by Consumers International

Consumers and the Global Market
Consumidores y Mercado Global
Les Consommateurs et le Marché Mondial

This report has been produced as part of Consumers International’s Consumer and the Global Market programme (see About Consumers International on page 29) which is supported by the Ford Foundation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands, Oxfam and the European Commission.

The report was compiled by Jonathan Charles with Amy Longrigg and edited by Alina Tugend.

The views contained in this report should not be seen as the definitive position of Consumers International. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the official policies of the funding partners.

ISBN 1 902391 37 3
Copyright Consumers International © 2001

Access to food is the most fundamental consumer right. Assuring a reliable supply of safe, nutritious and affordable food should be the starting point for any discussion on the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), the World Trade Organisation’s agreement for increasing international trade in farm products and processed foods.

Consumers International (CI) supports efforts to increase global supplies of nutritious, safe and affordable foods, especially to vulnerable consumers. Solely removing or lowering barriers to trade, however, cannot achieve that noble goal. Studies commissioned by CI as part of its Consumers and the Global Market (CGM) programme have found that liberalised trade has not always worked to the net benefit of consumers, particularly consumers who are poor or live in rural areas. The problems documented in these reports show how the AoA should be read, reviewed and ultimately amended and improved in the forthcoming negotiations.

The case studies were carried out by consumer organisations in 13 developing and transition economies from Poland to Pakistan. In some countries, for instance, liberalised food imports have resulted in a flood of unnaturally cheap imports that has driven small local farmers out of business. These imports are often subsidised during their production in the European Union (EU) and United States (US) and then further subsidised as exports. Export opportunities, which are often cited as a potential benefit to local farmers, have been limited as levels of protection in the markets of the EU and US remain high.

Consumer groups in developing countries have found that the limited benefits from trade liberalisation under the AoA have tended to accrue to larger and better-capitalised farms rather than to the farmers with smallholdings. These problems are exaggerated by the global slump in prices for coffee, cocoa, maize and most other commodities.

As a result, many small farmers face financial ruin and the potential loss of their land, an eventuality that locks them into poverty while also denying them the means to feed themselves and their families.

Such losses affect not only those farmers immediately concerned. Agriculture accounts for more than two-thirds of the jobs in low-income countries, more than one-third of all economic activity and more than one-third of all exports. With their purchasing power seriously affected, many consumers, especially the most vulnerable ones, experience reduced access to food as a result of these changes.

At the same time, imports have exposed consumers to some products they may not want to eat, notably genetically modified (GM) maize and soy. Often, consumers are not notified the grains have been altered. Some countries have temporarily banned the import of GM foods, although the government has allowed some modified grains to enter the country when they are donated as part of international aid programmes.

Consumers also face the danger of foods that may have spoiled in transit, been banned as unfit elsewhere or are otherwise unsafe because such countries often lack the monitoring and regulatory capacity to assure that imports are wholesome.

In light of the problems uncovered by Consumers International’s country case studies, the AoA should be modified to expand and protect consumers’ interests. This can be done by:

• Making markets in developed countries more accessible to food exports from developing countries by reducing tariffs and eliminating tariff escalation.
• Encouraging fair competition in the global market by developed countries eliminating export subsidies and credits and reducing domestic subsidies.
• Encouraging domestic production in developing countries.
• Offering technical assistance where required to improve production levels and quality.
• Improving the setting, monitoring and enforcement of safety standards.
• Clearly labelling genetically modified food.

The research conducted by consumer groups around the world shows that liberalising international trade in food affects people, particularly those in developing countries, in very basic ways that are not always easy to predict but which can tear the fabric of society. In proceeding with the Agreement on Agriculture, the WTO should give full measure to how such changes disrupt lives and wrench economies in the short run, as well as considering how it might improve lives and benefit economies in the future.

Drawing on 13 country studies conducted for Consumers International by local non-governmental organisations around the world, this report will explain how the World Trade Organisation’s trade rules on foodstuffs, called the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), affects consumers. It will also outline the positions taken by different countries in the continuing agriculture negotiations within the WTO. This report will then show how agricultural liberalisation has affected consumers in different countries, and recommend how the agricultural negotiations within the WTO might proceed to best meet the interests of the world’s consumers. As part of Consumers International’s Consumers and the Global Market programme, this report focuses on the experiences of consumers who are living with liberalised agricultural trade in Bolivia, Brazil, Chad, Fiji, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, South Korea, Ukraine and Zambia.

The first consumer right is access to basic goods and services, so a reliable source of enough safe food is paramount to the consumer movement. Whether consumers get as much food as they need depends on whether food is available and, just as important, whether it is affordable.

Availability and affordability are determined by many factors, some of which are affected by trade liberalisation. This is why the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture is of key interest to Consumers International.

The AoA can threaten the amount of safe food available to consumers in several ways. Governments may not be able to import sufficient quantities of food because of rising prices abroad or a shortage of cash at home. At the same time, countries may not produce enough goods domestically because of a decrease in government support or because imports have discouraged domestic production. Cuts in food aid from other countries also can make it difficult for national governments to meet consumer demand.

Even when food supplies appear to be adequate, consumers may not get enough to eat for any of several reasons. Food may not be affordable either because it is too expensive or because consumers are too poor to pay world market prices. Growing staple crops is an option, but that may also prove too expensive if free trade encourages farmers in developing countries to rely on imported seed, fertiliser or other agricultural input materials sold at world market prices. Government price ceilings or other forms of intervention could ameliorate some of these problems, but such state actions may be problematic under the terms of the AoA.

The impact on consumers, as reported by consumer groups in the case studies commissioned by Consumers International, illustrate what it is like to live under the AoA and agricultural liberalisation in general. These portraits will provide a basis for recommendations for the future of the Agreement on Agriculture.

Agricultural liberalisation and the AoA do not affect consumers simply in terms of the range, quality and prices of consumer goods. The relationships are more complex. They also, for example, involve issues like purchasing power -- a measure of income relative to food prices, not just food prices themselves.

The relationships are even more complex for farmers, who are often a majority of the people in the least-developed countries. They are also affected by the prices at which they can sell their crops, as well as how much they must pay for agricultural inputs -- the seed, fertiliser and other agricultural chemicals they must buy to produce those crops in the first place. For landless rural and poor urban consumers, purchasing power is not just derived from prices but also from the availability and stability of paid work, and the amount of money received for that work.

The impact of changes in agricultural policy is disproportionately large in developing countries. In Kenya and Mali, for example, the agricultural sector plays a dominant role, not only in producing food but also in employing people and earning foreign exchange. Although the agricultural sector is important in developed countries, it is not comparable in term of the impact on consumers’ food security and on the economy as a whole.

In low-income countries, agriculture employs more than 70% of the population, in middle-income countries it employs 30% and in high-income countries only 4%. Between 1990 and 1996, agriculture accounted for 34% of GDP in low-income countries, 8% in middle-income countries and 1.5% in high-income countries. Agriculture supplies the least developed countries (LDCs) with 34% of their exports, compared with 8.3% for developed countries.

Many of the 13 countries analysed here are low-income countries such as Chad, where about 70% of the population are primarily employed in agriculture, and Mali, where 40% of GDP comes from agriculture. It also discusses the case of OECD countries such as Poland and South Korea, where agriculture accounts for just 6% of GDP.

Adding to the importance of agriculture in developing countries is that poorer consumers spend a larger proportion of their income on food, making consumers more vulnerable to higher prices and lower incomes.

These are not theoretical concerns. Despite a consistent global surplus of food production in recent years, 800 million people are malnourished. In Bolivia, for example, around 40% of the urban population and 60% of the rural population do not have access to an adequate food supply.

Employment, national income and exports are not the only ways to gauge the effect of agricultural liberalisation on consumers or to outline the appropriate policy priorities for consumers in future negotiations. Domestic production is also important.

Domestic production, including subsistence farming, is a key source of food for much of the world’s population. In poorer, agriculture-based economies, it is usually more reliable than trade-based sources of food because it provides jobs and does not depend on volatile foreign exchange rates and fluctuating world market prices. The AoA should encourage national governments to pursue domestic agricultural development and give governments the ability to restrict imports if they act as disincentives to domestic production.

The AoA’s effect on domestic production can be measured in many ways, including:

• Levels of food imports and self-sufficiency in food staples.
• Production subsidies before and after trade liberalisation.
• Tariff levels and types for different commodities before and after liberalisation.
• The degree to which imported seed, fertiliser and other inputs are used.
• Rainfall and vulnerability to drought and floods.
• Market structures in domestic agricultural production.
• Access to credit by commercial farmers and small farmers; men and women; remote localities and those close to urban centres.
• Land scarcity and distribution.
• Consumer’s access to food through trade.

The degree to which the AoA and agricultural-trade liberalisation generally will affect any particular country depends on many factors. The importance of trade as a proportion of GDP is one example. Others are the diversity of a country’s agricultural exports and its trading partners, and differences in domestic price support and export subsidies to both trading partners and competitors.

The more dependent a country is on exports as a source of foreign exchange and jobs, the more important it is to improve the country’s access to export markets and to raise the competitiveness of all of its food producers, regardless of size. The AoA can help to do this in several ways, including:

• Reduce tariff barriers in developed economies.
• Make it easier to comply with import quality regulations.
• Harmonise levels of domestic support and export subsidies for all producers.
• Promote equal access to export markets so small producers can compete.

The AoA also could be the framework to discuss how agricultural trade liberalisation could be used to promote other consumer rights, such as food safety, choice and labelling. Negotiators could, for example, review whether liberalisation has increased the variety of foods available for everyone or only for affluent consumers, and whether increased trade has improved food-safety standards for domestic stocks as well as exports.

The country case studies in this report cover a wide range of consumers: urban and rural, net buyers of food and net sellers. The consumers all use different methods to obtain food and therefore they are affected differently by international trade policies and how those policies change circumstance at the local level.

For the small farmer who sells to the markets and then buys the majority of household goods, purchasing power is determined by how much is spent to grow crops, how much the produce fetches in the market and the cost of foodstuffs and other goods that the farmer then buys. For the landless or the urban poor, purchasing power is not just derived from prices but also from the availability of paid work, and the amount of money received for that work. Some small-scale farmers buy almost all of the food for themselves and their families after choosing or being forced to sell their cash crops at harvest time. Others grow food for themselves and sell what they do not eat, or rely on outside work to supplement meagre harvests or income from uneconomical plots. Some are largely self-sufficient with little contact with the market place.

Traders and moneylenders also affect how individuals are able to respond to the changes prompted by agricultural liberalisation, the studies commissioned by Consumers International have found. In Indonesia, for example, the prices that villages received for palm oil varied widely based on the relationships of producers and traders. In some villages, the producers bargained collectively with a divided group of traders, while in others the traders formed a cohesive unit that is able to pay the producers lower prices. In some cases, when wholesale prices fall, local brokers maintain consumer prices at the same level, while they tend to immediately pass on any price increase to consumers.

Credit can be decisive in determining how well consumers adapt to the new opportunities presented by liberalisation, but access to credit varies widely. Credit may be more readily available to men than to women, to commercial farmers than to low-income resource-poor farmers, more to those near urban centres than to those in remote areas.

This report focuses on the most vulnerable consumers, because they risk losing their most basic consumer right: safe and affordable food. Generally, the most vulnerable consumers are in the developing world, and they are most likely to be small farmers. For this reason, some of the recommendations of this report are aimed at helping small farmers in developing countries.

This report is concerned with the relationships between both the AoA and the wider processes of agricultural liberalisation. Many of the countries mentioned in this report already meet the AoA’s requirements to be open to imports and to avoid high subsides. This is often as a result of International Monetary Fund/World Bank structural adjustment programmes implemented in the 1980s and 1990s, but also as a result of a number of other bilateral and multilateral agreements. North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is an example of one of the many multilateral trade agreements that have had major impacts on consumers. As a result of different and sometimes overlapping agreements, it is difficult to isolate the impacts of the AoA from trade liberalisation in general. In South Korea, for example, trade in more than 80% of commodities had been liberalised before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, although key commodities have been liberalised since. It is in relation to these specific AoA-related measures that clear links can be made between consumers and the position of consumers.

While the Agreement on Agriculture is not singularly responsible for the liberalisation of trade in agriculture, it has made a significant contribution to the process. The AoA has, through the binding commitments of WTO members, "locked in" the liberal trade policies of countries for the indefinite future. Many of the changes made in the name of "structural reform" and "stabilisation policies" are now the everyday policy of national governments.

Other factors also make analysis difficult. These include droughts, political instability (such as that in Fiji in 2000), and economic instability (such as that prompted by the East Asia crash in 1997). This report tries to take these differences into account when analysing national case studies, and seeks common threads in the AoA and agricultural liberalisation that concern consumers regardless of differing national contexts.

The Uruguay Round marked the first serious attempt to include the agricultural sector in the multilateral trade reforms, with the end result being the Agreement on Agriculture.

The Agreement focuses on three main issues: market access (getting member countries to import at least a small proportion of their agricultural needs), domestic support (reducing subsidies to domestic producers) and export competition (limiting the distortions in agricultural trade caused by government intervention and subsidies).

Market access: Under the Agreement on Agriculture, all non-tariff border measures (with the exception of those products for which special treatment had been negotiated) were converted to tariffs and these tariffs were all subjected to bound rates. These rates were 36% and 24% for developed countries and developing countries respectively.

Domestic support for agriculture: Commitments in domestic support aimed at reducing expenditure on domestic producers. The reductions apply to a wide range of support policies, but the targets are based on a sector wide aggregate: the total Aggregate Measure of Support. The agreement specifies reductions in support measures of 20% for developed countries and 13% for developing countries. The AoA distinguishes between different types of support (see box on page 14).

Export subsidies: reductions in the volume of subsidised exports of 21% for developed countries and 14% for developing countries, and reductions in expenditure on export subsidies of 36% for developed countries and 24% for developing countries.

Negotiations during the Uruguay Round also resulted in a separate Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), and a ministerial decision on least-developed and net food-importing developing countries. Both are outlined below.

Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: With the reduction in tariff barriers in agriculture, it was feared that non-tariff barriers such as health and safety standards would increase. The SPS Agreement allows a country to take steps that are "necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or heath". The Agreement spells out procedures and criteria for assessing health risks and determining appropriate levels of protection. It uses the international food safety standards set by Codex Alimentarius as benchmarks. Governments can invoke national standards that are set higher than international standards as long as they have a scientific base for any steps they take.

Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries: In what has come to be known as the Marrakech Decision, ministers acknowledged that the reform programme might hurt the least-developed and net food-importing developing countries. Cuts in export subsidies and domestic support, for example, could raise the cost of food imports by countries least able to afford it. Moreover, NFIDCs and LDCs could face shortages. Significant rises in grain prices in the 1990s exacerbated these problems. Under the Marrakech Decision, ministers agreed to:

• Provide enough food aid "to meet the legitimate needs of developing countries during the reform programme".
• Adopt guidelines to ensure that "an increasing proportion of basic foodstuffs is provided to least-developed and net food-importing countries" as outright grants or on appropriate terms.
• Give full consideration for technical and financial assistance to least-developed countries "to improve their agricultural productivity and infrastructure".

At the end of the Uruguay Round, WTO Members agreed to resume negotiations on agriculture in 2000, one year before the end of the original six-year implementation period. The negotiations are intended to examine what further commitments are necessary to achieve the long-term objective of substantial reductions in support and protection resulting in fundamental reform. The talks are also to take into account the experience gained in the implementation period, the effects of the Uruguay Round on agriculture, non-trade concerns, special and differential treatment to developing countries, and how much progress has been made towards a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system.

The different government positions on the agriculture negotiations within the WTO have been expressed within a number of official proposals made in 2000 and 2001. A cross-section of these government proposals is summarised here. The proposals of the WTO African Group, a developing-country group (composed of Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Kenya, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Zimbabwe) as well as separate proposals by Mali, Kenya and India, all have a similar agenda. They are presented here as developing-country proposals, with specific references where different approaches stand out. Also included are the views of the EU, South Korea and the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters (Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay).

The main areas of discussion are non-trade concerns, export subsidies, domestic support and market access. We do not have space for an exhaustive list of all positions, but we can sketch out the proposals of major negotiating blocks, with some reference to specific country proposals.

Non-trade concerns: These include such issues as consumer interests, livelihoods and the environment. Proposals range from creating a special development box to amending the agreement to consider the various benefits gained from agriculture.

Developing countries emphasised that their food security concerns -- poverty alleviation and rural development -- should be taken into account. Special and differential measures should be enhanced to address the agricultural, rural development, food security, and subsistence and small-scale farming needs of developing countries and LDCs, as well as to protect domestic food production in NFIDCs. In its proposal for a food-security box, India recommended that poverty-alleviation measures by developing countries exempted from reduction commitments. The EU and South Korea emphasised food labelling, the maintenance of rural people and the rural economy, and the conservation of the countryside.

Export Subsidies: Primarily used by wealthier countries, the discussions revolve around their reduction, as well as upon appropriate regulation of other forms of export support and the role of state-trading export enterprises. Fears that cancelling export subsidies will increase the cost of food imports for NFIDCs resulted in the Marrakech Decision.

Developing-country proposals on export subsidies range from proper regulation to abolition. Developing countries urge that the ministerial decision on NFIDCs be implemented, with the establishment of an inter-agency revolving fund to assist LDCs and NFIDCs with import bills. Moreover, food aid should be in grant form. Kenya also called for technical and financial assistance for developing countries to meet SPS regulations, as well as an end to the dumping of food exports that are not in line with the SPS agreements. The EU called for negotiations to emphasise export credits, food aid and state-trading enterprises as well as export subsidies.

Domestic Support: Japan, the EU and the US account for 90% of all domestic subsidies in the world. In 1999, such supports in OECD countries made up 90% of farm income -- the same level as in the mid-1980s. Total use of subsidies within the green box has been increasing since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Discussions are focused on reducing domestic support levels.

The EU supported the existing AoA system for addressing domestic support, while South Korea called for greater flexibility with regard to domestic support reductions, tariff rates, tariff rate quotas and the scope of the green box. Developing countries urged reductions in developed country levels of domestic support, as well as a reduction in the scope of the green box. However, requirements for developing countries should be flexible, and input and investment subsidies to low-income and resource-poor farmers should be non-actionable. A development box should allow flexibility in applying urgent safeguard and domestic-support measures to meet the developmental concerns of poorer countries. Kenya called for special and differential measures to fill gaps in supply capacity, economic development and financial resources between small farmers and TNCs.

Market Access: There are proposals for further reductions or the elimination of tariffs, tariff escalation and tariff peaks, as well as for the simplification of tariffs and changes to the special safeguard provisions. A recent report suggested that some developing countries ought to be able to renegotiate bound tariff rates and raise tariff levels in areas important to food security and rural livelihoods, especially where such tariffs are below the required bound levels. A further issue relates to the SPS agreement under which some developing countries, unable to meet the requirements of importing countries, feel that they are being discriminated against, even while they receive goods that do not meet the requirements of their consumers.

Developing countries argued for lower tariffs overall and for no tariffs or quotas on LDC exports to developed countries. Safeguards should be improved to prevent cheap imports from decreasing incentives for local production. India proposed a separate special safeguard mechanism similar to the Special Safeguard provisions. This would allow quantitative restrictions under specified circumstances, which would be made available to all developing countries in the event of an import surge or price decline; the goal is to ensure food and the livelihoods of their people. Moreover, the maintenance of bound rates in key staples should be permissible for developing countries. India has also proposed that developing countries should be exempt from any obligation to provide any minimum market access, and that special measures should be taken to assist small-scale and limited commodity exporters to benefit from tariff rate quotas in major markets. The Cairns Group of agricultural exporting countries called for deep across-the-board reductions in tariffs. It has called for action to be taken to curb the practice of tariff escalation, which restricts value-adding processing in developing countries.

Original research commissioned by Consumers International has produced a range of information concerning the impacts of the AoA and agricultural liberalisation as a whole on consumers. The national reports reflect a variety of situations. For example, Bolivia is a member of the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters. Kenya is a net food importer and a developing country, while South Korea is an OECD member and a net food importer. Mali, Zambia and Chad are least-developed countries. Ukraine is still in WTO accession negotiations. Despite the diverse national contexts, patterns have emerged from the evidence provided by consumer organisations in relation to export opportunities; small farmers and livelihoods; food safety; institutional failures; and, the role of transnational corporations (TNCs).

The original reports commissioned by Consumers International document the issues that countries face when they try to export agricultural products under the liberalised trade conditions of the AoA.

In 1985, Bolivia abandoned its failing policies of import substitution and began to implement an export-oriented liberalisation strategy. Since then, two clear problems have arisen in relation to the growing importance of non-traditional agricultural exports. Cotton and soy are amongst non-traditional exports in Bolivia, but the majority of Bolivia’s small farmers with a potential to export "do not fulfil sanitary norms and requirements" necessary for international trade. Since 1985, the share of Bolivian smallholders in agricultural exports has fallen to 21% in 1997 from 54% in 1985. This suggests that agricultural exports in Bolivia have been skewed towards large producers.

Zambia’s largest 600 farmers dominate agricultural exports from that country, where there is considerable scope for increasing the size of the cultivated area. The 430,000 small farmers who use traditional techniques to cultivate maize, sorghum, millet, cassava and beans are not involved in exports.

Kenya’s government has highlighted problems faced by that country’s export sector as a result of clear asymmetries in relation to the WTO SPS agreement. Market access has been denied on the grounds that Kenyan exports are not deemed as meeting Codex requirements, while food products that would not pass the Codex standards are periodically dumped on Kenya.

The cases of Fiji, Chad, Mali and Ghana are set out in more detail below to expand on some of these issues.

Agriculture provides 40% of Fiji’s employment and 19% of its GDP. Sugar has been the principal agricultural export although there has been an increase in the export of horticultural products such as ginger. The dismantling of government trading monopolies facilitated the shift to non-traditional agricultural exports.

Fiji joined the WTO in 1996. The most significant implications of the AoA concern the securing of export markets for horticultural products and the loss of preferential market access under the EU-ACP Lomé convention. The assessment of the impacts of the AoA is blurred by the serious drought of 1997-1998, and by the political crisis of 2000.

After a decade of import substitution ending in the mid 1980s, Fiji underwent partial agricultural liberalisation although in 1997 there was a shift back towards a more prominent government role in the agricultural sector.

The removal of Lomé convention benefits will be particularly detrimental to sugar producers because prices will fall towards the declining world price for sugar.

The production of food crops currently has a comparative advantage owing to the unavailability and high cost of imported alternatives. Most production is for domestic consumption and there is a relatively high level of national self-sufficiency. Trade in agricultural crops is increasing, as is the commercialisation of agriculture.

In 1997-1998, the export of non-sugar commodities increased by 462.5 million tonnes. Access to export markets however is being constrained by food quality related import regulations imposed by countries like Australia and the United States. Australia is blocking the import of Fijian ginger on such grounds, while the US is blocking Fijian fruit and vegetables on similar sanitary grounds. This raises the issue of asymmetries between developed and developing countries with regard to the relationships between Codex standards and the WTO SPS agreement.

As more of the arable land is used for export crops, there has been a concentration of land ownership. Larger-scale farmers are better placed to respond to export opportunities, and to access the required inputs. This is being exacerbated by reduced government support for extension work, input subsidies and marketing support. With the shift towards exports, it is the food production sector that is being displaced. There has been a marked increase in the consumer price of cassava which has seen supply cut to make way for export crops.

Unemployment has increased as smaller farmers lose out through the shift to export crops and the drop in government support. Agricultural trade liberalisation has encouraged a trend towards the monopolistic control of agriculture. Liberalisation has increased the number and power of traders in the food sector who have replaced the retreating state and played a role in increasing food prices. The process of concentration of control over agricultural commodity chains has displaced small farmers.

The government has bound tariffs at 40% in line with the AoA, although most agricultural commodities have tariffs of 15% or are duty-free. Small farmers producing crops such as rice and edible oils are unable to compete with cheap imports. They are also facing increasing input prices while receiving lower prices for their produce. Despite the methodological difficulties in identifying the impacts of the AoA in the wake of drought and political crisis, the benefits of agricultural liberalisation have clearly been skewed towards larger-scale producers while some small-scale producers have clearly suffered adverse effects.

There are a number of similarities between Mali and Chad in relation to the AoA. Both are LDCs with a high percentage of households who produce for household consumption. Both have coarse grain staples, important livestock sectors, and a similar scope for competitive exports in cotton and livestock products. In 1997, the agricultural sector provided 49% of GDP, 83% of employment and 59% of total exports in Mali, while the figures for Chad were 39%, 79% and 68% respectively.

Both are presented with similar opportunities and dangers by the AoA Mali has argued for better market access and a more level playing field (the reduction of export subsidies and domestic support by competitors) for exports such as cotton and livestock products. Chad is hopeful that the EU will reduce its trade-distorting measures. While increased exports would provide much-needed foreign exchange, there is the danger of repeating the skewed distribution of benefits evident in Fiji.

A further issue is that while the reduction of subsidies in the developed countries may improve export access, it can be expected to prompt a higher food import bill, which increases the importance of an appropriate enactment of the Marrakech Decision. Both countries as LDCs and NFIDCs depend to a significant degree on food aid. Mali has imported 40% of its grain requirements over the last five years. In 2000-2001 it has produced 2,148,000 tonnes of grain, and requires imports of 90,000 tonnes (80,000 tonnes of commercial imports and 10,000 tonnes of food aid). Rather than respond to an increasing import bill by increasing food aid, and the possibility of undermining domestic food production, it would be of course be preferable to increase productive capacity with an increased area of irrigated cereal production.

The 60% of the Ghana labour force who are engaged in peasant agriculture in Ghana are engaged mainly in cocoa and food crop production. Cocoa is the most important agricultural export, although the government has sought to diversify its export base primarily through promoting non-traditional exports.

Ghana had already surpassed the AoA requirements through a series of liberalisation measures that were initiated in 1983. Prior to the completion of the AoA, the distribution of fertilisers and imports had been privatised, input subsidies had been abolished, trade in agricultural goods had been liberalised, government guaranteed prices had been discontinued and interest rates had been released to find their market value. This range of measures serves to emphasise the importance of considering the impacts of the AoA on consumers in relation to a wide range of institutional factors.

As a member of the EU-ACP Lomé Convention, Ghana had non-reciprocal preferential access to many European markets.

The gradual removal of this preferential access under WTO rules is hastening government attempts to shift the focus of export increases into non-traditional agricultural sectors.

Should the AoA stimulate agricultural exports, particularly the production of non-traditional crops, questions remain as to who will benefit. The benefits may not be accessible to small-scale farmers so much as to larger scale farmers with the capacity to meet the demand. However, should smallholders gain greater access to credit and the inputs and infrastructure requirements needed for them to be competitive in producing for export markets, the benefits of agricultural liberalisation and the shift to export-oriented production may still be more equally distributed than has been the case in Fiji.

The shift towards export-orientation has tended to provide unequal benefits both within and between countries. The AoA has not provided increased market access to export markets for LDCs like Chad and Mali. Meanwhile the competitiveness of LDC exports are hampered by the widely differing capacities of national governments to provide subsidies to their producers, as well as by disparities in productivity between LDCs and developed countries (in terms of such factors as infrastructure, climate vulnerability, credit provision and access to technology). Export-oriented agriculture also raises concerns about long-term productivity because production techniques tend to be more chemically intensive, and therefore will tend to degrade soils over time. Even irrigation systems -- if they are drawn from exhaustible water tables, for example -- can have short life spans. Another vital issue in relation to increased export-orientation is the impact that such a shift has on food security. In the case of countries that are very food insecure such as Chad, it is perhaps safer to increase grain productivity before increasing the area cultivated with export crops.

The AoA and the wider process of agricultural liberalisation have led to reduced support for domestic producers and more food imports in many countries. A number of the national reports written for Consumers International suggest how these trends affect food security and the viability of small farms that in some countries provide jobs for most of the population.

The Agreement on Agriculture has hurt Kenya’s small farmers, who produce 75% of the country’s agricultural output, by encouraging imports that have driven prices down. Kenya has opted for bound tariff rates but only applies a fraction of what it can under the AoA because it fears retaliatory measures should it raise those tariffs. Although bound tariff rates are 100%, the average tariff is in practice less than 20%.

The problems for small farmers are greatest where the government no longer acts as a buyer. The combination of low or non-existent subsidies and higher input prices have meant that many small farmers, especially women, cannot afford agricultural inputs, and output has declined as a result. At the same time, increased imports have driven down the price of what they do grow. As a result, the large section of Kenya’s consumers who are small farmers have seen their purchasing power decline. One source estimates that 50% of the Kenyan population is not assured of enough food. Increases in imports means little to the growing number of people -- many of them small farmers -- whose purchasing power has declined to the point where they cannot afford to buy imported food even at lower prices.

Self-sufficiency in food is declining, with 10% of Kenya’s staple crop -- maize -- being imported last year. As that percentage increases, the price of the domestic producers’ maize is likely to fall because urban markets will buy the cheaper imported grain. This phenomenon has been well documented in Mexico, where hundreds of thousands of small maize producers from the south of the country have been displaced from their livelihoods by the influx of cheap imported grain after the implementation of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The same process has been affecting small Indian producers of edible oils since that industry was partially liberalised in 1998. India, which was self-sufficient in edible oils, became a major importer in a matter of months.

For those sectors of agriculture in Kenya that are oriented towards exports, there is the problem of unstable world prices. From 1995 to 1997, 55% of Kenya’s exports were agricultural, most of them tea, coffee or horticultural products. Low international coffee prices have forced some of Kenya’s coffee farmers to focus on growing enough food to feed themselves and their families. Input prices have risen in Kenya in recent years, as they have in most countries. Only four transnational corporations produce one-third of all commercial seeds, fertilisers and pesticides used around the world.

The adverse impacts of the AoA in Kenya are not limited to small-scale farmers. They also hurt people employed in agriculture-related industries that depend on domestically produced sisal, cotton and sugar. Several factories have closed down, with 30,000 jobs lost in the textile industry alone because of market liberalisation.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that the issue of domestic support among Kenya’s trading partners and competitors deeply affects Kenya, even though domestic support has been well below de minimis requirements since before the end of the Uruguay Round. These subsidies hurt the competitiveness of Kenyan exports and discourage production for its domestic markets. Kenya has used some green box provisions but there have been cuts in agricultural extension work. The Kenyan government, unlike governments in developed countries, does not have the capacity to utilise the AoA domestic-support exemption boxes.

Agriculture’s share of Ghana’s GDP has declined to 41% in the 1990s from 52% in the 1980s, while its contribution to foreign exchange stabilised at 46%. The number of people employed in agriculture fell to 57% in the 1990s from 70% in the 1970s. Nevertheless, Ghana depends on the agricultural sector to meet domestic requirements, as well as for providing raw materials for agriculture-based enterprises.

Liberalising trade in agricultural resulted in increased rice imports, discouraging domestic production of that staple. Locally grown rice could not compete with better-quality imports. After the removal of input subsidies and guaranteed minimum output prices, the price of input products like seed and fertiliser rose faster than the market price of rice, making inputs inaccessible to many farmers. The privatisation of fertiliser imports and their distribution did not increase availability at competitive prices, but led to a private monopoly.

Intensive agricultural techniques apply in Ghana primarily to medium- and large-scale farms, while small farmers have few chemical or mechanical inputs and rely largely on household labour. Domestic food production and consumption centres on fish, livestock and grains. In the last three decades, the production of all staples increased substantially, although millet and sorghum production (the primary traditional staples) has grown less than that of rice and maize. There is considerable scope for increasing the cultivated area. While Ghana is self-sufficient in some foods, others -- such as wheat, meat, dairy products and processed foods -- are imported in large quantities.

Food purchases consume 67% of all household spending in Ghana. Rural households are increasingly deriving their food supply from the marketplace.

Rural areas suffer disproportionately during times of scarcity because imported food is predominantly consumed in urban area. This leads to higher food prices in rural areas when people can least afford to pay. The ratio between food prices and the minimum wage deteriorated between 1970 and 1999. This is partially attributable to liberalisation policies that increased the costs of food production.

South Korean agriculture, which supplies 6% of the country’s GDP, is subsidy-dependent, intensive and small-scale. Its farmers have an average landholding of one hectare. About half of its cultivated land is used to grow rice, the country’s staple food.

Small farmers in South Korea are being hurt by increased imports of agricultural goods, as well as by decreasing government support. Overall, they have been paying more for inputs and receiving less for their output since 1997. While it is impossible to separate this phenomenon from the consequences of the 1997 economic crash, the AoA’s limits on domestic support and protective trade measures may have exacerbated the situation. South Korea’s high levels of domestic support and its intensive form of agriculture make its small farmers vulnerable to the loss of subsidies, which totalled US$6443 million in 1996 (about 5% of the total domestic support expenditure of WTO members). At the same time, the government has been buying less rice itself since 1993, as a partial step towards conforming to domestic support reduction requirements. While the rice market price has become more volatile since the start of this grains policy, the government continues to release rice from its stocks when necessary to stabilise prices.

The quantity of agricultural imports in South Korea rose by 62% between the periods 1988-1994 and 1995-1997, discouraging domestic production. Fruit and vegetable imports rose 166%, driving down prices for domestic growers. The increase in imports for other products was less dramatic. South Korea had liberalised trade in 82% of agricultural commodities prior to the completion of the AoA. The problems arising from the AoA have tended to concern those commodities that have been liberalised since 1994. Trade in meat products also was liberalised since the end of the Uruguay Round, and prices and incomes of livestock farmers have declined since then. However, the effect of greater imports is hard to distinguish from the decline in exports after the East Asia crash. The impact of the AoA on the livestock industry may become clearer after the full liberalisation of beef imports in 2001.

In addition to declining government support, more expensive agricultural inputs and increased imports, South Korea’s small farmers have been hurt by increased imports of processed foods.

Since rice imports were liberalised in 1989, domestic producers have seen their share of the market for staple grain fall to 30% in 1997 from 43% in 1990. In 1996-1997 alone, 20 million tonnes of rice were imported. South Korea’s agricultural trade deficit had risen by US$1,433 million between 1994 and 1997, while the EU’s deficit fell by more than two-thirds in that period and those of Japan and the US were relatively static. Despite the use of the special safeguard for rice, South Korea is still incrementally applying the minimum-access regulation, which is having adverse effects on South Korean farmers. Some farmers have abandoned rural areas.

Because of relatively low levels of commercialisation, countries like Chad and Mali should be less vulnerable to increased openness to imports. But they are actually more vulnerable because food insecurity is so high. Both Chad and Mali have removed non-tariff barriers to trade, and have bound tariffs at 80%. The AoA is expected to lead to higher prices for rice, flour and other imports from Europe, the US and parts of Asia to Chad.

In Chad, food crops account for about one-quarter of GDP, but the country imports most of its grains. There is a low level of commercialisation, with 70% of food crops (predominantly grains) destined for household consumption. Production is conducted largely with traditional methods. Credit is scarce. The commercial linkages between rural and urban areas are very low, and infrastructure is poorly developed in both countries. In Chad, only 7,000 hectares are irrigated, although it is estimated that 5.6 million hectares could be irrigated.

Chad is drought-prone, especially in its northern Saharan and central Sahelian belts. The south of the country is best suited to agriculture and supports grain and cotton production. Its central belt is best suited for livestock and some grain production. Livestock plays an important role in Chad’s exports as well as being the sector that 40% of the population relies on for their livelihoods. Fishing is also an important food source and provides 10% of GDP. Cotton growing employs 400,000 people. Production levels are erratic, as is the case with many agricultural commodities in both countries. Prices, incomes and household food security vary considerably as a result.

Clearly, agricultural liberalisation has reduced incomes and purchasing power for some consumers. Producer prices and consumer prices in many countries have become more closely linked to world prices and world markets, increasing the vulnerability of those consumers who spend the highest percentages of household incomes on food. Low-income and resource-poor farmers have been adversely effected. The impacts on other vulnerable groups such as landless rural and urban workers are less clear, although thousands of jobs in agriculture-related industries have been lost in Kenya. In Chad and Mali, low and erratic levels of productivity and low levels of commercialisation complicate food security issues in a context of increased agricultural liberalisation.

Central to the concern of consumers from South Korea to Kenya to Bolivia is the issue of food safety and worries over the implications of consuming genetically modified food. In Bolivia in April 2001, tests were carried out on food imported into the country under the PL-480 food aid programme of the United States. Imports were found to contain genetically modified maize and soy. Bolivian consumers are concerned that the consumption of such foods may cause dangerous allergic reactions. Despite the fact that the Bolivian Agriculture Ministry passed a resolution in January 2001 to suspend the importation of genetically modified food for a year, the Bolivian government has permitted genetically modified food to enter the country in the form of EU donations.

Consumers in Bolivia have supplementary concerns about the impact that the cultivation of genetically modified crops might have upon the environment. Moreover, consumers in both Bolivia and South Korea are concerned about the possible socio-economic implications of the cultivation of genetically modified seeds. Many genetically modified seeds require the use of fertilisers and pesticides that are often produced by the same companies that hold the intellectual property rights to the seeds. Herbicide-resistant seed varieties and the spectre of non-reproducing "terminator" seeds raise concerns about small farmers becoming increasingly dependent upon TNCs, leading to rising debts and bankruptcy. In such circumstances, land ownership would become more concentrated as small farmers were forced to abandon their holdings. South Korean consumers raised similar concerns both in terms of the potential for increased levels of transnational corporation control over agricultural commodity chains, and in terms of the food safety concerns that surround GM foods. Claims that genetic engineering offered a solution to the high incidence of food insecurity and malnutrition were dismissed on the grounds that "hunger is a problem of the inequality of distribution". Regardless of the possible health, environmental and socio-economic implications of GM food, the absence of clear recourse to safeguards against such produce being imported should consumers not wish to consume GM food or cultivate GM crops raises serious concerns over the capacity of consumers to choose.

The failure both of Bolivia’s central regulatory system, and of its devolved political structures, to protect consumers from a perceived food safety threat is one example of institutional failure. Ukraine’s transition from one institutional regime to another offers another example. This can be contrasted to Poland where state and civil society groups have been reactivated in order to smooth some of the social problems occurring with transition.

Ukraine’s agricultural sector is in a state of crisis. GDP has declined to less than 40% of its 1989 level. Demand for foodstuffs, particularly of protein-rich foodstuffs, shrunk considerably in the 1990s as the purchasing power of the population fell. Supply constraints are so serious that the output of some crops has fallen to pre-1940 levels, and even to pre-1917 levels. Prices rose sharply in 2000, while wage arrears remained widespread and services continued to decay. A significant amount of labour in rural areas is paid in kind, and barter is commonplace. Moreover, the price disparity between industry and agriculture impedes the development of the agricultural sector.

Ukraine’s agricultural-industrial complex (AIC) provided 30% of GDP in 1998. Agricultural production is gradually being transferred from state to private hands. Ambiguities over property rights remain an impediment to investments in productive capacity. Moreover, the extension of credit to farms fell 20-fold between 1992 and 2001. State financing of agriculture also fell substantially. Privately owned farms now account for most agricultural output but productive capacity remains low, especially in the public sector. The area cultivated with grains fell by almost one quarter between 1985 and 1998, while yield fell by almost a half.

In nearby Poland, one million agricultural jobs were lost in the first three years of transition. But the Pact for Agriculture and Rural Areas is a wide-ranging programme to activate rural areas that involves a number of ministries, local self-government bodies, local self-governing agricultural organisations, employers, professional associations and a range of other actors.

Trade in some sectors in Ukraine remains subject to the acquiring of import licenses, as well as to non-tariff and tariff barriers. There are also technical barriers and pre-market certification barriers which restrict consumer choice. Accession to the WTO is sought by consumers as a means of improving accessibility to basic goods, but the experience of other countries facing cheap food imports indicates the need to be cautious in how the agricultural liberalisation of Ukraine proceeds. In the current context of high prices for many agricultural commodities in Ukraine, prices in wheat and sugar exceed world prices. Accession to the WTO could lead to an import surge similar to that experienced by the Indian oilseeds sector in which domestic prices were higher than world prices.

As well as paying due attention to the issue of import surges and how they could be avoided, there is also the issue of the ability of Ukrainian exports to compete with goods from countries that maintain high subsidy levels.

The Agreement on Agriculture has reduced the amount of control national governments can exert over their trade policy. In contrast, transnational corporations, which have witnessed expediential growth over the past decades, have been given more freedom to move around globally, largely unhampered by national governments and international rules. The role in trade has grown and transnationals now are said to control 80% to 90% of world trade.

Both small farmers and consumers are subject to the negative impacts of the increasing power that TNCs hold over the international food chain, from research and development to the provision of production inputs, to distribution and marketing. TNCs’ increasing power is being facilitated by agricultural liberalisation. TNCs affect consumers in many ways, such as:

• The control over the trade of major agricultural commodities by a handful of TNCs distorts both producer and consumer prices.
• The dependence of small farmers on TNC produced chemical inputs should be reduced on economic, health and ecological grounds.
• The increasing importance of GM foods threatens consumer food safety and the increased dependence of producers on TNCs.

Agricultural liberalisation affects countries and people in a variety of ways, but there are some common threads that are relevant to consumer rights everywhere. The information provided by the 13 national reports illustrate many of the ways that agricultural trade liberalisation in general -- and the AoA in particular -- have affected consumers. Simple access to food has been threatened in a number of areas:

• Small farmers have lost their livelihoods, severely reducing their purchasing power as vulnerable consumers.
• The ability to increase purchasing power through export opportunities has been a mixed experience, and usually has been unequally distributed to the disadvantage of smaller farmers.
• The ability for consumers to meet their own consumption requirements has been affected by the loss of land.
• Consumers could be facing new threats to food safety with the rise of GM foods and lack of monitoring and regulatory capacity of developing countries.

Based on its research, Consumers International makes a number of recommendations. Central to these recommendations is the right of consumers to have access to basic goods and services. To achieve this, a consumer-rights approach should be adopted in future negotiations. This approach supports recent calls for a development box, but seeks to incorporate other issues of central importance to consumers. Four key recommendations provide the basis to our consumers rights approach to the AoA

Increase and protect consumer access to food though:

• Promoting domestic production through encouraging development-oriented domestic support, assistance where required and measures to protect domestic market from import surges.
• Promoting foreign exchange earning of developing countries though increased and reliable market access by reducing protection in developed country markets.
• Providing consumers with access to safe food, through better monitoring and the enforcement of safety standards.
• Checking the powers of transnational corporations, to protect competition and safety of food on the world market.

Promoting domestic production: All developing countries should be able to produce a list of food staple crops, and crops which are central to a large number of rural livelihoods. The crops on the list should be exempt from all WTO AoA market access and domestic support provisions. This would enhance and make concrete the existing non-binding commitments to special and differential measures. In relation to those crops not included on the list, special and differential measures should be binding commitments which allow national governments and local political authorities to raise tariffs and re-impose non-tariff barriers to protect small farmers from import surges, as well as to provide subsidies to support small farmers. Such support may take the form of credit provision or improving infrastructure to allow easier access to markets. As such, all subsidies designed to protect food security, rural livelihoods and rural development in developing countries should be exempt from restrictions.

Increased and reliable market access: Access to developed country markets should be improved by reducing domestic support and export subsidies in developed countries, as well as tariff peaks and tariff escalation measures that block developing country exports. Small farmers and consumers should be protected from falling incomes and higher prices by reallocating other subsidies -- particularly green box provisions -- from TNCs to consumers and small farmers. Governments in developing countries should act to ensure that small farmers have access to export markets by adopting measures permitted under Codex standards. And developed countries should be prevented from using safety standards as an unfair trade barrier to exports from developing countries.

Tackling the growing power of TNCs: Transnational corporations are one source of the problems that developing countries face under agricultural liberalisation. While this is not documented widely in the report, TNCs clearly play a role in limiting the access of developing countries to the export sector through their influence over the world market. The role played by TNCs in world agriculture should be thoroughly researched. In particular, does the influence of the handful of TNCs that dominate the market distort prices? How do the different actors in the commodity chains benefit? Do consumers and small farmers get a fair deal from intermediaries?

Researchers should investigate whether local traders pass along cheaper prices to consumers. Do TNCs charge too much for agricultural inputs? Are health and environmental issues sufficiently taken into account in the production and application of chemical inputs? Increasing TNC control over seed production and distribution should be blocked by banning terminator technology and by asserting the primacy of the right of producers to save seeds over existing TNC patents. Patents for foodstuffs should not be allowed in the future.

Food safety: Appropriate steps should be taken to ensure that food is of a high quality and safe to eat. Genetically modified food and seeds should be clearly labelled, and member governments should have the right to ban the cultivation of genetically modified crops until consumers and farmers have enough information to make an informed decision about the crops’ health, environmental and socio-economic effects. Countries should retain the right to refuse all genetically modified foods and seeds at the end of any such moratorium.

Negotiating parity: The WTO should ensure that developing countries can participate fully in future negotiations and are not disadvantaged vis-à-vis developed countries. The close links between agribusiness TNCs, national governments and multilateral institutions should be made transparent. Finally, consumer groups should continue to collect evidence of the impacts of agricultural liberalisation in order to pressurise national governments and multilateral organisations such as the WTO, World Bank and International Monetary Fund to safeguard the consumer right to access to safe food.

Association of Polish Consumers (2001), National Report on the Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Consumer Interest in Poland

Consumer Council of Fiji (2001), National Report on the Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Consumer Interest in Fiji

Consumers Association of Ghana (2001), National Report on the Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Consumer Interest in Ghana

Consumer Information Network (2001), National Report on the Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Consumer Interest in Kenya

Citizen’s Alliance of Consumer Protection (2001), National Report on the Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Consumer Interest in South Korea

Association des Consommateurs du Mali (2001), National Report on the Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Consumer Interest in Mali

The Network (2001), National Report on the Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Consumer Interest in Pakistan

Association pour la Defense des Droits des Consommateurs (2001), National Report on the Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Consumer Interest in Chad

Ukraine Consumers Association (2001), National Report on the Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Consumer Interest in Ukraine

Zambia Consumers Association (2001), National Report on the Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Consumer Interest in Zambia

Comité de Defensa del Consumidor (2001), National Report on the Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Consumer Interest in Bolivia

Instituto Brasileiro de Defesa do Consumidor (2001), National Report on the Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Consumer Interest in Brazil

Liga por la Defensa del Consumidor de Nicaragua (2001), National Report on the Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Consumer Interest in Nicaragua

Cairns Group (21/12/2000), WTO Negotiations on Agriculture- Cairns Group Negotiating Proposal.

Government of the South Korea (9 Jan 2001), Proposal for WTO Negotiations on Agriculture (WTO, G/AG/NG/W/98).

Cairns Group (22 Sept 2000), Negotiating Proposal on Domestic Support (WTO, G/AG/NG/W/35).

Caricom Group (15 January 2001) Negotiating Proposal on behalf of Members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (WTO, G/AG/NG/W/100).

Governments of Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Kenya, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Zimbabwe (28 Sept 2000), Proposal on Market Access (WTO, G/AG/NG/W/37).

Government of India (15 Jan 2001), Proposals by India in the areas of: (i) Food Security, (ii) Market Access, (iii) Domestic Support, and (iv) Export Competition (WTO, G/AG/NG/W/102).

Government of Kenya (12 Mar 2001), WTO Negotiations on Agriculture Proposal (WTO, G/AG/NG/W/136).

Government of Mali (11 Jan 2001), Malian Proposals for the Future Negotiations on Agriculture (WTO, G/AG/NG/W/99).

Government of Poland (19 Jan 2001), Proposal on WTO Negotiations for the Continuation of the Reform Process in the Agriculture Sector (WTO, G/AG/NG/W/103).

Government of South Korea (9 Jan 2001) Proposal for WTO Negotiations on Agriculture (WTO, G/AG/NG/W/98).

WTO African Group (23 Mar 2001), Joint Proposal on Negotiations in Agriculture (WTO, G/AG/NG/W/142).

Action Aid (2000), The Marrakech Ministerial Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least Developed Countries: Proposals for Improving its Content and Implementation (Action Aid: London).

Action Aid (1999) The Agreement on Agriculture -- Domestic Support (Action Aid: London).

Action Aid (1999) The Agreement on Agriculture -- Export Subsidies (Action Aid: London).

Action Aid (1999) The Agreement on Agriculture -- Dumping (Action Aid: London).

Action Aid (1999) The Agreement on Agriculture -- Market Access: Free Trade Rhetoric and Protectionist Realities (Action Aid: London).

Action Aid (1999) Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and Farmers’ Rights (Action Aid: London).

Action Aid (1999) Crops and Robbers : Biopiracy and the Patenting of Staple Food Crops (London: Action Aid).

Consumers International (2000), The Agreement on Agriculture, Post-Seattle (Consumers International: London).

Corporate Europe Observatory, (1999) The WTO Millennium Bug: TNC Control over Global Trade Politics (CEO: Amsterdam).

FAO Symposium on Agriculture, Trade and Food Security: Issues and Options in the Forthcoming WTO Negotiations from the Perspective of Developing Countries (23-24 September 1999), Paper No. 4 Issues at Stake Relating to Agricultural Development, Trade and Food Security Commodity Policy and Projections Service (FAO: Rome).

FAO/GIEWS (2001), Africa Report No.2 (FAO: Rome). Green, D., and Priyardarshi, S. (2001), Proposal for a ‘Development Box’ in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (CAFOD and South Centre).

Green, D., and Melamed, C. (2000), A Human Development Approach to Globalisation (Cafod and Christian Aid: London).

Madeley, J. (2000), Hungry for Trade: How the Poor Pay for Free Trade (Zed: London).

World Trade Organisation, Agreement on Agriculture (http://www.wto.org).

Consumers International (CI) was founded in 1960 as the International Organisation of Consumer Unions (IOCU) by a group of national consumer organisations that recognised that they could build upon their individual strengths by working across national borders. It is an independent, non-profit organisation, not aligned with or supported by any political party or industry. Funding comes from membership fees and by grants from foundations, governments and multilateral agencies.

Consumers International acts as the global voice of consumers by supporting and representing consumer groups and agencies all over the world. It has a membership of more than 260 consumer organisations in almost 120 countries. Most of its members are independent, non-governmental organisations. About a quarter of its members are from government agencies and statutory standards bodies.

Consumers International strives to promote a fairer society through defending the rights of all consumers, including poor, marginalized and disadvantaged people, by:

• Supporting and strengthening member organisations and the consumer movement in general
• Campaigning at the international level for policies that respect consumer concerns.

Consumers International develops knowledge and skills in its member organisations through training programmes, seed grants, technical assistance, information networks, exchange programmes and joint projects. Training programmes include campaigning and lobbying techniques, mobilising consumers, research techniques, fundraising, organisational development, producing and marketing publications and working with the media.

It represents the consumer interest at regional and global decision making forums. As the international economy becomes more and more global, and the implications of decisions and trade policies of governments extend increasingly beyond national boundaries, Consumers International takes an active role in the promotion of consumer rights and the development of civil society to address these issues. Consumers International influences consumer policy through its high-level contacts with agencies such as: UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), World Trade Organisation (WTO), Codex Alimentarius Commission, Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), International Standards Organisation (ISO), World Health Organisation (WHO), UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It also works with many regional bodies.

Consumer policy promotes the establishment of legislation, institutions and information, which improve the quality of life and health and empower people to make changes in their own lives. It seeks to ensure that basic human rights are recognised and promotes understanding of people’s rights and responsibilities as consumers.

Consumer policy is a broad term for action taken, in order to ensure that fundamental rights of consumers are met. These are the rights to satisfaction of basic needs, safety, be informed, choose, be heard, redress, consumer education and a healthy environment. Consumers have the responsibility to use their power in the market to drive out abuses, to encourage ethical practices and to support sustainable consumption and production. Developing and protecting consumer rights and responsibilities are integral to eradication of poverty, good governance, respect for human rights, transparent, fair and effective market economies and sustainable development.

Consumers International is headquartered in London. Its Office for Developed and Transition Economies is also based in London and it has offices in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; Santiago, Chile; and Harare, Zimbabwe. Consumers International has about 80 staff worldwide.

Consumers and the Global Market (CGM) is a three-year programme supported by the Ford Foundation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands, Oxfam, European Commission and Consumers International. It is managed by Consumers International and forms a part of its Trade and Economics Programme (TEP).

Consumers and the Global Market aims to encourage the development of just and fair marketplaces through strengthening the capacity and influence of the consumer movement at the international, regional and national level in the setting and implementation of trade policy. It works by carrying out original research and analysis, providing training and capacity building and representing the consumer interest in policy making.

CGM focuses on three topics: competition policy, agriculture and services and works primarily in 16 countries with consumer groups as the core partners. These partners are: IDEC, Brazil; CODEDCO, Bolivia; ADC, Chad; ODECU, Chile; CCF, Fiji; CAG, Ghana; YLKI, Indonesia; CIN, Kenya; ASCOMA, Mali; LIDECONI, Nicaragua; The Network, Pakistan; APC, Poland; SCA, Slovenia; CACPK, South Korea; UCA, Ukraine and ZACA, Zambia. Other consumer groups and NGOs will also be involved in programme activities.

CGM will develop specific research and campaigns in relation to three main priority areas -- competition policy, agriculture and services. But its wider objective is to establish knowledge and capacity within organisations that will develop and expand their work in the area of trade and economics and take up other related issues. The goal is to encourage consumer involvement and participation in governance.

Recent publications under the CGM programme include:

• The General Agreement on Trade in Services: An Impact Assessment En, Fr, Es
• Consumers and Trade: The Consumer Guide to Trade Issues and Agreements (CD-ROM) En, Fr, Es
• The way forward for the Least Developed Countries: Empowering consumers for pro-poor development En, Fr
• The Impact of Multilateral Trade Agreements on the African Consumer En, Fr
• Liberalization of the Water Sector in Africa: Trends and Impact En, Fr
• Economic Relations Between the European Union and Latin America En, Es
• The Way Forward for the Multilateral Trading System En, Fr, Es

For these and other resources, please visit our website at www.consumersinternational.org/trade or contact any of our offices.

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