The Crumbling of a Fragile Alliance: the Latest Chapter in the Tuna-DolphinConflict

By Henry Wong, Global Environment and Trade Study (GETS)

August 4, 2000

A federal court ruled on April 11, 2000 that the new United States "dolphinsafe" label, which would apply to tuna caught by chasing and nettingdolphins as long as they were not seriously hurt or killed in the process,is invalid. The environmentalists who sued the Clinton Administrationsuccessfully argued that the scientific evidence suggests that thesemethods have a significant and unobserved impact on dolphin populations inthe Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP). The ruling throws a wrench intoyears of meticulously negotiated international agreements between the USand Latin American countries involved in tuna operations in the ETP.Without the "dolphin safe" label in the US, Latin American countries cannotget what they truly want: market access to the US.

The latest chapter in the tuna-dolphin debate indicates just how difficultit can be to resolve the dual objectives of free trade and environmentalprotection. After years of contested US trade embargoes, frayedNorth-South relations, two bitterly disputed GATT panel decisions, and therapid decline of the US tuna fleet in the ETP from heavy domesticregulation, dolphin mortality from tuna fishing still did not drop tosustainable levels. Amazingly, the conflict seemed to have reached anamicable solution when a series of international agreements forged byexporting countries, importing countries, fishers and environmentalistsguided the reduction of fishing-related dolphin kills from 133,000 in 1986to 2,000 in 1998. However, dolphin populations are not recovering, whichsuggests that the frequent pursuit and encirclement of dolphins are leadingto unsustainable levels of unobserved kills and injuries. If that is thecase, then the international treaties developed to satisfy bothenvironmentalists and fishers may have been formulated on entirely faultypremises.

This report first goes through the history of dolphin protection in the ETPto show why cooperation became the preferred path to resolution instead ofcontinuous confrontation between dolphin lovers and tuna fishers, betweenthe US and developing Latin American countries, and betweenenvironmentalists and free trade advocates. Next, I will look at how newscientific evidence raise serious doubts about the effectiveness of theinternationalist approach in saving dolphins, leading to the US Federalcourt decision. Finally, this report will consider whether thetuna-dolphin debate will come to a satisfactory resolution for all sidesinvolved or if it is destined to indefinitely continue its existence as theposter child of the clash between trade and the environment.

The Early Years

For unknown reasons, many schools of tuna travel directly under dolphins inthe ETP. Fishers have taken advantage of this since the late 1950s bysearching for dolphins, which are easy to find because they must surface tobreathe, and by guiding the dolphins to giant purse seine nets so that theycan haul in the tuna that follow the dolphins. Using dolphins to catchtuna, or "setting" on dolphins, is economically lucrative because of thehigh yields of large yellowfin tuna and because of the abundance ofdolphin-associated tuna outside of the 200-mile exclusive economic zones ofthe coastal nations of the ETP.

The lucrative yields of premium tuna comes at a price, though-a huge numberof dolphins die from this method of tuna fishing. An estimated 200,000 to300,000 dolphins were killed annually from purse seine netting during the1960s. The population of the eastern spinner dolphin is at 44% of itspre-exploited level during the 1950s, while the population of thenortheastern spotted dolphin was depleted to approximately 20% of itspre-exploited level. Had the rate of dolphin mortality not beencurtailed, the tuna fishers would have wiped out these two species ofdolphins by now.

Congress first intervened in 1972 with the Marine Mammal Protection Act(MMPA). Any species of marine mammal that was "depleted"-a designationgiven to species whose numbers were below their maximum productivitylevels-was not to be chased, harassed, hurt or killed by commercialoperations of any sort except with a permit from the National MarineFisheries Service. Undermining the act, however, was a general exemptionissued to the American Tunaboat Association to continue dolphin sets. Ittook a 1976 court order to force the National Marine Fisheries Service(NMFS) to initiate efforts to curtail dolphin kills. The first quota of78,000 kills for 1976 was surpassed in October, forcing the US governmentto prohibit any dolphin sets for the remainder of the year.

Persistence did pay off, however, as the NMFS formed equipment andprocedure standards, held training workshops for fishing crews, placed moreobservers onboard fishing vessels, and conducted research programs inconjunction with industry efforts. The American tuna fleet was then ableto meet the 1977 quota of 59,000 dolphin kills, the 1979 quota of 31,150kills, and the 1980 quota of 20,500 kills. However, further reductions didnot occur immediately because the 1980 quota was extended for 5 years, thenextended indefinitely until 1988. During that time, the annual number ofdolphin kills remained the same, but the average number of kills per UStuna vessel active in the ETP rose dramatically as the fleet shrunk. Inaddition, tuna fishers again surpassed the annual dolphin quota in Octoberof 1986.

Worse, both the dolphins and the American tuna fleet suffered from theinflux of tuna vessels from other countries in the ETP. American tunavessels operated under much greater scrutiny than vessels from othercountries. Therefore, much of the fleet moved their operations to theWestern Tropical Pacific Ocean (WTP), where tuna do not associate withdolphins. Many vessels also reflagged, either through the permanent ortemporary adoption of another country's flag, in order to circumvent USlaw. Other factors that drove US vessels out of the ETP were a drop intuna prices, a shift in reliance on tuna from international markets insteadof domestic suppliers for US canned tuna, and the extension of exclusiveeconomic zones by coastal states to 200 miles.

Dire predictions from the US tuna industry during the 1970s that they wouldeventually be pushed out by other ETP fleets that lacked dolphin protectionguidelines fell on mostly deaf ears. The MMPA did allow for an import banon products from other countries that were caught with a level of oceanmammal mortality that exceeded US standards. In practice, this meantabsolutely nothing: the NMFS failed to impose any embargoes based on theinadequacy of foreign regulatory programs. Further amendments in 1984,which added the requirement that the rate of kills for any one country hadto be comparable to the US kill rate, were futile because the NMFS did notrelease final regulations until 1988 and did not require compliance withthese regulations until 1991.

The United States Versus the World

In 1988, an undercover videotape recorded onboard a Panamanian tuna vesselshowed hours of grisly footage in which dolphins were suffocated, exposedto explosions, and entangled in tuna nets. Since non-US tuna vesselscaused approximately 85% of the 130,000 tuna-related dolphin deaths in 1986and 100,000 deaths in 1987, much of the attention shifted from the US fleetto the non-US fleets.

Congress realized that the NMFS had been, and still was, reluctant toenforce the provisions of the MMPA concerning certification of foreigncountries' regulatory programs, and so included detailed guidelines for theexecutive branch to follow. The 1988 Amendments to the MMPA clearly laidout what other countries had to do to gain certification for tuna exportsto the US. Foreign governments were required to institute procedure andequipment standards comparable to the US's standards, such as limitedprohibitions on dolphin sets after sundown and a ban on the use ofexplosives. Each country must also not exceed twice the kill rate of theUS fleet in 1989 and 1.25 times the US kill rate thereafter; no more than15% of these kills can be eastern spinner dolphins and no more than 2% ofthese kills can be coastal spotted dolphins. In addition, each country'sfleet had to be monitored by observers from the InterAmerican Tropical TunaCommission (IATTC) or a comparable program. Finally, Congress authorizedsecondary embargoes on intermediary countries that tried to import into theUS tuna from countries that lacked certification.

Before the 1988 MMPA Amendments, the battle between dolphin lovers and tunafishers was largely confined to the US. It was only a matter of time,however, until the migratory nature of both tuna and dolphins would drawinto the conflict all those involved in the capture, processing, andselling of ETP tuna.

Despite the specific orders issued by Congress in the 1988 Amendments, NMFScontinued to stall enforcement of the MMPA. Part of their reluctancestemmed from the unfairness of the US guidelines for compliance: the2x/1.25x foreign-to-US dolphin kill ratio imposed an unreasonable timetableon foreign countries to lower their dolphin kills. Also, it was impossibleto know exactly what the US kill rate was going to be in any given year,making the goal of 1.25x the US kill rate a moving target. The movingtarget became even more elusive because the continued exodus of US vesselsfrom the WTP inevitably meant fewer dolphin kills.

It took a series of lawsuits from the Earth Island Institute and courtorders from Federal District Judge Thelton E. Henderson of northernCalifornia to make NMFS enforce the MMPA and impose tuna sanctions.Primary embargoes were issued against Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, Ecuador,and Vanuatu in 1990; the courts then halted efforts to lift the embargo onMexico. Secondary embargoes followed in 1992 under court order against 13countries, including Costa Rica, Italy, Spain, and Japan.

While pushing for embargoes in court, Earth Island Institute and otherenvironmentalists initiated a boycott of Star-Kist brand tuna, the biggestAmerican tuna company. Star-Kist later responded by voluntarily pledgingto buy only "dolphin-safe" tuna-that is, tuna that was caught without theintentional pursuit and encirclement of dolphins. Chicken of the Sea,Bumble Bee, and several smaller foreign tuna companies quickly followedsuit. At least 80% of the US market was now cut off from ETPdolphin-associated tuna. In 1991, the dolphin-safe label that began toappear voluntarily on most tuna cans in the US became an officialgovernment label under the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act(DPCIA). European tuna companies also began to adopt the same dolphin-safestandard, prompting fears that the entire European Community would also godolphin-safe. A full two-thirds of the world market for ETP tuna wouldhave been lost if the EC followed the US.

Although the US Secretaries of Commerce and State were instructed by the1988 MMPA Amendments to negotiate international agreements through theIATTC, the heart of the MMPA was coercive unilateral trade sanctions froman economic superpower. The reaction was often equally fierce andantagonistic. All around Latin America, people denounced the US for usingenvironmental concerns to justify protectionist bullying.

Mexico countered by challenging the validity of both the embargoes and theofficial dolphin-safe label under the General Agreement on Tariffs andTrade (GATT). The 1991 GATT panel report made the famous-andnotorious-distinction between trade-distorting regulations based on aproduct and trade-distorting regulations based on the process by which aproduct was manufactured or obtained. It also ruled that traderestrictions based on environmental protection could not be applied againstother countries. Many environmentalists found the ruling to be theultimate proof of the triumph of big business over the earth. To this day,no international trade dispute can match the tuna-dolphin case for itsnotoriety among the environmental community. Interestingly, Mexico did not press for adoption of the GATT decision.Many scholars thought that Mexico shelved the matter due to negotiationsover the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but perhaps the realreason was because Mexico was dissatisfied with the ruling on the DPCIA.The GATT panel ruled that the eco-label was valid, since it applied equallyto all fishers in the ETP. Without the elimination of the dolphin-safelabel, almost no one would buy Mexico's ETP yellowfin tuna.

Meanwhile, the foreign fleets began to adapt to the constraints placed uponthem by the loss of the US market. Prices for premium yellowfin tunasagged in Europe through 1995, but then hit record highs in 1997. Domesticmarkets, particularly in Venezuela and Mexico, were purposely expanded tohelp make up for the US market. Through all this, foreign fleets continuedto chase, encircle and kill tens of thousands of dolphins. The greatest blow to the two-pronged strategy of embargoes and boycottscame from the IATTC. Through compiled data from observers and researchstudies, the IATTC discovered that the main alternatives to dolphin setshad potentially severe environmental consequences. Both log sets andschool sets-log sets refer to sets on tuna that aggregate under largefloating objects, while school sets refers to sets on free-swimming schoolsof tuna-tend to haul in alarming amounts of bycatch.

Estimates of bycatch of species that would be caught and discarded in10,000 sets of the net in the three modes of fishing used in the EasternPacific Ocean (EPO)

Species School Fishing Log Fishing Dolphin FishingDolphins 8 25 5,000Small tunas 2,430,000 130,080,000 70,000Mahi mahi 2,100 513,870 100Sharks 12,200 139,580 --Wahoo 530 118,660 --Rainbow Runner 270 30,050 --Billfish 1,440 6,540 520Sea Turtles 580 1,020 100

IATTC was especially concerned with the exorbitant amount of juvenile tunacaught by school and log fishing. Removing large numbers of tuna that havenot had a chance to reproduce could quickly contribute to the collapse ofthe ETP tuna fishery. The near-collapse of the fishery in 1982 onlyheightened this fear.

There were no real winners from US trade sanctions and dolphin-safelabeling. The US fleet could not compete in the ETP anymore. Foreignfleets could not sell its tuna to the US, and had little hope of doing soin the near future unless both the dolphin-safe label and the embargoeswere abolished. Increased use of log sets and school sets was highlydamaging ecologically and potentially unsustainable for the entire fishery. The entire international community was unhappy with the US's aggressiveuse of unilateral trade sanctions. US consumers could no longer buy primeyellowfish tuna. The trade and environment communities were pitted againsteach other by the GATT panel decisions. And dolphins were still dying inunsustainable numbers. It was time for a new approach.

A Fragile Alliance

Greenpeace sailed into the fishing port of Ensenada, Mexico on February 11,1992 amidst public demonstrations and protests from tuna fishers. Sufficeto say that the whole town was shocked to hear Greenpeace announce itswithdrawal of support for US tuna sanctions. Instead, Greenpeace sought aninternational agreement that would minimize dolphin mortality whileallowing the catch and sale of yellowfin tuna from the ETP.

Along with the Environmental Defense Fund, World Wildlife Fund, Center forMarine Conservation, and National Wildlife Federation, Greenpeaceparticipated in the negotiations of the landmark 1992 La Jolla Agreement.Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Spain, the UnitedStates, Vanuatu, and Venezuela all signed the agreement. Although theagreement was non-binding, all signatories eventually implemented the LaJolla Agreement.

The La Jolla Agreement tries to comply with the GATT by introducing thesystem of Dolphin Mortality Limits (DML). Instead of punishing entirenational fleets, the DML system imposes dolphin kill limits and thepenalties for dolphin kills on individual vessels. This system is moreeffective because vessels that did not kill dolphins under the previoussystem were still punished; such a system discouraged vessels from reducingdolphin kills. Another feature of the La Jolla Agreement is the requirement to have anobserver onboard every trip to approve tuna catches as dolphin-safe. Halfof the observers for each country's fleet must be from the IATTC.

The La Jolla agreement also set up an administrative panel consisting ofrepresentatives from participating countries, the IATCC, environmentalNGOs, and the tuna fishing industry. They can investigate fleetcompliance, allocate DMLs, and provide recommendations to governmentsregarding punishment, training, and equipment. A complimentary ScientificAdvisory Panel was formed to investigate methods to reduce dolphin mortality. What makes the La Jolla Agreement palatable and practical to the tunaindustry was the discovery that dolphin mortality could be substantiallyreduced with inexpensive modifications in fishing methods and equipment.High dolphin mortality could be prevented simply by avoiding sets on largeherds of tuna or dolphin, sundown and night sets, sets in strongsub-surface currents, and lengthy sets. Properly maintained equipment, useof safety panels, and utilization of crewmen to aid the manual release ofdolphins can also contribute to deep cuts in dolphin mortality. Theknowledge that each tuna vessel had the power to reduce dolphin mortalitymade the system of individual vessel DMLs fair to all parties involved; allthat was needed was funding and training.

Not everybody shared high hopes for the La Jolla Agreement, however. Someenvironmental and animal rights groups spitefully dubbed the fiveenvironment NGOs that participated in the negotiations of the La Jollaagreement the "Slaughterhouse Five." Many members of Congress, meanwhile,were still fuming over the GATT report and refused to budge from their hardline stance on dolphin protection. In 1992, Congress refused to pass theBreaux Bill, which would have lifted the tuna embargoes on all theparticipants of the La Jolla Agreement. Instead, they passed theInternational Dolphin Conservation Act, another aggressive and unilateralmeasure that nearly led to the crumbling of the La Jolla Agreement. Inorder to lift the embargo, each country had to agree to a five-yearmoratorium on dolphin sets and reductions in dolphin mortality in 1992 and1993. Violators of the moratorium, without exception, would have beensubjected to a total ban on yellowfish tuna along with a 40% on all fishand shellfish imports. To top it all off, the act mandated a ban on thesale of tuna in the US caught from dolphin sets beginning on June 1, 1994. Surprisingly, the La Jolla Agreement survived, despite Congress's coldresponse. The low cost of compliance with the La Jolla Agreement, combinedwith the recognition that La Jolla represented the best way to keepEuropean markets open and the hope that the US would eventually open itsmarkets up all kept the La Jolla Agreement alive. Latin Americancountries began to channel its anger into pushing the US to fully implementthe La Jolla Agreement.

After months of heated negotiations, mediated by the environmental NGOspresent at the La Jolla negotiations, Latin American countries and the USagreed to the Panama Declaration on October 1, 1995. This agreement set aninternational mortality cap in the ETP at 0.2% of the dolphin stock'sminimum estimated abundance through the year 2000, followed by a 0.1% capafter 2000. The annual mortality cap could never exceed 5,000 dolphins.Investigations into bycatch reduction methods from log and school sets werefinally proposed. In return, the US agreed to legislate the following:elimination of all primary and secondary embargoes imposed on countries incompliance with the La Jolla Agreement and Panama Declaration, marketaccess for ETP yellowfin tuna, and a redefinition of dolphin-safe tuna toallow tuna from dolphin sets in which no dolphins were seriously hurt orkilled to qualify for the dolphin-safe label.

Despite the Panama Declaration, the US failed to pass legislation to codifythe multilateral agreements into US law in 1996. Latin American countrieshad to wait until 1997 before Congress finally passed the InternationalDolphin Conservation Program Act (IDCPA) of 1997. It was not a completevictory, either: the US refused to alter the definition of dolphin-safetuna until the NMFS conducted "stress" studies to show that the pursuit andencirclement of dolphins, even without observed serious injuries orfatalities, were not harming dolphin populations.

Nonetheless, the lack of a full commitment from the US did not stop LatinAmerica countries from using multilateral cooperation to further progress.Latin American countries and the US signed the Agreement on theInternational Dolphin Conservation Program in 1998. The treaty elevatedthe terms of the La Jolla Agreement and the Panama Declaration to bindingstatus. Furthermore, it prepared a new verification scheme in preparationfor the redefinition of dolphin-safe tuna.

The success of the multilateral environmental agreements astounded all butthe most zealous dolphin lovers. Dolphin mortality under the La JollaAgreement plummeted to 3,600 in 1993 and 2,000 in 1998. All that wasneeded to close the book on the tuna-dolphin debate was the label change sothat ETP tuna vessels could gain access to the lucrative US canned tunamarket.

It is Really Dolphin-Safe Tuna?

Preliminary results from the stress studies conducted by NMFS shattered anyhope that the tuna-dolphin debate would end soon. In the conclusion oftheir 1999 report to Congress on the matter, NMFS casts a shadow over themultilateral agreements:

In summary, evidence from a combination of research vessel estimates ofabsolute abundance and tuna vessel estimates of relative abundance andfishery mortality indicate that during the past decade there has been afailure to recover as expected by both the northeastern offshore spotteddolphin and eastern spinner dolphin stocks. Our first examination of alarge amount of data on the region's oceanography disclosed no indicationof a regime shift or other large-scale change that conceivably couldcontribute to this failure. A review of literature on stress in mammalssuggested that fishery-caused stress is a plausible contributor to such afailure. These latter two observations do not provide "proof" that the tunapurse seine fishery is the cause of the failures to recover but neither dothey dismiss it as a possible cause.

The problem is simple: dolphin stocks are not recovering as fast asexpected. Considering the impressive drops in dolphin mortality over theyears, one would expect the populations of the two types of dolphins mostcommonly found in association with tuna to rise. That has not been thecase. According to NMFS results, the population of eastern spinnerdolphins have remained stable, while the number of northeastern spotteddolphins have actually fallen in the past decade. The report ruled outany changes to the ocean environment, such as El Niño, as the cause for thesuppressed dolphin numbers. Source: NMFS Report to Congress, op. cit. 9, 19 (Figure 3), 20 (Figure 4). Unfortunately, NMFS could not rule out any other factors for the declinein dolphin numbers. It could not rule out certain changes in theecosystem, such as the disappearance of food for dolphins or increasedcompetition for resources by other sea animals. Nor could NMFS eliminatethe possibility that IATTC and national observers were intentionally orunintentionally misrepresenting total dolphin mortality or dolphinpopulations.

NMFS also failed to rule out the stress hypothesis. Several studiesexhibit how animals can be physiologically and psychologically sensitive tomanmade disruptions like helicopters. Other scientists have shown thatanimals often become injured during and after repeated chasing, hunting,and entrapment. This might be especially true of sets on dolphins, due tounobserved cow-calf separation and the physical and mental exhaustion ofbeing chased by tuna vessels for an hour or two.

The main problem with the NMFS preliminary data is that it is simply toosparse for anyone to make sound conclusions with. Certainly, the stresshypothesis is plausible, but NMFS did not acquire any evidence fromfirsthand field research that this theory had any scientific basis.Although no one could reasonably expect NMFS to acquire complete results inless than two years of work, it appears that the Clinton Administrationstalled in initiating the necessary research. In particular, Mexico wasmore than willing to participate in NMFS's necropsy research, but the USdid not take advantage of the opportunity.

The report left Commerce Secretary William Daley in a quandary. If tunafrom dolphin sets were contributing to a decline in dolphin populations,then allowing tuna from dolphin sets to be sold with the dolphin-safe labelwould be a disastrous public policy decision. On the other hand,maintaining the old label standard of no chase and encirclement of dolphinsmight permanently derail years of progress and cooperation with other ETPcountries.

On April 29, 1999, the Commerce Department announced its decision toauthorize the redefinition of dolphin-safe tuna. The decision would notgo unchallenged, however: on August 18, 1999, the Earth Island Instituteand a coalition of environmental and animal rights groups sued theDepartment of Commerce in US Federal District Court. On April 11, 2000,US District Judge Thelton Henderson ruled against the ClintonAdministration, saying that the decision to loosen the label standard wasnot justifiable given the scientific evidence that suggests the chasing andencircling of dolphins have a significant and unobserved impact on dolphinpopulations. As another chapter of the tuna-dolphin saga unfolds, it is all too temptingto let the debate sink back into a mud-slinging contest. Earth IslandInstitute blames the government for selling out to "a handful of foreigntuna millionaires in the dubious name of free trade." Secretary ofCommerce William Daley counters by arguing that, "For the internationalprogram to be effective in protecting dolphins, the foreign nations whichhave been responsible for reducing the harm to dolphins must have theincentive of selling their tuna to U.S. markets." The Mexican tunaindustry, now only half its size in 1990, is predictably furious about thelatest setback. Even Judge Henderson, who ordered the US government toenforce the MMPA embargoes from 1990 to 1992, has received both praise andblame for his latest ruling.

In the end, the true culprit is lack of information. Dolphin stocks arenot recovering, and the new fishing methods utilized by vessels in the ETPmight be to blame. But the evidence is far from conclusive. This leavesthe policy maker with a classic problem: take precautionary measures, orwait for convincing evidence? Both choices have merit.

Yes, the collapse of nearly a decade of international agreements would be aterrible setback. But if the new fishing procedures are causing furtherdecline of dolphin populations, then the treaty is not accomplishing itsgoal of minimizing dolphin mortality to sustainable levels and shouldtherefore be renegotiated.

What Lies Ahead

While the US government has appealed Judge Henderson's ruling, additionalinformation on the mysterious lack of recovery of dolphin populations willnot arrive for some time. A final determination on the stress effects fromNMFS is not due until December 31, 2002. Until then, it is safe to saythat the tuna-dolphin conflict will continue to drag on.

If the multilateral agreement on dolphin conservation falls apart, Mexicoand other countries might decide to file a complaint with the WTO over theUS label standard. A new tuna-dolphin dispute would surely test WTO's newdoctrine of seeking non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory, and multilateralsolutions to trade-related environmental problems. Among thecomplications: the WTO's stance on eco-labeling is not entirely known, asit refused to specify whether it supported both voluntary and mandatorylabeling; a failed multilateral environmental agreement can soften WTOsupport for unilateral trade sanctions; the doctrine of allowing the leasttrade-restrictive policies to stand will also be given a serious test; andfinally, the issue of bycatch that comes from a ban on dolphin sets mightforce the WTO panel to choose the lesser of two ecological evils. However,Mexico's failure to defeat the dolphin-safe label in 1991 might deter itfrom seeking a WTO dispute settlement panel on the matter.

A final note: the three giants of the US canned tuna industry, Star-Kist,Chicken of the Sea, and Bumble Bee, still refuse to buy ETP yellowfin tunafrom dolphin sets. They have voluntarily decided to stay with the oldlabel standard of no dolphin encirclement. Since they control 90% of theUS market, implementation of the new official US government label stillwould not grant other ETP countries the market access they want. It isquite possible that a victory by the Department of Commerce in implementingthe new dolphin-safe label standard would still be a hollow victory for theETP tuna industry. Whether the fragile alliance of Latin American states,the US, tuna fishers, dolphin lovers, environmentalists and free traderscan survive these latest and future developments remains to be seen. Untilthen, tuna-dolphin will be synonymous with conflict.