old powers have clearly missed their goal for a new world order and are now again on the track to build defensive fortresses in the US and the EU against a southern hemisphere that is, in terms of national security, perceived as threatening and hostile. A comprehensive security arrangement for both, North and South, let alone a debate on this issue, is not in sight. The debates on an American missile defense system and the European security and defense identity show that these northern debates will again supersede the need for an integrated southern perspective on stable and secure peace structures.

The limitations of the current democratic peace strategy, that will remain a basically Euro-centered project, and the long road towards a consensus on a common security concept based on a global governance structure might be best illustrated by an analogy: Beginning in the late 1960s, the East-West conflict and the logic of mutual deterrence was hollowed out and eventually overcome by the very logic of "common security" and "confidence building measures" within the Helsinki process. Today, the functional logic of "common security" can be adopted from the East-West conflict to the North-South disparities. The driving force behind the Helsinki-process was the risk of a nuclear escalation; the driving force behind a common security arrangement along the topics of the current world conferences could be the risk of an ecological collapse from unsustainable ways of living and economic reproduction or the risks from an re-anarchization of the international system. Both form an ultima ratio that can create the willingness to cooperate and the dynamics for a successful negotiation process that even a hegemon cannot ignore. In this sense, Global Governance can serve as a framework for a peace project based on common security.

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