REQUEST
FOR APPLICATIONS (RFA)
EGAT/AFS-02-001
PROGRAM
FOR BIOSAFETY SYSTEMS (PBS)
ISSUE
DATE: March 22, 2002
CLOSING
DATE: May 31, 2002 (to be received by 5:00 pm EST)
Office of Agriculture and Food Security
Bureau for Economic Growth, Agricultural and Trade
GUIDELINES
FY
2002
PROGRAM
FOR BIOSAFETY SYSTEMS (PBS)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
PROGRAM SUMMARY AND GOAL
II.
BACKGROUND
III.
BIOSAFETY SYSTEMS APPROACH
IV.
A SPECIAL NOTE ON THE INCORPORATION OF THE BBI PROGRAM
V.
PARTNERSHIPS
VI.
TARGET COUNTRIES AND REGIONS
VII. A NOTE ON
LEADER/ASSOCIATE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS
VIII. PROHIBITED
ACTIVITIES
IX.
PROPOSAL FORMAT
X.
SELECTION CRITERIA
XI.
SUBMISSION OF APPLICATION
XII. QUESTIONS
REGARDING RFA
APPPENDIX A – ABSP
EVALUATION REPORT
APPENDIX B – BBI RFA
APPENDIX C -
CERTIFICATIONS
A.
COLLABORATIVE AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY (CABIO) INITIATIVE
This
RFA represents one component of a new USAID initiative that will take a
comprehensive and integrative approach to agricultural biotechnology. The
Collaborative Agricultural Biotechnology (CABIO) Initiative will carry the
lessons and success of the Agency’s previous Agricultural Biotechnology for
Sustainable Productivity (ABSP) program forward while addressing changes in
international dimensions of agricultural biotechnology. In addition to this RFA for the Program for
Biosafety Systems (PBS), please see the accompanying RFA for the Agricultural
Biotechnology Support Project (ABSP) II.
USAID
has invested in biotechnology with developing country partners for more than
ten years as one component of a larger strategy to increase agricultural
productivity and economic growth.
Adding to the weight of that experience are several international
reports that note the potential contribution of biotechnology to address
agricultural constraints and improve nutrition in developing countries. In July 2000, the Royal Society of London,
the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, and five national academies of sciences
from developing countries issued a joint report titled ‘Transgenic Plants and
World Agriculture’, which concluded that developing countries stand to make
significant gains in agricultural productivity from the adoption of this
technology (http://www.nap.edu/html/transgenic/). The 2001 United National Development Program’s annual Human
Development Report also concludes that developing countries might reap
significant benefits from genetically modified foods, crops and other organisms
to significantly reduce malnutrition and increase productivity on marginal
lands (http://www.undp.org/hdr2001).
The
CABIO Initiative is designed to address a comprehensive range of issues
surrounding the development and use of agricultural biotechnology. While CABIO will consist of a number of
activities across USAID’ s bureau and mission programs, it will place strong
emphasis on building synergies between these efforts and promoting
communication across activities to achieve a systems approach. CABIO will address the following goals:
I. Research & Technology Development: to integrate the tools of
biotechnology to support agriculture, nutrition, trade, and environment
objectives. These tools include
genetic engineering, molecular-assisted breeding and diagnostic methods for
crops and livestock.
II. Public Infrastructure Development
(institutional & human capacity building and policy development): to establish the public
sector framework in developing countries to support the development, use, and
management of biotechnology through strengthening scientific capacity; research
management; national policy frameworks, including development of effective
biosafety regulations; public outreach; and promotion of linkages between
public research and technology delivery or commercialization.
III.
Commercial Sector &
Delivery Systems: to address the delivery mechanisms for making improved technologies,
such as crops improved through biotechnology, available to farmers and to build
market integration of biotechnology.
While the focus will be primarily on private sector delivery systems for
seed or vaccines, NGO and/or public sector models will be considered as needed.
The
expanded scope of activities under CABIO reflects an increased commitment by
USAID to agriculture and increased opportunities and requests from our
developing country partners for assistance in biotechnology. The expanded scope
also provides the opportunity to more effectively integrate the tools of
biotechnology into our approaches to food security, economic growth, nutrition,
and environmental quality. These programs will complement other agricultural, environment
and trade activities supported by USAID.
B.
PROGRAM GOAL
The
goal of the Program for Biosafety Systems (PBS) is to more effectively address
biosafety within a sustainable development strategy anchored by agriculture-led
economic growth, trade, and environment objectives. This will require a comprehensive approach to biosafety, one that
looks at biosafety as a system beyond regulatory development. Through the PBS, USAID seeks to stimulate
innovative thinking about new approaches to biosafety that address the range of
needs in developing countries and that link policy development and formulation
of regulations more explicitly to considerations of implementation. Further, through innovative research, we seek
to expand the understanding of the broader relationships between biosafety
policy and issues such as technology development, agricultural and food
systems, and economic development. In
so doing, we seek to assist our partners in understanding policy options, and
impacts of those options, for integrating biosafety more effectively into
sustainable development strategies.
Within
the context of the second goal of the CABIO Initiative, the PBS will stress
linkages between biosafety policy and the development, access, and use of
biotechnology applications that will assist developing countries to improve
agricultural productivity in an environmentally sustainable fashion.
C.
PBS OBJECTIVES
Achieving
the goal of more effectively integrating biosafety into economic development
strategies will require innovative research and new approaches. Past experience by USAID and reflection on
international developments in the area of biotechnology and biosafety raise the
following challenges, among others, for the PBS:
·
New
models for biosafety systems that address issues of feasibility and the impacts
of different policy options for developing countries, innovative new approaches
to setting policy objectives and developing effective biosafety regulatory
systems are needed. These may
incorporate economic analyses of biosafety policy options, institutional
analyses of existing infrastructure and technical capacities including national
and regional approaches to biosafety, new tools and approaches to technical
capacity building, or broadening the range of capacity building among different
actors in a biosafety system.
·
Developing
approaches that are mutually supportive of host country and U.S. interests –
including economic development, trade and environment objectives.
·
Facilitating
access to technology – policy research is necessary to better understand the
impact of biosafety systems on access to technology by developing countries,
impacts on the range of technologies needed in developing country agricultural
systems, and impacts on public sector and local private sector development and
delivery of technology to small farmers.
·
Integration
of biosafety into related policies and international obligations in areas such
as food safety, environment, economic growth and food security is a
consideration for national policy integration and with respect to international
obligations such as the World Trade Organizations Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Agreement and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
·
Collaborating
with USAID Missions and Bureaus or other U.S. Government and development
partners for the purpose of designing new activities or contributing to
short-term activities.
A.
THE ABSP EXPERIENCE
Designed in 1991, the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project (ABSP, also known as Agricultural Biotechnology for Sustainable Productivity) was USAID’s first comprehensive and focused program in agricultural biotechnology. While designed primarily with a research and technology development goal, biosafety regulatory policy and intellectual property rights issues were integrated into the program from the start. This was in recognition of the fact that transfer and use of the technology would depend on establishment of the supporting policy framework and capacities to manage the further development of biotechnology. At the time, biosafety was not as significant a priority for developing countries themselves as scientific capacity building and technology transfer. Thus, in the early experience of ABSP, the progress of technology development under the program served as the primary motivation for progress on biosafety policy. As technologies arising from collaborative research came closer to the field-testing stage, partner countries gave higher priority to biosafety regulatory development to ensure access to technologies they co-developed and saw as beneficial. This linkage between technology and policy development under ABSP reinforced the mutual goals of the program. The types of biosafety activities undertaken by ABSP included:
· National biosafety guidelines and policy development;
· Sensitization of policy makers on issues of biosafety;
· Training of national biosafety committee members in biotechnology and risk assessment to support regulatory decision making;
· Institutional biosafety policy development for research and field testing;
· Training in the conduct of field tests under biosafety containment conditions;
· Limited infrastructure development of laboratory and greenhouse containment facilities;
· Development of a biosafety manual for training in risk assessment and risk management.
With increased focus in the international community on concerns associated with biotechnology and agreements such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the balance of interests and the complexity of surrounding issues shifted towards a far greater emphasis on biosafety and weakened links between biosafety and the technology development process. As a result, ABSP began to undertake new approaches to biosafety, in particular two regional efforts in east and southern Africa. In East Africa, ABSP supported the Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in East and Central Africa (ASARECA) to explore options for the definition of regional goals and the role of this regional organization of national agricultural research systems in convening a policy development process involving much broader stakeholders. ABSP will assist in the development of this regional initiative, but not its implementation. The Southern Africa Regional Biosafety training program (SARB) was a second regional initiative under ABSP in collaboration with the South African Agricultural Research Council’s Vegetable and Ornamental Plant Institute (ARC-VOPI). SARB focused on training related to regulatory implementation – risk assessment and decision making – to increase the understanding of regulatory implementation as countries were developing biosafety policies and to explore interest and commitment to a more explicit regional policy harmonization or cooperation approach.
In addition, as the technology matured in partner countries, biosafety challenges downstream of the laboratory research phase arose under ABSP such as:
· Examination of food safety policy options related to commercial approval of biotech crops;
· Identification of national or international laboratories and funding to conduct food safety analyses;
· Public outreach to address concerns about biotechnology;
· Seed and food industry acceptance of biotechnology; and,
· Media training to provide public information on biotechnology.
Additional information on the experience of ABSP can be found at the project web site: http://www.iia.msu.edu/ABSP or from the final project evaluation conducted in 2001, the report from which is attached as Appendix A to this RFA.
B.
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS TO BE CONSIDERED
In
addition to the experience of ABSP, the PBS should address new developments in
the international arena such as:
·
Given
the higher priority placed on biosafety by developing countries, many countries
will proceed with policy development in the absence of significant experience
or technical capacity in the sciences related to biotechnology and biosafety.
·
Biotechnology
applications are moving closer to entering the marketplace and farm use in
developing countries, both commercial technologies such as insect-resistant
cotton and technologies arising from public R&D at International
Agricultural Research Centers, U.S. and other international universities, and
leading national agricultural research systems.
·
The
complexity and costs of biosafety regulatory approval pose difficult challenges
for public R&D in terms of technical capacity, laboratory infrastructure,
understanding of effective regulatory systems, and funding for food safety and
environmental impact studies. USAID and
other donors have invested in public R&D to ensure development of a broader
range of crop applications than will attract private sector investment alone.
·
A
broader set of stakeholders in biotechnology, including food and seed
industries, the public, farmers’ organizations, etc.
·
International
agreements such as Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the elaboration of
biotechnology regulations and standards under the WTO-referenced agreements
Codex Alimentarius and the International Plant Protection Convention and other
relevant international standards such as the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO).
·
Impact
of biosafety on agricultural trade including exports and imports of food and
commodities.
III.
Biosafety
Systems Approach
In supporting innovate new approaches to biosafety, particular emphasis is placed on taking a more systematic and comprehensive view of biosafety, one not limited to establishing guidelines or regulatory policies alone. Rather, considering biosafety in light of related policies in other sectors, considering the impacts of biosafety policy options and considering the diverse players in an effective biosafety system would be key issues. Below are suggested key areas with issues under each that may be addressed. Please note that alternative approaches and factors beyond these will also be considered.
A.
SYSTEM COMPONENTS – are not limited to, but include the following issues of particular
interest:
1.
New
models for biosafety regulatory systems – including both national &
regional models that address the goals and objectives of the program outline in
sections I and II above.
2.
Policy
analysis to inform regulatory development – in particular, to assess the
impacts of different policy options on technology access, the types of
technologies available to developing country farmers, and economic growth, food
security, and environmental strategies
of developing countries
3.
National
and regional policy development – providing sensitization and technical
assistance in the development of biosafety regulatory policies in partner
countries.
4.
Capacity
building – human and institutional development among the different actors in
the system, ranging from policy makers, government regulators, scientists,
farmers, etc.
5.
Environmental
risk assessment and risk management research – see section IV on the absorption
of management of the Biotechnology and Biodiversity Interface grants program.
6.
Assistance
with regulatory packages – provide technical assistance to R&D institutions
and regulatory agencies in the design of strategies for the regulatory approval
of specific technologies in host countries.
7.
Public
outreach – training of policy makers and scientists in partner countries to
reach out to media and other groups to address public education on
biotechnology and biosafety. Note that
this is also identified as a component of ABSP II and thus linkages and
collaboration across these programs will be given high priority.
B.
COMPREHENSIVE DEFINITION OF ACTORS IN SYSTEM
In taking a more comprehensive and integrative approach to biosafety, the Program for Biosafety Systems should seek to engage a broader set of stakeholders in policy development and address the roles and capacities of the range of actors in a biosafety system. This may include, but is not limited to:
1.
Cross
ministerial and cross sectoral approach – reflecting the different approaches
countries have taken in who provides leadership on biosafety, as well as the
important roles, interests, and relevant experience of different ministries in
policy development and implementation.
In addition, this cross-ministerial approach will be necessary to
address relationships of biosafety policy to different sectoral strategies and
to different international agreements including agriculture, health,
environment, trade, and science & technology.
2.
In
addition to working across sectors or ministries, a comprehensive approach will
go beyond just addressing policy development and the role of regulators but
also include those who are regulated or indirectly affected by regulations. PBS should consider the distinct roles and
needs of different actors in the system, including, but not limited to:
·
policy
makers
·
regulators
·
national
and international public R&D institutions
·
agrifood
industries (including seed industry)
·
farmers
·
public.
C.
FRAMEWORK FOR SERVICE TO CABIO
It
is envisioned that PBS will provide a global framework for development of new
tools, methods, and experience that may be applied to other USAID efforts under
the CABIO Initiative. Under this model,
the Program for Biosafety Systems should consist of both global activities and
country or region-specific implementation (elaborated in Section VI). Among the types of global activities may be:
·
Training
courses
·
Development
of manuals or other information technology
·
New
models
·
Policy
analysis to inform decision-making
·
Technical
assistance for short-term activities.
In
addition, it is expected that implementation may include country or regional
specific application of these tools and activities that address the specific
needs of the partners. A small portion of program funds should be set aside for
technical assistance to USAID Bureaus or Mission to develop new activities and
associate awards, to other U.S. government activities related to biosafety
issues, or to develop new partnerships with other donor programs.
IV.
A
Special Note on the Incorporation of the BBI Program
In FY01, USAID launched a new competitive grants program, the Biotechnology and Biodiversity Interface grants program, or BBI. The BBI program supports research that provides information needed to assess the potential risks to natural biodiversity associated with agricultural biotechnology and to design risk management strategies appropriate to developing country agricultural systems.
The
primary goals of the BBI program are:
1)
To
assist regulatory bodies in making science-based decisions about the effects on
biodiversity of introducing genetically engineered organisms into the
environment.
2)
To
begin generating scientific data on potential risks associated with particular
applications of biotechnology on specific aspects of biodiversity in developing
countries.
3)
Develop
strategies for managing potential risks in the context of agroecosystems found
in developing countries.
4) Build collaboration between agricultural research and environmental conservation communities in the U.S. and developing countries.
5) To build capacity among developing countries in risk assessment and risk management research.
To both reduce the management burden of this program and to leverage the linkages between BBI and the new program described here, USAID seeks to integrate the management of BBI under the PBS. Under this arrangement the grantee of the PBS would be expected to issue an annual call for proposals under BBI, to engage external technical review in the determination of awards, and to issue sub-grants for each of the BBI awards. It is expected that there will be 3-5 sub-grants each year under this BBI component of the PBS. In the context of the cooperative agreement arrangement of PBS described in section VI, USAID’s Office of Agriculture and Food Security, and the Office of Environment and Natural Resources, will remain engaged in review of the priorities listed in the annual RFA and in review of proposals submitted under the BBI component. USAID will maintain authority for final approval of grants awarded under this activity. For your information, a copy of the BBI RFA issued in FY01 is attached to this RFA as Appendix B. It is expected that in subsequent years, priorities under the BBI program will be correlated with research and technology development supported by the ABSP II Program and other USAID biotechnology activities such that the ecological research supported under BBI will provide a foundation for the biosafety review of USAID-funded research.
V. Partnerships
The PBS will address a broad range of issues and support a comprehensive scope under the CABIO Initiative. It is expected that the PBS will require a broader range of expertise, perspectives, and resources than may be found in any one kind of institution, leading to a partnership approach both within the one program and as the PBS relates to other programs under CABIO.
A.
PARTNERSHIPS WITHIN PBS
Considering the range of
issues outlined above that comprise an integrated approach to biosafety, it is
anticipated that the PBS will be implemented by a consortium of different
institutions including, but not limited to U.S. universities, U.S. regulatory
agencies, international research and policy institutions (including those from
other developing countries), non-governmental organizations, other development
organizations, and individual consultants. The lead institution on the PBS may
represent any one of these types of institutions.
With respect to developing country partners, USAID seeks to emphasize their central role and responsibility for strategic decisions. Thus, we will place high priority on engagement of host country institutions as full partners in the program, not solely as recipients of technical assistance. In addition, creative partnerships that take advantage of expertise and experience of other developing country institutions or individuals will be of interest.
Finally, USAID seeks a partnership approach that will adapt over time as new countries or issues related to the program goal and objectives evolve into the program.
B.
PARTNERSHIPS ACROSS CABIO
As presented in the first section of this RFA, the PBS is one component of the integrated CABIO Initiative. USAID seeks mechanisms to leverage experience and impacts across the various efforts in CABIO. These include linkages between PBS and ABSP II such as seeing that the technical expertise in biotech developed by host country scientists developed under ABSP II is leveraged to promote science-based biosafety policies. Similarly, policy analysis under IBS can examine the potential impact of access to or commercialization of particular technologies developed under ABSP II or the Commercial Sector activities to be developed at a later date.
In addition to these new activities, USAID will seek linkages to other CABIO Initiatives in research innovation supported by EGAT/AFS, other bureaus, or our Missions. For example, USAID is currently in discussions with the Rockefeller Foundation in support of the development of the African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF) that will provide strategic management of projects that involve donation of technology from industry for the benefit of Africa. Among the issues the AATF will provide assistance with is the development of regulatory strategies for biotechnology applications as a means of addressing legal, liability, and product stewardship concerns surrounding biotechnology. As the AATF develops in the coming year, linkages between this service and the capacity building efforts of the PBS will be sought.
To achieve these linkages and cross fertilization, proposals in response to this RFA and that of ABSP II should specifically address mechanisms for cross-program service and communication. In addition, the Agency will be developing approaches such as regional or subject-matter partnerships meetings on biotechnology issues. Finally, to provide strategic direction to USAID across the diverse programs under the CABIO Initiative, USAID will establish a Biotechnology Advisory Board that will hold annual meetings to examine issues and progress across activities.
VI.
Target
Countries & Regions
Through a combination of core funding from EGAT/AFS and Missions and regional bureaus, the leader program will address two geographic regions – Asia and Africa – though it is anticipated that additional countries and regions will be added through associate awards over the life of the program. Proposals should address these core regions while balancing the country/regional specific activities with developing new tools and approaches that have global relevance and can be adapted to new partners and countries as associate awards may be added. The specific needs and activities in each country may be elaborated in more detail in the annual work plans, once the program has been initiated and more time has been allotted for dialogue between the international and host country partners. It is also recognized that all the host country partners may not be identified in the short time of this RFA. Proposals should address a process for how partners will be identified and consulted and the types of partners that will be considered.
A.
ASIA LEADER PROGRAM
In
collaboration between EGAT/FAS, the Asia/Near East Bureau, and country Missions,
the leader program for Asia will address the following countries:
Proposals may take the form of regional, or sub-regional (e.g. pairs such as India/Bangladesh and/or Philippines/Indonesia), a country-level approach, or some hybrid of regional and country-level activities. Considering the state of biosafety development and experience differs among these countries, it is expected that the specific activities may vary among them. Hybrid approaches that incorporate sub-regional or regional activities as a means of promoting policy dialogue or sharing of experiences may be considered. The funding level for each country may vary and the annual work plan will be approved in consultation between EGAT/AFS and the Missions in these countries.
These same countries and region has been identified under the ABSP II leader program. Cross-project activities and linkages will be sought to leverage the relationship between the science and technology and policy development.
B.
AFRICA LEADER PROGRAM
Through
funding from both EGAT/AFS and the Africa Bureau, the leader program will
include two regional efforts in Africa:
USAID
is specifically seeking development of sub-regional approaches to biotechnology
in Africa to complement the Agency’s ongoing investment in sub-regional
agricultural organizations to promote greater dissemination of technology and
make effective use of scarce donor and African resources. The specific goals of
a sub-regional approach may be defined in terms of regional training
activities, policy analysis to support regional decision making, regional
regulatory harmonization, regulatory cooperation, formal inter-government
agreements or other strategies. Which
option(s) one may take on a sub-regional basis will need to involve priority
setting and commitments by both national and sub-regional partners. Through separate efforts, USAID is
supporting regional biotechnology priority setting and research through two
sub-regional organizations: the Association for Strengthening Agricultural
Research in East and Central Africa (ASARECA) and Conference des Responsables Africains et Francaise de la
Recherché Agronomique (CORAF) in West Africa.
Other regional stakeholders in aspects of biosafety include trade and
economic agreements, biotechnology advocacy groups, and seed associations.
The
PBS should develop methods, tools, and approaches that provide a framework not
only for these leader-program targets, but that provide a framework for
addition of specific Mission-funded associate awards and exploration of efforts
in Southern Africa in future years.
C.
FUTURE MISSION OR BUREAU ASSOCIATE AWARDS
It
is expected that in addition to the leader program targets above, additional
regions or countries will be added in response to associate awards.
VII.
A
Note on Leader/Associate Cooperative Agreements
A.
LEADER/ASSOCIATE MECHANISM
The Leader with Associate (LWA) form of a cooperative agreement was introduced by USAID several years ago to provide additional flexibility in the Agency’s procurement mechanisms. The benefit of the LWA is to provide the opportunity for Missions or regional bureaus to support specific activities within the broader scope of the Leader cooperative agreement and to maintain specific reporting by the Leader against that specific scope of activities. While it is expected that the EGAT Bureau will still provide technical oversight to most associate awards due to the lack of biotechnology expertise in Missions, the LWA mechanisms does give Missions or regional bureaus greater flexibility in integrating biotechnology and biosafety into their agriculture, environment, or economic growth strategies.
While
the Leader award is a cooperative agreement, any Associate awards from Mission
or other USAID offices may be awarded as a cooperative agreement or as a
grant. There would be neither an
additional competition requirement not pre-established dollar ceiling on
Associate awards. The Mission or USAID
bureau office that funds the award would manage each Associate award though
they may seek technical assistance from the EGAT Pillar Bureau to complement
their management capacity.
In
addition to an expected $15 million over five years in core funding from EGAT
for the Leader program, it is anticipated that Associate awards of up to $15
million over a period of five years may be made. The amount and extent of Associate awards are unknown, and there
is no overall limit on them. Associate
awards may be made for any length of time and at any time during the program
until the Leader award expires June 30, 2006. Associate awards may be issued
until the Leader award expires. It is
necessary for the Leader award to continue in force until all the Associate
awards are completed since the Associate awards will not contain separate
standard provisions. Instead they will
be subject to the provisions of the Leader award.
B.
SUBSTANTIAL INVOLVEMENT UNDERSTANDING
The
cooperative agreement mechanism provides substantial involvement by USAID
during implementation of the PBS. The
USAID Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) for the PBS will be substantially
involved in the following areas:
·
Annual Work plan/Revision – The USAID CTO will be
consulted during the development of the annual work plans and their revision
and has the right of final approval. The CTO will also consult with Missions or
other Bureaus engaged as part of either the leader or associate awards before
approval of work plans. Work plans
should include a description of annual activities, timeframe, and planned
achievements against the program objectives.
·
Key Personnel – The USAID CTO will be
consulted and have the right-of-approval for the designation of key positions
and appointment of key personnel, including at the lead institution and significant
partner institutions in the program.
·
Monitoring and Evaluation – The USAID CTO will be
consulted during the development of monitoring and evaluation plans, including
advisory bodies established under the program for this purpose, and have the right
of final approval.
VIII.
Prohibited
Activities
Due to legislative restrictions on USAID activities, the following provisions will be incorporated in the LWA cooperative agreements to be issued:
1.
The
recipient shall not use, expend, or otherwise utilize funds obligated hereunder
to engage in any testing or breeding feasibility study, variety improvement or
introduction, consultancy, publication, conference, or training in connection
with the growth or production in a foreign country of an agricultural commodity
for export which would compete with a similar commodity grown or produced in
the United States, excepting activities designed to increase food security in
developing countries where such activities will not have a significant impact
on the export of agricultural commodities of the United States, or research
activities intended primarily to benefit American producers.
2.
The
recipient shall not expend or otherwise utilize funds obligated hereunder to
provide (a) any financial incentive to a business enterprise currently located
in the United States for the purpose of inducing such an enterprise to relocate
outside the United States if such incentive or inducement is likely to reduce
the number of employees of such business enterprise in the United States because
United States production is being replaced by such enterprise outside the
United States; (b) assistance for the purpose of establishing or developing in
a foreign country any export processing zone or designated area in which the
tax, tariff, labor, environment, and safety laws of that country do not apply,
in part or in whole, to activities carried out within that zone or area, unless
the President determines and certifies that such assistance is not likely to
cause a loss of jobs within the United States; or (c) assistance for any
project or activity that contributes to the violation of internationally
recognized workers rights.
3.
The
recipient shall not expend or otherwise utilize funds obligated hereunder for
any activity that may have a significant effect on the environment without
further environmental review and approval by USAID. In particular, any activities that involve the transfer or
testing of genetically engineered products must comply with the Agency’s
biosafety policy.
IX.
PREPARATION
OF APPLICATIONS
Submit
one (1) unbound original and five
(5) copies of proposal typed using single-spaced, no smaller than twelve
(12) point font with one (1) inch margins, on single-sided paper.
A.
Cover Sheet (1-2 pages) which states the following:
·
Title
of RFA
·
Name
(and country if not apparent from name) of all organizations in partnership;
include names of key individuals if identified based on specific expertise
·
Name
and contact of proposed program director at lead institution. All further
correspondence will be with this individual unless otherwise designated.
B.
Executive Summary (1-4 pages) with the following:
·
Summary
of biosafety systems approach;
·
Summary
of partnership approach;
·
Summary
of expected outcomes at end of project.
C.
Project Description (20 pages maximum) which addresses the
following:
·
Section
II and III of this RFA or additional innovative ideas in biosafety that address
Goals and Background in sections I and II.
·
Approach
to each of the Leader countries/regions discussed in section V of this RFA.
D.
Expected Outcomes (5 pages maximum), including addressing the following:
·
Specific
proposed intermediate project milestones, end of project outcomes, and
longer-term (i.e. after project completion in some cases) impacts;
·
Timetable
for reaching milestones;
·
How these will support the goals and
objectives in section I of this RFA.
E.
Lead Institution (1-2 pages), including addressing:
·
Biosafety
expertise with a discussion of which specific aspects of biosafety it has
expertise;
·
Demonstrated
capacity to manage international development programs.
F.
Other U.S., International, and Host Country or Regional partners (5
pages maximum);
for each discuss
·
Role
in program with reference to the proposed biosafety system;
·
Specific
aspects of biosafety expertise;
·
Experience
in international development programs.
G.
Management structure (2-3 pages), including addressing:
·
Staffing
at lead institution;
·
Structure
and approach to relationships with other U.S., international & host country
partners;
·
Monitoring
and review strategy, including use of technical advisory committees, etc. - how
will decisions be made internal to the program on which activities are
successful, what should be expanded or cut based on performance, etc.
·
Approach
to interaction across CABIO Initiative.
H.
Budget Summary (2-3 pages)
·
May
include representative annual and/or life of project budget;
·
Indicate
any complementary funding contributed as cost sharing by partner institutions
and any other federal or donor support for implementation of proposed program
(Note: USAID requests some degree of
cost-sharing, and strongly encourages applicants to cost-share
a minimum 25% of total program cost).
I.
Annexes
1.
Certifications
and SF424
Applicants are requested to submit the Certification
(see Appendix C to this RFA) and SF424 (in addition to budget summary above). Note:
USAID requests some degree of cost-sharing, and strongly encourages
applicants to cost-share a minimum 25% of total
program cost. See the following USAID web page to download the
SF424: http://www.usaid.gov/procurement_bus_opp/procurement/forms/SF-424/. Please make sure sufficient budget narrative
(purpose and basis) and breakdown of costs, for all five years of the proposal,
are submitted with the SF424 to determine cost reasonableness.
Please indicate concurrence to standard provisions
that can be viewed at USAID website http://www.usaid.gov/publs/ads/300/303.pdf.
2.
Letters
of support from partners and any other organizations such as USAID Missions,
other donors, or groups working in this area.
X.
Selection
Criteria
A.
Systems Framework Design (40 points)
·
The
extent to which the proposed approach addresses the range of components and
players in the development and implementation of biosafety systems;
·
The
extent to which the proposed approach links issues and implications of a
biosafety system across different sectors;
·
The
feasibility of the approach;
·
The
degree of innovation of the proposed approach.
B.
Strength of the Partnership (30 points)
·
Role
in program (with reference to goals) of lead institution and other U.S. or
international partners;
·
Role
in program (with reference to goals) of host country or regional partners;
·
Diversity
of expertise in agricultural biotechnology and experience in international
development program of lead institutions and partners;
·
Management
structure and strategy.
C.
Potential to Create an Enabling Policy Environment (30 points)
·
Capacity
building strategy
·
The
extent to which the proposed activity is relevant to USAID goals and
objectives;
·
The
extent to which the proposed regulatory approach will be feasible for
developing countries to implement;
·
Consideration
of economic implications or other impacts by the proposed approach.
·
Support
of U.S. and host country mutual interests.
XI.
Submission
of Application
Applications in response to this RFA should be submitted according to the format described in section VII. The EGAT Bureau should receive one unbound original and five (5) copies [for a total number of six (6)] by 5:00 pm EST on May 31, 2002. Applications should be sent to:
By Mail: By
Courier/Express Mail:
PBS PBS
Attn: Josette Lewis or Attn: Josette Lewis or
Bhavani Pathak Bhavani
Pathak
EGAT/AFS EGAT/AFS
Rm 2.11-052
1300 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
XII.
Questions Regarding RFA
Any questions related to this RFA should be submitted in writing on or before April 26, 2002 via fax or email (no postal correspondence please) to:
Josette
Lewis, Ph.D.
Senior
Biotechnology Advisor
USAID
Rm
2.11.052
Fax:
202-216-3579
Email:
[email protected]
or
Bhavani
Pathak, Ph.D.
Biotechnology
Specialist
USAID
Rm
2.11.053
Fax:
202-216-3579
Email:
bpathak@usaid.gov
All written questions will be answered and made available to the public on or before May 10, 2002.
APPENDIX A – ABSP EVALUATION
FINAL PROJECT EVALUATION
Project Title: ABSP:
Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project
Project Number: 936-4197
Name of Grantee: Michigan State
University, East Lansing, MI
Cooperative Agreement No.: DAN-A-00-91-00126-00
Project Director: Catherine L.
Ives, ABSP, Michigan State University
Tel:
(517) 432-1641, Fax: 353-1888, [email protected]
USAID Project Contact: Josette Lewis, Biotechnology Officer
EGAT/AFS
USAID, Washington, DC 20523-2110
Tel:
(202) 712-5592, Fax: 216-3579, [email protected]
Review Team: Carliene
Brenner, Consultant in Emerging Technologies
Paris, France
Maria Jose
Sampaio, IPR and Biotechnology Advisor EMBRAPA, Brasilia, Brazil
Ana Maria
Sittenfeld, Associate Professor
Center for
Research in Cellular and Molecular Biology, University of Costa Rica, San Jose,
Costa Rica
Ann Marie Thro,
National Program Leader-Plant Genetics
(Team Coordinator)
USDA/Cooperative
States Research, Education, & Extension Service, Washington, D. C., USA
Site Visit Dates: June 9-15
and July 9-18, 2001
Sites visited: Michigan
State University, Lansing, Michigan
Cornell
University, Ithaca, New York
AGERI,
Cairo, Egypt
Various
sites, Indonesia
Report date: October 29, 2001
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive summary 20
1. B<DIV><SPAN
class=950194810-20072001>ackground 30
2.
<DIV><SPAN
class=950194810-20072001>Research 34
3. <DIV><SPAN
class=950194810-20072001>Policy 41</SPAN></DIV>
4. <DIV><SPAN
class=950194810-20072001>Technology Transfer and Commercialization 46
5. </SPAN></DIV><DIV><SPAN
class=950194810-20072001>Communication and Networking 50
6. <DIV><SPAN
class=950194810-20072001>Management 53 </SPAN></DIV>
7. <DIV><SPAN
class=950194810-20072001>Budget and Buy-ins 60 </SPAN></DIV>
8.
<DIV><SPAN
class=950194810-20072001><DIV><SPAN class=950194810-20072001>References 63
9.
List of Acronyms 64
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The present document represents the
findings and recommendations of a comprehensive external evaluation of USAID’s
flagship effort in agricultural biotechnology over the last decade. ABSP was a bold and original effort to
empower developing countries to capture new technologies for their own purposes,
understand and manage new issues, and so enter a new era in their agricultural
development. The project planners were
the first to foresee these needs, or certainly, the first to undertake a
development project that attempted to meet them.
In 1991, any project such as ABSP
that hoped to have transgenic products for commercialization within six to ten
years, had no choice but to use “on-the-shelf” technologies in situations where
these could meet a need. By 2001, both
the scientific and political landscapes in agricultural biotechnology applications
changed dramatically. So fast has the
science evolved, that most crops can be transformed successfully, and gene
discovery in a reasonable time frame seems feasible for many situations (NSTC,
2000). A follow-on project to ABSP will
have unprecedented biological opportunities to provide useful
technologies. This will be extremely
important in the next decade, when the development community focuses hard on
the problem of improving food crop productivity and economic opportunity in
areas, such as Africa, where it has stagnated or declined, and if adaptation to
climate change requires new crop germplasm everywhere.
The external environment for
transgenic technologies, however, has become more complex. For a kaleidoscope of reasons beyond the
scope of this review, opposition to transgenic products has closed certain
markets to transgenic products, at least for the time being --markets that
developing countries hope to access.
Regulatory regimes for environmental and human health and food safety are
creating the need for sophisticated review processes and imposing very high
costs -- hurdles that are the most difficult for the countries most in need of
new tools for food security and development.
A follow-on project will also have great challenges in supporting
countries’ efforts to bring biotechnology products to market successfully.
These technological opportunities
and policy challenges are precisely the reasons why the common goal of ABSP--to
demonstrate the value of transgenic technologies for development--remains in
need of a long-term, responsive, and flexible project, with ever-closer
involvement of stakeholders in the developing country partners as well as the
United States.
Because ABSP was in many ways a
pioneering and unique project, the primary purpose of the evaluation was to
highlight its most successful practices and innovations, i.e., aspects any
follow on project would do well to emulate, from those that were not effective
and which a follow-on project should correct. A second purpose of the review
was to identify major strengths and weaknesses in the way in which ABSP carried
out the agenda set forth in the project documents.
MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS OF ABSP
·
Innovative linkages: The project
forged private-public, public-public, and private-private linkages
successfully. This created enabling
environments in developing countries for the application of modern agbiotech in
developing countries. With more
business management expertise, these could have gone even farther. The lessons learned could prove highly
valuable to future projects, both international and domestic.
·
Created positive awareness of
biotechnology in developing countries, and highlighted the importance of policy
aspects in planning research activities, particularly in collaborative
projects.
·
Successfully fostered the
development of high-quality national biotechnology research expertise in Egypt
and Indonesia.
·
Provided integrated approach
protocols and methods for biotechnology policy development to a wide range of
relevant officials in developing countries.
·
Time frame: The project time frame
was long enough for the project to use lessons from its own experiences to
improve project design.
·
Maintaining continuous and effective
communication with USAID.
·
Forward-looking policy activities
Phase II should provide a foundation for further USAID collaboration,
particularly in Africa.
SHORTCOMINGS OF ABSP
·
ABSP's own learning curve in
managing product development and biotechnology policy:
Ø
IPR audits, risk assessment
protocols, and biosafety/food safety data collection were begun late on
promising research products closest to the market,
Ø
Continued funding for projects not
likely to support ABSP’s goals of product development-related research.
·
Weak tools for (sub-) project
selection and evaluation; breakdowns in effectiveness of research monitoring
and accountability mechanisms -- for a range of reasons, some beyond the
project’s control.
·
The choice of research objectives,
especially in Phase I:
Ø
Based on a biological assessment of
needs and opportunities, but with need for more use of socio-economic, market
and other analyses appropriate to a project targeted at ultimate
commercialization,
Ø
Need for more national stakeholder
participation in priority setting.
ABSP PROJECT BACKGROUND
In 1990, as part of designing a new
program in agricultural biotechnology, USAID called upon the National Research
Council (NRC) of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences for assistance in
identifying priorities for an international biotechnology development
program. The NRC panel recommended
equal weight on addressing institutional management issues, such as
intellectual property rights (IPRs) and biosafety, research and technology
development, and private-public or private-private sector linkages.
Building upon these recommendations,
USAID designed the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project (ABSP) to
integrate policy with research and training.
The project would bring together public sector and commercial research
with the long-term goal of increasing incomes of the poor, and expanding
availability of food while maintaining sustainable productivity. It would achieve this through mutually
enhancing U.S. and LDC institutional capacity for use and management of
biotechnology to develop environmentally compatible, improved germplasm. During the anticipated six-year project
life, it was to move from the research and development stage to field testing
of potential products.
In September 1991, a cooperative
agreement for ABSP was awarded to Michigan State University (MSU), as a
consortium of public sector institutions and private companies in the United
States and developing countries.
ABSP’s scientific objectives included transfer of host plant resistance
genes into developing country crops.
Training of scientists, administrators, and policy makers in biosafety
procedures and intellectual property rights was an important priority.
In 1998, ABSP was granted a
non-competitive extension (Phase II) to continue until 2002. The primary goal of Phase II was to move to
move promising transgenic research to field-testing and initiate the
registration process in developing countries.
An additional goal was to build on the policy training of Phase I, to
help improve the capacity and policy environment for management and
commercialization of agricultural biotechnology in developing and transition
economies.
RESEARCH
ABSP is to be recognized as a unique program for its use of innovative approaches in both the scientific procedures used, and the structure of research collaborations implemented between public and private sector institutions in the US and developing countries. By coupling these interactions with investments in infrastructure and capacity building, ABSP created environments in developing countries capable of producing world class scientific research. In many cases, scientific research also stimulated policy activities leading to the creation of necessary frameworks to support biotech commercialization. The main research developments occurred in the production of improved micro-propagation methods, and genetically modified plants resistant to pests, diseases, and drought, and tolerant to salinity.
POLICY
ABSP today is a radiograph of what
now seems so obvious: issue awareness and capacity building, research and
policy developed side by side. However, ten years ago it took sharp insight to
propose and implement such a design.
USAID, through ABSP, has promoted science development and technology
transfer, both direct and indirect; helped increase awareness of biotechnology,
and developed of political, philosophical and practical aspects of both
intellectual property and biosafety issues surrounding the use of transgenic
crops.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND COMMERCIALIZATION
ABSP has been highly successful in some aspects
of technology transfer. Its
achievements have been notable in the following areas: training and research
collaboration, particularly with private sector partners; helping to create an
enabling environment in developing country partners for the transfer of
materials for research and testing purposes; and creating innovative technology
transfer institutions in Egypt and Indonesia.
It has not, however, succeeded in the key objective of bringing a
transgenic product to the stage of commercialization.
COMMUNICATION
AND NETWORKING
Perhaps the most
notable overall achievement of ABSP in communication and networking is that it
raising awareness on a range of issues associated with agricultural
biotechnology, not only in participating countries, but also in other
developing countries. These issues
include not only the potential of biotechnology to contribute to problems
confronting developing country agriculture, but also potential risks associated
with its use, and management of these risks.
MANAGEMENT
ABSP management did an excellent job
of balancing research and policy aspects throughout the project; of enlisting
private sector partners despite different private vs. public sector cultures
and practices; and of sustaining the visibility of the project’s unique
goals. ABSP management also maintained
a constructive relationship with USAID throughout the project. The design of new projects as ABSP
progressed showed that management actively learned from its own experience with
the new forms of research partnerships it encouraged (for example, compare the
structure of the later Pioneer/AGERI project with the earlier ICI/Indonesia
project). These lessons will be
invaluable to any follow-on project receptive to the experience of ABSP. Management structure was clarified in Phase
II, and in anticipation of a recommended reduction in management activity,
staff was reduced. However, numerous
activities continued in Phase II, and in some areas even increased, leading to
management over-extension. In addition,
in both phases, expertise in business development was recommended for the
management team but not obtained, and strong technical review and
accountability mechanisms were lacking.
These problems impacted ABSP’s ability to make targeted decisions about
resource allocation.
BUDGET AND BUY-IN
ABSP’s planned Phase I core budget
was drastically cut just at the time that start-up activities were scheduled to
expand. ABSP management showed energy,
persistence, and persuasion to have been able to attract and retain capable
partner institutions in an atmosphere of chronic financial retrenchment and
unpredictability.
In general, ABSP benefited from the
additional funds contributed by USAID country missions. When buy-in funding in Phase II, in
particular, emphasized research, ABSP management maintained overall balance by
using core funds for policy development activities. However, management's ability to require accountability for
technical progress in the buy-in research projects, and for adherence to ABSP's
product development goal, was undermined.
Country missions did not have technical capacity to do reviews to
require accountability from biotechnology research.
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SHORT TERM (for the final
phase of ABSP)
·
Immediately revisit the potato project in Egypt and the cucurbit
project in several countries to ensure that investment is not lost. There is a
need to focus on research issues related to product development, such as
adaptation of transgenic lines to tropical environments, and evaluation of
agricultural performance at different sites in developing countries.
·
Increase the number of publications from research activities. In particular promote joint publications by
scientists from the US and developing countries. Such publications should
include documentation of the learning experiences of ABSP, to extend benefits
of lessons learned beyond the immediate participants.
·
Revisit those projects where the research is too ‘upstream’ to
provide results to a developing country in the time frame of ABSP, and make
go/no go decisions based on recommendations from a TAG review.
·
Conduct ecological assessment, gene
flow analysis and food safety research for transgenic potatoes and cucurbits.
Policy
1. Intellectual Property
(IP) Rights:
·
Make arrangements for freedom to
operate (FTO) with all components of on-going projects.
·
Out-source with private IP offices
experienced in working with developing countries to review FTO of IP-protected
components and implement license agreements required for the continuation of
on-going projects linking those with pre-market analyses (royalty &
mile-stone payments).
2. Biosafety:
·
Develop cost estimations of
biosafety risk assessment, management and communication as part of the project,
on a case by case basis.
·
Review/start developing food and environmental safety data for
individual products which are on the verge of reaching the commercial phase.
·
With specialists, review country food and environmental safety
protocols to identify adaptations appropriate to LOCAL conditions.
·
Organize short seminars on practical aspects of environmental and
food safety, for lawyers, politicians, policy makers, NGOs and other players.
Technology Transfer and Commercialization
·
During the time that remains, effort should
remain focused on achieving, to the extent possible, the objectives set in
Phase II of the project. This would
involve, in particular:
Ø Resolving
the situation in Indonesia regarding approval for the multi-location trials for
transgenic potato,
Ø Taking
decisions regarding future options for commercialization of products generated
by AGERI.
·
Ensure that the relevant socio-economic studies
are conducted in the case of the High Beta-Carotene Mustard project, to
determine how development and delivery costs will be met, and by which public
or private sector partners.
Communication
and Networking
·
In the time remaining, it is important that, to
the extent possible, a proper balance be maintained between:
- Ensuring that the
project remains focused on achieving the objectives set but not yet met,
- Maintaining
communication with a growing number of partners,
- Consolidating the
results and lessons to be drawn from the life of the project.
·
ABSP should publish, in a widely accessible
format, a description and analysis of the cumulative "lessons
learned" by ABSP management, particularly lessons learned in
private-sector collaborations.
·
USAID should organise a final international
workshop. Such an event, the
proceedings of which would be published, would help determine the directions of
a new program and would, at the same time, be a fitting concluding event of the
ABSP program.
Management
·
Obtain business development
expertise to assist in the development of socio-economic and business plans for
ABSP products close to the market (see recommendations for Technology Transfer
and Commercialization).
B. LONG TERM (for future projects)
·
Research projects within larger
composite projects such as ABSP should be selected and approved on the basis of
competitive calls for proposals and a peer review recommendation process in
both U.S. and developing countries.
·
Implement effective systems for
evaluation and scientific accountability, including incremental reviews to
permit adjustments in the course of research plans.
·
Prioritise research objectives
giving stronger weight to country needs -- this has become more feasible due to
scientific advances since the ABSP project was designed in 1991.
·
Continue and increase private-private collaboration, and
facilitate industry internships for senior scientists from public institutions
to private sectors. Include the
nurturing of weak local seed industries as an objective in these partnerships.
·
Include food safety research, ecological assessment, and risk
management for tropical areas (see also “Policy”).
·
Create stronger links with other
biotechnologies such as molecular genetics, and stronger links with applied
breeding to ensure that research products are ultimately presented to farmers
and consumers in desirable varieties.
·
Reduce investment risk by creating a balanced portfolio of
projects, including transgenic technologies and molecular biology, in support
of classical plant breeding methods in export and local crops. This may afford opportunities to interface
with other USAID projects.
·
Increase frequency of meetings to
promote detailed discussion of scientific programs, especially for planning
experimental details (see also “Management”).
·
Continue and increase capacity building for developing research
institutions in developing countries capable of independently identifying needs
and performing research.
·
Include research programs that consider mix crop-livestock systems
and livestock diseases. This will be
timely in light of the projected increase in demand for meat and milk over the
next two decades in developing countries.
Policy
1. Intellectual Property
Rights:
·
Develop strategic planning of the IP
platform needed for individual products before project starts.
·
Map out the ownership of a set of
most useful tools and components and provide this information to biotechnology
users.
·
Review and expand the IPR course to
include technology transfer offices, and management and implementation of PVP
laws (UPOV-like model).
·
Expand participation in these
courses to include judiciary systems of developing countries.
·
Develop case studies e.g. transfer
of genes and processes covered by third party IPR - practical applications.
·
Develop model contracts and model
material transfer agreements to provide to partners.
2. Biosafety:
·
Continue to provide funds for
specialized biosafety infrastructure.
Review the available “tool boxes” for engineering new products, in accordance with the latest safety requirements.
Expand the biosafety course to include the design of food and environmental safety protocols for model products adapted for specific regions of the globe.
·
Audit laboratories for best practices and international
certification.
Technology Transfer and Commercialization
·
If collaborative research, technology
development and transfer are to be successful, the choice of research
techniques, technologies to be developed and choice of crops should be decided
mutually between research institutions in the United States and developing
country partners.
·
Socio-economic analysis should underpin the
choice of research projects and technology development. At the very least this would involve
analysis of market conditions and prospects.
·
Funds should be allocated for the
"development" (lab to small and large-scale testing) phase of
R&D.
·
Retain and increase the Competitive Small Grants program, for both
public and private sector partners, for research, pilot development and
marketing projects.
·
Research teams should include a socio-economist
or market analyst.
Communication
and Networking
· In any future project, networking resources should be provided to bring all participants together on a regular basis to report on their work and discuss technical and policy-related issues of common interest.
Management
·
Include professional business
development expertise in the management team from the beginning.
·
Continue an external Technical
Advisory Group (TAG) to monitor and advise on progress.
·
Design robust mechanisms for
monitoring and accountability based on realistic understanding of both USAID
and cooperating institution requirements and constraints.
·
Use a uniform reporting format with
short "highlights" sections on progress, expectations, issues, problems,
and adjustments.
·
Select in-country coordinators
carefully and assist them to identify possible conflicts of interest to be
resolved; provide funds for logistics to meet their responsibilities to the
project.
·
Develop a network in which
participants in different research projects share responsibility for a common
goal--in ABSP’s case, the goal of demonstrating biotechnology’s value for
sustainable development. The management
objectives here are to create self-monitoring forces through constructive peer
pressure, and to empower participants to generate spin-offs.
·
Give careful consideration, in the
design of any new project, to balance between national and regional activities.
·
USAID should provide additional
support to the USAID Biotechnology Officer.
This need was chronic throughout ABSP, an obstacle to the degree of
contact necessary between a donor and a project as complex as ABSP. Additional support will be even more necessary
in future in an ever-more-changeable technical and political environment and
with increasing demands on this USAID position.
Budget And Buy-In
·
USAID should seek a mechanism for
protecting project core budgets, especially once commitments have been made and
collaborators have begun expenditures.
·
USAID should develop best-practice
guidelines for interactions between global units and country missions, to
obtain maximum benefits from country-specific knowledge, global perspectives,
and agency investments. Projects that
demonstrate exceptional synergy between country/mission objectives and global
unit goals should be recognized.
Section 1. BACKGROUND
In the mid 1980's as agricultural biotechnology
started to move toward commercialization in the United States, development
community interest in the potential of biotechnology for developing countries
also increased. The first initiative
of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in the area of
biotechnology was the Tissue Culture for Crops Project (TCCP) based at Colorado
State University. Research sponsored
under the TCCP sought to produce crops (wheat, rice and sorghum) tolerant to an
array of stresses, including salinity, drought, and acid/aluminum soil
conditions. As new technologies were
developed, USAID began a review of opportunities to support biotechnology in
1989.
As a basis for designing a new program in
international agricultural biotechnology, USAID followed the procedure used by
leading domestic research initiatives, i.e. it called upon the National
Research Council (NRC) of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. The NRC was asked for assistance in
identifying broad priorities for consideration in an international
biotechnology development program. NCR
appointed a panel of experts consisting of seven US university scientists, two
representatives of the US private sector, one representative each from a
private foundation and from USDA, four from international research centers,
eight USAID staff members, and one representative of a developing country
national agricultural research program.
With the possible exception of some of the USAID members whose expertise
is not given, all but one panelist were biologists. The panel met in September 1989.
The NRC panel (NRC, 1990) made recommendations
regarding specific biotechnologies, objectives, and technological capacity
building, but placed equal weight on the capacity to address issues of
intellectual property rights (IPRs) and biosafety. The panel also suggested private-public or private-private sector
linkages. Building upon these
recommendations, USAID designed a program that integrated aspects associated
with the dissemination and application of biotechnology, particularly
management and technology transfer issues, with biotechnology research
training. USAID issued a competitive
call for proposals (Request for Applications: RFA No. W/FA-91-004 Agricultural
Biotechnology for Sustainable Productivity (ABSP), Project No. 936-419, issued
June 17, 1991, closing date July 23, 1991).
This new project was designed to bring together
public sector and commercial research efforts in an integrated
product-development program. The ABSP
project was designed to support a program of research and development for six
years at a cost of $6,035,000 of central funds. Participatory funding
(“buy-ins”) from missions and regional bureaus was anticipated at $3,500,000 for a total life-of -project
level of approximately $ 9.5 million.
The initial funding was to:
·
Increase capacity of at least two US and five LDC institutions for integrated,
priority based management of projects in plant biotechnology;
·
Maintain sustainable agriculture as a conceptual
focal point;
·
Advance human resource development;
·
Advance US and LDC institutional integration and
management of biotech research by providing internships and consulting in IPR
and biosafety;
·
Promote product development, field testing and
commercialization of biotech innovations in LDCs;
·
Sponsor an international biotechnology network;
·
Advance two or more products to adaptation for
commercialization and use.
The project anticipated the following outcomes:
·
Support for the institution-building of, and
research by, three laboratories/research institutions in developing countries
in Latin America, Africa and the Near East;
·
Further establishment of an international
network;
·
During the six-year life of ABSP project, move
from the research and development stage toward testing, commercialization and
product distribution;
·
Funds for publication and distribution of
newsletter/information dissemination; international conferences, internships in
IPR, biosafety, and commercialization, trade memberships, legal assistance,
seminars, economic marketing and feasibility studies.
Specific end-of-project status was to include:
·
Centers of institutional expertise in agbiotech
in developing countries;
·
Two U.S. and developing country scientists will
have conducted a minimum of five research projects to solve specific
constraints;
·
Training of one Ph.D. candidate and at least 5
post-doctoral fellowships;
·
Internships in IPR and biosafety;
·
Commercial and managerial linkages;
·
Development of patents and licenses;
·
Distribution of improved germplasm to developing
countries and international centers;
·
Operational network of LDC, U.S. and other
research scientists.
AWARD
OF ABSP AND PHASE I
Applications were reviewed by an external peer
review panel selected by the NRC, and in
September 1991, a cooperative agreement for the Agricultural
Biotechnology Support Project (ABSP) was awarded to Michigan State University. In addition, a private sector component was
awarded to DNA Plant Technologies to collaborate with Agribiotecnologia-Costa
Rica on development of micropropagation techniques for coffee, banana and
pineapple.
The overall goal of this phase of ABSP was to
mutually enhance U.S. and developing country institutional capacity for the use
and management of biotechnology research to develop environmentally compatible,
improved germplasm. A major scientific
goal was the transfer of host plant resistance genes into crops with major pest
problems in developing countries, specifically those difficult to manage via
conventional breeding. The project
aimed to produce a number of transgenic crops and field-test them in the US and
collaborating countries. The project also aimed to develop innovative and
robust micropropagation methods. Specific research objectives were:
·
To develop disease-free, high quality planting
material of tropical crops, specifically banana, pineapple, coffee, and palm;
·
To assemble vectors containing insect and
virus-resistant genes;
·
To genetically engineer potato, sweet potato,
and maize for resistance to virus and insect pests in developing countries;
·
To genetically engineer cucurbits with a virus
coat protein for development of resistance to potyviruses;
·
To transfer scientific knowledge and techniques
to developing countries through postdoctoral fellowships;
·
To demonstrate pest resistance of transgenic
crops and integrate this into sustainable agricultural systems via
collaborations.
Additionally, the training of scientists,
administrators, and policy makers on the application of biosafety procedures
and intellectual property rights in biotechnology was an important priority.
ABSP
PHASE II
The second phase of ABSP was to emphasize
transfer and commercialization of the products of Phase I research. The TAG’s mid-term report indicates the need
to make a shift in goals and objectives away from research to delivery of
research products, including change in management structure that will best
serve the new directions of the second phase.
In 1998, ABSP was granted a non-competitive
extension to continue the project until 2002.
This extension was based on consultations within USAID, among the
regional bureaus and the Office of Agriculture and Food Security, to meet
Agency priorities for agriculture and a market orientation. Phase II had the following specific
objectives:
·
To improve the capacity and policy environment
for the use, management and commercialization of agricultural biotechnology in
developing countries and transition economies.
Indicator: Transgenic
cultivars developed by ABSP or external sources (e.g. multinational seed
companies), field tested and undergoing registration in host countries.
·
To establish a policy framework in developing
countries and transition economies which allows the effective use, management
and commercialization of biotechnology by both host country and multinational
agribusiness and research institutions.
Indicators:
Ø Science-based
policies for IPR, biosafety and/or novel foods drafted and adopted at national
and/or regional levels.
Ø Applications
for field-testing and/or protection of intellectual property rights for
improved and/or genetically engineered varieties handled effectively by host
country regulatory bodies.
·
To improve marketed crops through strategic
research partnerships between the U.S. and developing country public and
private sectors.
Indicators:
Ø At
least two improved cultivars with enhanced agronomic qualities, and/or pest and
disease resistance developed and field-tested or in the registration process in
at least two host countries.
Ø Private
and public sector partnerships identified and agreements signed.
These objectives would positively impact food
availability, economic growth, and conservation of natural resources through
agricultural development-- strategic objectives of USAID.
Three developing countries were targeted in the
RFA: Indonesia, Kenya and Ecuador, however, the initial partner countries
became Kenya, Indonesia, and Costa Rica.
For the purpose of reference, the main country programs over the life of
the project were:
Kenya: collaborative research on the
development of virus resistant sweet potatoes, development of maize lines
resistant to insect pests, and improvement of banana production through tissue
culture.
Indonesia: policy work on
intellectual property rights, including drafting of a national PVP law,
technology transfer and biosafety; collaboration with ICI seeds on development
of Bt maize, collaboration on the potato and cucurbits projects at Michigan
State and Cornell, and a small competitive grants program to fund national
research.
Costa Rica: collaboration with
DNAP on micropropagation, and policy work on intellectual property rights.
Morocco: development of a national PVP law, and
technical assistance and training for related implementation.
Egypt: largest program addressing research on
tomatoes, cucurbits, maize, and potatoes; technology transfer and intellectual
property rights at the institutional level, and biosafety at the institutional
and national levels; research infrastructure development.
East/Central Africa Regional Program:
technical support to a regional organization in development of a
multidonor-funded program for biotechnology research, and regional biosafety
policy development.
Southern Africa Regional Program:
partnership with South African institutions to deliver technical training in
biosafety to support regulatory development and implementation
Section 2. RESEARCH
Science and technology, policy and financial aspects have tended
to determine the direction of biotechnology development and its
applications. ABSP has improved
research capacities, which have produced important impacts in human resource
development and capacity building for modern biotechnology research in target
developing countries. Main research developments occurred in the production of
genetically modified plants, in areas of pest and disease resistance (Bt potato
and maize and virus resistant/tolerant cucurbits, sweet potato and tomato). In addition inreased agricultural
productivity, by improving micro-propagation methods for bananas, coffee,
ornamental plants, and pineapple, and improved cucurbit seeds produced by
traditional methods, were part of the research activities. More recently,
projects were implemented to produce drought and salinity tolerance in wheat
and tomato. Improved nutrient content in the form of high beta-carotene mustard
oil is in early phases of research collaboration between a developing country
and the U.S. private sector, with the objective of transforming local Indian
mustard varieties.
If developing countries are to be able to take full advantage of
agricultural biotechnology, it is important that they develop their own
research capacities. In this regard, research collaborations under ABSP,
involving creative partnerships between both public and private sectors in the
US and in the developing countries, represent one of the major accomplishments
of the project. ABSP has to be
recognized as a unique program for producing new and/or adapted knowledge,
technology and tools of high quality, using innovative approaches in terms of
both the scientific procedures used, and the structure of the research
collaborative efforts to conduct research activities within international
cooperation frameworks. In addition to facilitating training, technology access
and technology development by scientists in developing countries, these
interactions also increased their capacity to manage the complex issues
involved in the application of agbiotech. Coupled with investments in
infrastructure and capacity building, targeted research institutions in Egypt
and Indonesia have developed necessary skills for independently conducting
world class scientific research. In many cases, scientific research stimulated
and promoted policy activities, leading to the creation of necessary frameworks
to support biotech commercialization.
The connections with the private sector in most cases offered the
opportunity for scientists in developing countries to understand the working
environment and scientific research performed at the US industry level. The private sector in many senses drives the
development of new technologies in agricultural research in the US and other
developed countries, and ABSP should be commended for including, since the
early stages, the involvement of the private sector. Interactions with the
private sector have resulted in excellent learning experiences of mutual
benefit, which should be promoted. ABSP
learned from experience that this requires several conditions be met including
the selection of research activities of mutual interest, the presence of a
champion in the private sector institution leading and coordinating joint
efforts, a good understanding of developing country scientist of industry’s
culture and sense of business in terms of confidentiality and IPR, languages
skills and internships for a minimum of one year.
Activities and outcomes from ABSP, in general, are in agreement
with the following USAID strategic objectives and goals: a) Improved food
availability, economic growth and conservation of natural resources through
agricultural development, and, b) Support appropriate and functioning economic
policies, market reforms and institutions in selected emerging markets and
priority countries.
RESEARCH REVIEW
1. Potyvirus Resistant Cucurbits
The goal of the project is to develop high quality cucurbits with
multiple virus and disease resistance using a combination of molecular genetics
and conventional breeding approaches. The project includes collaborative
laboratories at MSU, Cornell, and several institutions in developing countries.
The cucurbit project has been executed with excellent science, representing an
outstanding example of a continuous line of research within ABSP. Unfortunately,
the project showed poor coordination among participants at various times,
therby decreasing the overall performance of the project.
The MSU group focused on the production of virus resistance
through the expression of the coat protein gene (cp). Research outputs included
melon and squash with resistance to zucchini yellow mosaic virus (ZYMV) using
the ZYMV coat protein gene provided by MSU.
Results from field trials of the ZYMV-tolerant squash lines in different
locations in Egypt indicate that this research output has the highest
possibilities to be the first ABSP product to reach the market place. Initial
greenhouse evaluation of ZYMV-tolerant melon lines containing the cp gene of
ZYMV-CT strain also showed promising results. In addition, AGERI developed an
effective regeneration and transformation system for Egyptian cultivars of
watermelon, using the coat protein for Water Melon Mosaic Virus (WMV). AGERI
also reports having successfully established a regeneration and transformation
system in the Beit Alpha open field cultivar of cucumber.
Breeding cucurbits for multiple virus resistance at Cornell University included, 1)
large scale greenhouse and field-based screens of advanced cucurbit varieties
with multiple resistance to four major viruses and other two fungal diseases,
and 2) identification of lines closest to commercial type which contain the
broadest spectrum of disease resistance. Research outputs included squash,
cucumber, tropical pumpkin and melon.
Seeds were distributed to Egypt, Jordan, South Africa, the Philippines,
Indonesia, South Africa, and Brazil. The Cornell group has provided germplasm
to companies and institutions operating all over the world using simple
licensing and material transfer agreements.
The group had difficulty in follow up and back reporting systems with
international collaborators. Poor
agronomic performance in some of the virus-tolerant lines, when tested in
tropical countries, reflected the need to put more emphasis on cooperation with
national plant breeding efforts in adapting improved germplasm to tropical
conditions.
A major objective in the last years is the development of a novel
non-regeneration dependent system for cucurbits. Although trying to solve issues related to non-regeneration
systems is at the forefront of science, in view of the time frame indicated for
ABSP termination in 2002, and the reduced funding situation, there is a high
possibility of leaving incomplete results in this area. Focusing on research issues related to
product development at the end of the project, such as adaptation of improved
germplasm to tropical environments, and evaluation of agricultural performance
at different sites in developing countries, could have being more productive
and in agreement with ABSP goals and indicators approved under Phase II of
ABSP.
2. Potato Tuber Moth Resistance
Potato research has focused on the development of Bt transgenic
potato germplasm for resistance to the potato tuber moth, which has to be
recognized for being the first transgenic product the research team
field-tested. Following a
recommendation from the ABSP Technical Advisory Group (TAG), initial problems
such as the use of unmodified wild Bt was replaced by synthetic cry V. This posed other problems in terms of IPR
and food safety. Negotiations to obtain
FTO have proven to be difficult, and food safety experiments started only
recently, indicating that AGERI and MSU in this collaboration have demonstrated
a strong scientific culture, but a less developed sense of market orientation
in their research. Moreover,
difficulties in the distribution of the transgenic lines are anticipated, in
view of the current situation in Europe, an important market for potatoes
produced in Egypt. European non-acceptance of transgenic crops reached a degree
that few anticipated. This is an
external factor that ABSP could not have prevented. Indeed, had there been more projects with similar goals of
proving the value of these technologies in the developing countries and of
facilitating policy development in these countries, support for using
transgenic technologies might be stronger today.
In Indonesia, field-testing is pending approval from the
Indonesian and USAID Biosafety Committees.
ABSP is continuing to work with Indonesia and USAID to receive approval
for field-testing. Similar efforts to
test Bt potatoes are in process with CIP in Peru.
The Agricultural Research Center (ARC) of South Africa expressed
interest in testing material in South Africa, and in December 1999, an MTA was
developed to facilitate transfer of 12 Bt transgenic potato lines (tissue
culture plantlets) from MSU to South Africa for greenhouse and field
evaluations. Approvals for field-testing from the appropriate regulatory
authorities were obtained and field trials are planned for late 2001.
3. Gemini Virus Resistant Tomato
The initial phases of this project were performed at the
International Laboratory for Tropical Agricultural Biotechnology (ILTAB), which
generated gene constructs for transformation and production of resistance to
tomato leaf curl virus (TYLCV). Work continued at AGERI, using several
different transformation strategies in order to develop tomatoes with
resistance to TYLCV. However, the level
of resistance obtained from these plants was found not to be stable and was
affected by environmental conditions.
Recently, AGERI scientists succeeded in transforming tomato with
resistance to TCLV using a ‘suicide cell’ strategy, which offers an interesting
alternative from the biosafety point of view.
Field-testing was conducted and seeds from these plants are currently
being collected for further testing.
4. Stem Borer Resistant Maize
The program initiated in 1991 with collaborating laboratories in
three US universities (MSU, Cornell, Texas A&M), developed novel
transformation techniques and produced two patents in this area. The production of insect resistant
transgenic maize is one the most expensive research projects in ABSP, costing
more than $1.5 million. In spite of
these costs, in terms of overall results, this project ranks third, after the
potato and cucurbit projects. Only two maize lines have being field tested in
the US. During the initial phase, the project suffered from lack of
coordination among participants, the use of non-commercial germplasm and
unsuccessful Bt transformation protocols.
At the time the private sector (DeKalb, Pioneer Hi-Bred, Novartis,
and Monsanto) was making important advancements leading to the
commercialization of Bt corn. ABSP would have done well to initiate a collaborative
effort with industry at that time - this team could not determine if this had
been attempted. In 1994, under ABSP,
Garst Seed Company (formerly ICI Seeds, Inc), USA, and the Central Research
Institute for Food Crops (CRIFC), Indonesia, funded through USAID/Jakarta,
started a program to develop Asian corn borer resistant tropical (Indonesian)
maize germplasm. Although the project
was valuable in terms of training and capacity building, and resulted in
production of transgenic material, the project was not ultimately successful,
due to policy and technical constraints related to the transformation of
tropical maize varieties using proprietary technologies, lack of National
Biosafety Guidelines in Indonesia, and because of personnel changes and lack of
commitment from the company. To our knowledge, close to $600,000 were invested
at ICI and no follow up process to negotiate valuable material has taken place
to date. There was no information available to us on the status of the
synthetic Bt gene and codon optimized Cry 1 A (b) and Cry V genes prepared by
Dr. Ray Wu at Cornell (TAG report, October, 1994) and ICI seeds.
In 1996, a new research collaboration between Pioneer Hi-Bred and
AGERI started a collaborative project for the introduction of Bt genes
affecting corn borers endemic to the Middle East into Egyptian commercial corn
varieties, including Bt genes from AGERI and Pioneer. Four novel constitute maize promoters were isolated, and patents
were filed with one Egyptian researcher as a co-inventor. Pioneer Hi-Bred was encouraged to test some
of their commercial Bt corn varieties in Egypt. Lessons to learn include a research agreement negotiated at the
early phases of the planning process, and having the right institutions,
particularly in terms of skills and personnel. We recommend producing a case
study of this collaboration to document the excellent research results and
protocols for collaboration developed among participants
In a separate collaborative effort with KARI (Kenya), research to
determine factors governing resistance of Kenyan maize lines to stem borer
insects was undertaken. According to
the final report from KARI, results were valuable for selecting germplasm with
different degrees of resistance.
Whatever the reason, it is unfortunate that ABSP did not establish
more effective collaboration on maize transformation until late in Phase
I. This case is an example of why the
review team considers that some mechanism of public competition and peer review
should be developed for assignment of research funds within large composite
projects such as ABSP.
5.
Bacillus thuringiensis Toxin Receptor
Research at University of Texas, Dallas investigates the molecular
basis of insect resistance to the Bt toxins using Cry 3A toxin of B. thuringiensis subsp. tenebrionis. A major development was the characterization
of a Bt receptor. Results also indicate
that resistance to Bt toxin involves decreased toxin binding to the receptor,
increased excretion of toxin and changes in the composition and activity of
midgut proteolytic enzymes, and elevated amino peptidase activity. Recently, in collaboration with Pioneer
Hi-Bred, proteomics of susceptible and resistant insects produced interesting
results in terms of differential expression of proteins. Although this research
is important, the immediate use of results is difficult to assess, particularly
in view of recent publications on the identification of genes related to Bt
resistance (Science, August 3, 2001).
Moreover, this project used a different Bt toxin than the ones used in
transgenic potato and maize project. In view of the importance of this kind of
research for the private sector in particular, it could have been supported by
other sources of funding. Instead, conducting food and environmental safety
research related to Bt-cry V, necessary for distribution of the potato
transgenic lines, would have reflected a better use of limited resources.
6. Drought and Salinity Tolerance
In this collaboration between AGERI and Ohio State University,
transformation of immature embryos of Egyptian and American bread wheats with
bacterial genes for salt and drought tolerance (obtained from Dr. Verma at Ohio
State University) has started recently. AGERI has succeeded in transforming
Egyptian wheat (Giza 163 and Giza 164) with salt-tolerance related genes (i.e.,
mtlD and fructan-accumulating, respectively) and achieved good expression for
the first gene under stress conditions. The other gene is now being evaluated
for efficiency in conferring salt tolerance to the Egyptian wheat cultivar Giza
164. A gene (dehydrin) identified and cloned by AGERI from a wild Egyptian
germplasm (Vicia monantha) is
providing interesting results. This project reflects the importance of
developing national research capacities by participant countries in ABSP.
7. Development of Virus Resistance in Sweet
Potato
The aim of this project is the development of transgenic sweet
potato germplasm resistant to the Sweet Potato Feathery Mottle Virus (SPFMV), a
constraint for production in Africa. The project was initiated by USAID,
outside the framework of ABSP. USAID coordinated technology donation by
Monsanto to KARI, providing for an important cutting edge experience in
public-private sector arrangements for agbiotech transfer. The project also
included the collaboration of ISAAA. ABSP’s role in the project consisted in
providing assistance to KARI in their development of the biosafety proposal to
the National Biosafety Committee, and by supporting training of Kenyan scientists.
Informal advice in issues related to product development and testing was also
provided by ABSP. Difficulties in
regenerating and transforming plant material offered problems for the selection
of varieties more accepted by farmers in Africa. Results from field trials
using the African variety CPT-560 should be produced during 2001. It is
difficult to assess the success of the project at this point.
8. High Beta-Carotene Mustard Oil
The goal of this collaborative project, between Monsanto Company
(St. Louis, MO), the TATA Energy Research Institute (TERI) and ABSP/MSU, is to
develop high beta-carotene mustard oil for use in India. These mustard varieties will provide a
food-based approach to reducing Vitamin A deficiency in India. ABSP/MSU will
provide management and fiscal oversight to this effort, with Monsanto providing
technical oversight. The review team
was not able to obtain information on the socio-economic or market analysis and
market distribution aspects being assessed by the active partners, Monsanto and
TERI.
9. Commercial Micropropagation of Tropical
Crops
This private to private collaborative project
had the goal of investigating the potential of embryo regeneration using
bioreactors to increase production of pineapple, coffee, palms and banana. The
collaborators were DNA Plant Technology, a plant biotechnology company in
Oakland, California, and Agribiotecnología de Costa Rica (ACR) in Costa Rica, a
micropropagation company. Although the
project was disrupted by some ownership, location, and personnel changes at
DNAP and a decrease in ABSP funding midstream, this private-to-private linkage
had a number of positive outcomes, primarily because it supported co-learning
rather than one-way technology transfer. Staff at ACR report that the work they
have carried out with ABSP’s involvement has enhanced the reputation of their
company.
Later, DNAP also
entered into an agreement with Fitotek Unggul in Indonesia for the
micropropagation of pineapple. In this case the request for participation came
from Fitotek Unggul, a small Indonesian tissue culture company, because they
were receiving large orders for pineapple plantlets from Indonesian
plantations. DNAP cooperated to
maximize the benefits of micropropagation methods using the bioreactor system
with capacity of producing 12 million plantlets a year. However, when demand
for pineapple plantlets suddenly and unexpectedly collapsed due to an export
quality-control incident, the bioreactor system was no longer cost-effective
for the Indonesian collaborator.
RESEARCH PROGRAM SHORTCOMINGS
The lack of adequate selection systems based on competitive calls for research proposals, and
recommendations from peer review panels at
both US and developing countries, led to difficulties in choosing the best research
alternatives and implementing research activities that considered needs,
research interests and target crops from developing countries.
Selection of research objectives in most cases
involved simply taking technology off the shelf. This was in fact the initial design of ABSP, for reasons of
expediency. This limitation led to a
number of downstream complications such as IPR and biosafety. It may also make it more difficult for
national decision makers and opinion leaders to develop and defend a sense of
national ownership of the technologies.
Research activities could have had a higher impact during the term of
the project if a system based on matching necessities from partner countries
with technologies available from advanced laboratories in the U.S. was more
frequently implemented.
A valuable example of this approach within ABSP is the development
of transgenic wheat with improved tolerance to environmental stresses,
particularly drought, at AGERI, Egypt. The research effort results from an
identified need for Egypt, makes use of high quality technology transfer from
Ohio State University, and uses a gene (dehydrin), identified and cloned by
AGERI scientists from a wild Egyptian germplasm (Vicia monantha). The lesson
from this case reflects the benefits to be derived from ABSP’s earlier work to
provide for research infrastructure and capacity building at research
institutions in developing countries, capable of identifying their own needs,
accessing the right technology, and performing independent research. Another
valuable experience from ABSP is represented by the Inventory on Agricultural
Biotechnology for Eastern and Central Africa Region, prepared for ASARECA,
which identifies a research priority agenda for agbiotech programs, in accordance
with needs and capacities from several countries in Africa.
The number of publications seems to be less than expected for a
project of the size and complexity of ABSP.
This calls attention to the fact that publications in peer review
journals, did not included in most cases, scientists from both US and
developing countries. Scientists from
US research institutions generally published, independently of their
collaborators in developing countries.
The reverse situation was also observed, in the case of publications
made by AGERI scientists in local journals.
Difficulties to produce coordinated efforts from participants in the US
and developing countries were also observed in some research activities This situation
could be the consequence of the reduced number of meetings to discuss in detail
scientific programs and planning experiments.
These are of great necessity, in view of the complexity of the research
activities performed by individual programs.
The project’s Technical Advisory Group (TAG) met only on few
occasions, and the lack of evaluation of scientific results on a timely manner
affected research output. Projects
continued under soft evaluation procedures, and poor scientific accountability
or enforcement measures, with no clear timeframes for product development.
Continuation of basic research particularly in the last two years of the
program led to good outputs in terms of biological research, but not as
products within a framework of an integrated approach for agbiotech research. As
an example, two of the transgenic products with higher possibilities to enter
the market place lack IPR audits and freedom to operate procedures, as well as
data related to environmental impact and food safety, both of importance for
future product transfer and distribution to farmers. In view of limited resources,
a better and more balanced investment could have been made by concentrating on
products nearing commercialization, rather than continuing activities that are
still far upstream.
·
Discuss priorities with country collaborators to identify the best
germplasm available for experimental and commercial purposes and the best trait
that might have a better chance of being accepted (for instance, the question
of marker genes is an important issue related with public acceptance).
·
Analyze other requirements of the commercialization step taking
into consideration the farming and distribution systems (see also “Technology
Transfer and Commercialization”).
Section
3. POLICY
ABSP was designed almost 10
years ago to innovate in several aspects regarding the integration between
science and policy development. The time was right for this integration to
happen, as the project developed during the early stages of biotechnology
applications in partner countries, that were (and still are) internalizing
international agreements, writing national laws or providing other legal
arrangements to regulate biosafety aspects of genetically modified organisms
and intellectual property rights. ABSP,
with assistance from consultants, helped countries build capacity for the
implementation of activities to achieve its goals.
It is clear that the development
of risk analyses per se on a case by
case basis depended on the stage of development of the new transgenic
cultivars. The project did not manage to achieve many transgenic products with
the exception of the Egyptian potato which seems closer to
commercialization. However, it
intelligently used the transfer of materials for laboratory research purposes
and subsequent steps such as green house and small field tests to raise
awareness regarding the importance and need of risk assessment among scientists
and policy makers. Activities were concentrated on training, policy development
and building basic infrastructure for greenhouse containment tests (Indonesia
and Egypt).
Achievements
ABSP has established a sui generis approach towards policy development by introducing many young researchers
and key scientists to organized biosafety courses, seminars and workshops, and
by exposing others to bench training including in the private sector. By
sponsoring scientists, who would become leaders at their institutions, to
attend various biosafety events, ABSP helped to build a vital bridge between
capacity building and policy development.
Efforts started in 1993 when ABSP provided financial support for the
participation of scientists from Kenya, Indonesia and Egypt to an eight-week
biosafety internship program for assistance in developing guidelines.
Subsequently, several workshops and internships helped participants build up
sufficient awareness and knowledge, an effort that resulted in achievements
such as the Indonesian biosafety guidelines (in use), Indonesian food safety
guidelines (in use), Indonesian Biosafety Law (draft), Egyptian Biosafety
Guidelines (in use), Kenyan Biosafety Guidelines (in use). As a means to having
a wider impact, ABSP has lately taken a more regional approach in Africa
forming a partnership with SARB (Southern Africa) and participating in the
discussions with ASARECA (Eastern and Central Africa). It is noticeable that
ABSP involvement in these two regional efforts in Africa is not as srong as in
Egypt or Indonesia, primarily because African countries have only recently
started to become interested in the transfer of transgenic technologies. An
“inventory” of transgenic crops applicable to the Eastern and Central Africa region produced by ABSP
at USAID’s (Africa Bureau) request is a very useful compilation of data and
should be used as background information in the design of the region’s
biotechnology program strategy. It
should also serve as a model approach for other regions/countries when
reviewing or designing biotechnology programs.
Biosafety is a growing concern in developing countries which are
under the continuous scrutiny of international non-governmental organizations
such as Greenpeace, Friends of Earth and others, joined lately by Consumers
International and its followers.
These concerns were evident a decade ago but grew rapidly stronger
during Phase II, with the ultimate effect that ABSP underestimated the
attention they would require when it began to assist countries in developing
transgenic ag-products and associated regulatory policies. The issue of public
awareness and acceptance has to be taken on board or products are not likely to
get commercialized. Issues such as food labeling and identity preservation of
crops are now being discussed and regulated in conjunction with the development
of GMO risk assessment protocols.
ABSP has submitted biosafety applications to USAID biosafety
committee for field testing potatoes in Egypt, Indonesia and South Africa, and
has received permission to test in Egypt and South Africa. In addition, National Committees need to
receive complete applications for their approval before commercialization can
be achieved, given other constraints such as freedom to operate for proprietary
genes and processes need to be negotiated. More emphasis needs to be given to
assessing potential risks, and not just to the establishment of the agronomic
acceptability of cultivars. For instance, the production of food safety data in
Egypt will demand re-orientation of different laboratories and specific
training for personnel not familiar with transgenics[1]. Such issues need to be considered earlier in
the project, so as not to become constraints at the end. The Egyptian model can
barely be taken as an example for other developing nations as much more funds
were made available by the country mission to AGERI for the development of
their biotechnology program. Capacity building was at its highest standards and
even in this case, the conclusion was that
“… depending on the stringency
of the commercialization procedures, it will be difficult for a public-funded
effort to meet the regulatory costs…”.
An early prospective analyses of the country’s overall scenario should
be a decisive step at the onset of a new project which is designed to be taken
beyond field testing.
Considering that the capacity building and training aspects in
biosafety were very successful, as they led to the development and
implementation of important in-country policies and the installation of
national biosafety committees, any follow-on project should:
·
Analyze the national, regional and international related policy
environment to identify procedures to be complied with, and include regulatory
costs in the project budget. Develop
cost estimates and provide sufficient funds for completion of major phases as
biotechnology projects can reach prohibitive prices for developing countries
when including food and environmental safety costs.
·
Require a socio-economic analysis of the new technology including
factors that will improve public acceptance (where needed).
·
Give incentive to interactive networking across all ABSP projects,
expose more participants to the availability of biosafety consultants (the same
goes for the IPR section), and work to find ways they could benefit from
interacting with them. Consultants should be asked to create a series of
"case study" experiences that can enhance the immediate and long-term
benefits to be received by the project.
ABSP started in a period when developing countries had not been
exposed to Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). However, since 1996, World Trade
Organization (WTO) member countries have agreed to implement minimum
intellectual property protection standards and therefore take on the exercise
to review, modify or even create new legislation to protect biotechnology
inventions and new cultivars[2].
Therefore, by the time ABSP strategies to build awareness and capacity in
technology receiving countries was ongoing, each one was eager to acquire
skills on intellectual property rights (IPR) related matters.
ABSP has been very successful in organizing many
quality courses, seminar and internships on the subject. The ABSP-initiated short courses on
biosafety and IPR for U.S. and international participants, held in the United
States and offered annually at MSU, have now been “spun-off” to MSU’s
management and subsequently expanded to include sections on food safety and
integrated pest management. These
courses provide a rarely available introduction to key topics in a format
accessible to research managers and policy makers. ABSP has directly sponsored
participants from Costa Rica (1), Egypt (4), Kenya (2), Morocco (5), Indonesia
(6), South Africa (1), India (2) and Ethiopia (1).
ABSP activities have also led to the development of PVP Law in
Indonesia and Morocco, technology transfer and IPR offices in Indonesia (KIAT,
linked to the Agency for Agricultural Research and Development) and in Egypt
(OTTIP, linked to AGERI), and the establishment of a Plant Breeders’ Rights
Office in Kenya. It is known that Indonesia will soon establish a PVP Office to
implement the newly approved PVP Law, an activity under high demand by the
private seed industry. Certainly, the training and awareness raised by ABSP
integrated approach to research and policy development has given the private
sector a better assurance allowing some companies such DNA Plant Technology,
ICI Seeds (Syngenta), Pioneer Hi-Bred and Monsanto to agree on technology
transfer projects. ABSP had the opportunity to use the MSU Office of
Intellectual Property’s legal expertise when needed and has used Professor John
Barton from Stanford University as a consultant to assist several countries in
designing and implementing IPR legislation.
An interesting feature of the program, uncommon in donor funded projects
is the fact that ABSP has supported the filing of two patents during the
development of research agreements.
However well-prepared for the
management of IPR issues due to its close links with MSU’s Intellectual
Property Office, ABSP’s IP legal issues are still not well resolved. Except for donated genes (e.g. sweet potato
technology donated to Kenya by Monsanto), other genes used, such as those for
transformation of corn (ICI/Syngenta), tomato, potato, and cucurbit are without
freedom to operate past the research stage.
It is not clear that countries can use common
promoters such as Monsanto’s 35S.
Unfortunately even licensing agreements with US universities have not
been resolved. In some cases, IPR considerations for US universities will
differ from those applying in partner countries, due to the territoriality of
patents. However, there may be reasons
(such as future collaborations; or potential export products) why a project
such as ABSP might chose not to take advantage of geographic differences in
FTOs.
More recent projects (e.g., maize transformation
with Pioneer Hi-Bred; stress-tolerant wheat at
AGERI) have started to address FTO issues early in the research phase. However, all
Material Transfer Agreements of projects closest to commercialization were
designed and signed to cover research only, leaving any commercial applications
for a later negotiation. As one of ABSP’s major goals was to reach
commercialization of some transgenic products, this seems to have been a
dangerous approach and in one case (ICI/Syngenta) has stopped the project
pending further negotiations.
·
No matter how difficult and time consuming all new biotechnology
projects must have a freedom to operate feasibility study done first. A study
of the required IP platform, licensing possibilities, required royalty return
by different IP holders, market analysis and product acceptability must be developed either by the developing country’s
officers or be a responsibility of the Funding Agency.
·
Equally important is the issue of IP territoriality. Many processes and elements (promoters,
markers, specific genes), patented in the U.S. and Europe, and used to produce
transgenic organisms, may not have patents, either granted or filed, in
developing countries. While researchers may be free to use the
technology (for instance, a plant transformed in the US with the biolistic
method may not be transferred to a developing country without due licensing
however the same plant transformed in the country where the Gene-Gun patent was
not filed can be used without any legal infringement of rights), this issue
needs careful legal consideration, given its implications for eventual access
to export markets, continued participation of private sector partners, and
other issues.
·
These studies can be contracted out or developed in conjunction
with University IP Offices – a reason why it is important that any successor
project to ABSP is assured that the coordinating University will provide such
support (see also “Management”).
·
As for the genes and other components already in use by the
present ABSP project a strong recommendation by the external board that freedom
to operate is urgently negotiated in every case remains to be implemented.
Technology transfer was a clearly stated aim of
the ABSP Project from the outset, but the issue of commercialization was not
mentioned until the October 1994 TAG report.
As stated, the principal objective of the second phase of the project
was "to improve the capacity and policy environment for the use,
management and commercialization of agricultural biotechnology in developing
countries and transition economies". In order to achieve that objective, the TAG proposed that emphasis
be shifted away from research to the delivery of research products and that a
commercialization specialist be included in the management team.
As interpreted in the first phase of the project,
technology transfer was linked to issues and requirements which arose in
biotechnology research collaboration -- particularly with private sector
partners -- and, consequently, to the transfer of research skills, techniques
and materials from US partners to the partner institutions in developing
countries. However, technology
transfer as exemplified in the objectives of the second phase of the project,
and in the view of the evaluation team, implies a broader definition,
encompassing the whole process of technological innovation from research to the
"transfer" of a finished technology product -- for example, a
virus-resistant cucurbit variety - to the farmer's field. In turn, that means
either commercialization through the private sector or technology
"delivery" through some non-market channel such as public extension
services or NGOs.
The path to commercialization raises issues that
require a more comprehensive approach.
In the context of this evaluation, the key isssue would be the extent to
which such an approach could -- or should -- have been accommodated within the
ABSP project.
Achievements
During the life of the ABSP project to date,
research collaboration, training courses and internships have been offered for
developing country participants.
Training of public sector scientists and/or regulators from several
countries including Costa Rica, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya have taken place at MSU, Cornell, or other institutions
in the United States. In addition, individuals from the private or public
sector in partner countries, have also benefited from research collaborations
with private sector partners in the United States, as in the case of the Crops
Research Institute in Indonesia and ICI Seeds in the development of Bt maize,
and the AGERI and Pioneer collaboration on the development of transgenic maize.
In-house training in private companies has been one of the innovative features
of ABSP.
These activities have generally been highly
appreciated by the developing country participants even though their impact may
not have been immediate. For example,
while research collaborations of Indonesian scientists on genetic engineering
of corn, potato and sweet potato, which ended in 1995, have not yet resulted in
the successful development of products, they have had useful
"spin-offs" in enabling the scientists to use techniques acquired in
subsequent research on other crops, including soybean and rice.
Enabling techniques and/or technologies which
have been successfully transferred to participating countries include: the use
of genetic markers for a number of crops; bioreactor micropropagation methods
for pineapple (Indonesia); improved tissue culture techniques for banana (Kenya
and Costa Rica); transgenic tomatoes, potatoes and sweet potatoes (Egypt,
Kenya, Indonesia); and new transformation methods for cucurbit species (Egypt
and Indonesia). In Costa Rica and
Indonesia, techniques transferred have been the result of collaborations
between local private companies and private companies in the United States.
An important aspect of these technology
transfers has been the transfer of materials for research purposes, and
subsequently, for greenhouse and field-testing. In Egypt, Indonesia, and Kenya these activities have helped
stimulate awareness among scientists and policy-makers of requirements in the
key biotechnology policy areas of IPRs and biosafety. At the same time, and at a more practical level, they have
enhanced national capacity to draw up MTAs and work through the process
involved in the transfer of genetic material from one country to another.
In the case of Indonesia, opportunities were
also provided for the development of applied research considered to be of
importance to Indonesian agriculture through a Small Grants Program funded by
USAID/Jakarta. Projects on cocoa,
ginger and citrus were conducted under this program.
Site visits to Egypt and Indonesia have
highlighted the achievements of ABSP (referred to in the section on Research)
in contributing to the advanced training of a critical mass of scientists who
are now able to conduct research independently and who now have their own
scientific networks in the United States and beyond. Indeed, the research capacity created at AGERI probably exceeds
Egypt's current capacity to capitalize on it fully.
The program has also been successful in
identifying inadequacies, and subsequently, supporting the development of the
regulatory framework and institutions needed to ensure that biosafety and IPRs
are not an impediment to technology transfer. These frameworks and institutions
are now essentially in place in developing country partners, if not yet fully
operational.
The ABSP project has also been instrumental in
facilitating institutional innovation in the form of the Technology Transfer
and Intellectual Property Office at AGERI in Egypt and, under the umbrella of
the Agency for Agricultural Research and Development (AARD), the Technology
Transfer Office (KIAT) in Indonesia.
It is hoped that these institutions will play a key role in promoting
collaboration between the public and private sectors in their respective
countries and in facilitating the development and commercialization of new
biotechnology products.
Shortcomings
Despite notable achievements, the evaluation
points to shortcomings in the first two phases of the technology innovation
cycle: research, product development and delivery. These include the "top-down" approach to collaborative
research projects, where decisions were taken in the United States without
prior consultation with developing country partners. They also suggest a research agenda which has been largely
"science-driven", with little effort devoted to determining either
needs (in a social sense), demand (in an economic sense) or priorities in
partner countries.
New biotechnology products generated by ABSP are
at varying stages in the second (or product development) phase of the
innovation cycle, i.e. going through the necessary regulatory procedures prior
to commercialization, in both Egypt and Indonesia. In Egypt, Bt potato and
virus-resistant squash have been field-tested and are ready to be registered.
However, as indicated in the Research Section, AGERI needs to address IPR, food
safety and environmental safety issues before clear commercial rights for Bt
transgenic potato developed in collaboration with MSU can be obtained. In Indonesia, Bt potatoes are awaiting
authorization for field-testing and it is understood from our site visit that a
new proposal will need to be submitted as an earlier proposal did not refer to
the right varieties.
When it comes to preparing the way for the
final, delivery phase of the innovation cycle - transfer to the farmer's field
- the situation is difficult to evaluate.
For reasons which are not clear - probably budgetary restrictions - no
business or marketing expertise was added to the ABSP management team as
specified in the 1991 RFA nor during the second phase of the project as
proposed by the TAG.
However, since 1999, efforts have been
undertaken by the Haas Business School of the University of California,
Berkeley, to examine more closely the prospects for commercialization of
products being developed at AGERI. The
studies have concluded that AGERI has awarded high priority to developing a
strong scientific culture, and successfully achieved this, but has neglected
market-oriented research and has failed to establish links throughout the
agro-food value chain. They have also
concluded that links with industry are needed for the commercialization and
distribution of the products currently being developed. Links with consumer groups are also needed
to determine market trends and needs for future research and product
development.
In Indonesia and South Africa, ex-ante
socio-economic impact studies on the introduction of virus-resistant cucurbit
varieties developed by Cornell through traditional breeding are being
conducted. In Indonesia, where work is
further advanced, the study highlights the extreme high growth potential of the
vegetable seed market in Indonesia, confirmed during our interviews in
Indonesia with East West Seed company and with the Research Institute for
Vegetable Crops.
Preliminary findings on cucumber and melon
suggest that there are considerable potential benefits to be gained for
producers in terms of yield and reduced pesticide application from the lines
provided by Cornell, although the harvesting of the new varieties would require
more labor. For the potential to be
realized, however, it would be necessary to incorporate stable virus-resistance
in varieties more suitable for the Indonesian market, which would take some 5-7
years. Any socio-economic benefits to
be anticipated will therefore not be realized in the short term.
Clearly, not all biotechnology research being
conducted in the ABSP program is intended to lead to the development of an end
product. It must also be acknowledged
that it is not the mission of ABSP per se, to commercialize products generated
by the project. However, in preparing
the way to commercialization, if the advice of the TAG had been taken and
business and/or marketing expertise included in the management team, some of
the obvious shortcomings could have been corrected and changes in direction
made during the course of the project. For
example, the focus of research on cucurbits could have been redirected to local
varieties of importance in the Indonesian market. Earlier analysis of market
conditions and potential would have permitted sounder decisions regarding the
crops and varieties most likely - or unlikely - to be commercialized in the
short term and marketing strategies could have been drawn up accordingly.
In the case of AGERI, which has benefited from
substantial investment both from the ABSP core budget and from the Cairo
mission, the prospects for commercializing products generated could have been
evaluated and, if necessary, facilitated at a much earlier stage.
Similarly, it would probably have been more
profitable to conduct studies on market conditions and to gain insights into
the obstacles likely to be encountered by ABSP's "near-market"
technologies than to conduct socio-economic impact studies of products that are
at an earlier stage of development.
This kind of analysis would have highlighted the strengths and
weaknesses of the seeds sector and the role of the public and private sector in
the development and distribution of new technologies.
Under these conditions, ABSP could have been
more effective, either directly or indirectly, by helping countries develop
linkages, partnerships (both public and private sector) and expertise for
accelerating the path to commercialization, i.e., move from testing to
production. This could perhaps have
been facilitated by drawing on independent expertise in partner countries and
on expertise available within the Business School at MSU.
RECOMMENDATIONS
·
ABSP needs to work with partner institutions,
particularly AGERI, to formulate a clear plan for commercializing potatoes and
cucurbits.
·
ABSP should try to resolve issues surrounding
the approval of multi-location trials for transgenic potatoes in Indonesia.
·
Conduct relative socio-economic studies of the
high beta-cartotene mustard project to determine development and delivery
mechanisms.
ABSP has undertaken a number of
communication, networking and information dissemiation activities. The original RFA for ABSP specified that
ABSP continue and expand IPBNet, the International Plant Biotechnology
Network. This was embodied in BioLink,
ABSP's widely distributed newsletter designed in Phase I. BioLink was significant in that it was one
of the first sources to reach public sector researchers in developing countries
with the message that biosafety and IPR issues were essential considerations in
their research. In Phase II, as part
of the down sizing of the management office, BioLink was replaced by
"Linkages", a simple project information newsletter with a more
limited circulation to ABSP project participants. The ABSP website provides easy
access to information on all facets of the ABSP program and, in particular, to
practical information on a range of IPR issues, forms, etc. available from
MSU. “Linkages” includes quarterly reporting
as well as commentary from the ABSP Director on current events and travel.
During the course of the project,
communication and networking activities have been considerably diversified;
they extend beyond the earlier focus of the project and are more global in
coverage.
Between May 1993 and March 2001,
ABSP organised a total of 10 country-specific, regional or international
meetings on different biotechnology-related themes. ABSP has also funded the participation of developing country
representatives at regional or international meetings, financed membership to
the US Bio-Industry Association, and subscriptions to CABI’s AgBiotechNet.
The extension of geographic
coverage is exemplified by recent involvement in regional initiatives in
Southern Africa. One example is the
public awareness workshop supported by ABSP, which took place in Pretoria,
South Africa, in May 2001, as part of the Southern Africa Regional Biosafety
Program. This particular meeting was
targeted at journalists, who, in addition to hearing oral presentations, were
able to see GM crops in the field. This
meeting was considered a success by the organisers in which 17 journalists were
provided with objective background information on biotechnology and with
contact details for obtaining additional information from regional scientists
and/or regulators.
ABSP is also currently
collaborating with UNDP and IBS/ISNAR in co-ordinating support to ASARECA, with
ISNAR’s Biotechnology Service and with the BIO-EARN program on biosafety. The outgoing Director of ABSP is also a member
of the Steering Committee of BIO-EARN.
ABSP’s networking and outreach
activities have impacted at different levels: at the level of the project
itself, in developing country partners, and with the international
biotechnology community at large.
The international visibility of
ABSP per se has been enhanced by the
participation of its Director and/or associates at international conferences on
different aspects of agricultural biotechnology and at more specialised
international gatherings on biosafety and IPRs.
Perhaps the most notable overall
achievement of ABSP with respect to communication and networking is that it has
raised awareness of a range of issues associated with agricultural
biotechnology within the countries that have participated in the project and
beyond. These issues include not only
the potential of biotechnology to contribute to problems confronting developing
country agriculture but also potential risks in its application and
management. ABSP has consequently also
heightened awareness of sensitive policy issues specific to biotechnology: IPR and biosafety.
The
unique experience that exists only as a result of the resources USAID invested
in ABSP's pioneering collaborations is identifiably an
ABSP output and remains to be made widely available. An ABSP publication should draw lessons from this experience, to
be shared by others involved in international agricultural development efforts. Those lessons should be brought to bear in the
design of any subsequent USAID funded biotechnology project and will be of mutual
benefit to the U.S, where interest in strengthened public-private sector
collaboration in agricultural research is increasing.
This could be done, for example, in
a series of short briefing or issues papers reviewing and analysing some of the
highlights and achievements, as well as some of the major obstacles or
constraints encountered. Possible
topics might include:
Ø
Fostering biotechnology research
collaboration between developed and developing country research institutes and
avoiding the pitfalls;
Ø
Brokering public/private,
private/private or multiple public/private partnerships for biotechnology
research and development;
Ø
Plotting the path to
commercialisation for ABSP biotechnology products.
Documentation of this kind,
together with the Biosafety Workbook to be produced in the coming months, could
serve as background material for a final international workshop (mentioned in
the Work Plan for October 2000 to September 2001) to be organised by
USAID. A final international workshop,
the proceedings of which would be published, would help determine the
directions of a new program and would, at the same time, be a fitting concluding
event of ABSP.
At no stage during the life of the
project have all partners been brought together to meet, exchange ideas, review
progress and identify common constraints.
This would have served the purpose of creating a sense of ownership and
participation in the ABSP network that was found absent during field visits to
the participating countries. Also, it
would have highlighted, much earlier, the need to focus research on cucurbit
and potato varieties of importance in the participating developing
countries. In any future project, networking
resources should be provided to bring all participants together on a regular
basis to report on their work and discuss technical, logistical and
policy-related issues of common interest.
As suggested (see “Management”), an interconnected network has many
advantages for both management and participants. Above all, it fosters a sense of shared responsibility toward a
goal and helps sustain a project vision.
The very unfortunate arson incident that destroyed ABSP offices at
MSU, nevertheless, resulted in some positive outcomes, the Director was able to
bring the program to the notice of the general public in the United States and
also publicize it locally, particularly on campus. While there is no doubt that ABSP is well known and
highly-respected internationally, it is possible that diversification into new
topic and geographic areas has diverted attention from the need to consolidate
the results and distil the lessons to be drawn from the life of this pioneering
project.
Section 6. MANAGEMENT
ABSP was initially structured as a
consortium of public sector institutions and private companies in the U.S. and
developing countries, managed by Michigan State University. Over time, ABSP included as many as six other
U.S. university partners, eight private sector partners, and six national
agricultural research system (NARS) partners in developing countries.
Management of a complex program such as ABSP was extremely challenging;
particularly due to its broad thematic and geographic coverage and heterogeneity
of partners; personnel changes in ABSP and its partners; shifts in emphasis
between phases; budget cuts; and dramatic changes in the external perception of
transgenic technologies which made its work progressively more difficult.
USAID’s 1991 RFA for ABSP stipulated
a management directorship (MD). As
implemented, this consisted of a Managing Director, who was also Innovation
Director, and a Network Specialist. The
MD was responsible for supporting a Technical Advisory Group (TAG) appointed by
USAID “to monitor and evaluate the progress of the project". Phase I management also included a part-time
Director for Research and Institutional Management (30/20%). An institutional advisory group (Internal
Board of Directors) was composed of MSU Department Chairs, the Director of the
MSU Institute of International Agriculture, representatives of Texas A&M
and Cornell, and one representative per developing country having ABSP
activities. This group was “to meet at
an interim and final stages . . . to regularly monitor technical and managerial
conduct of the project", review reports sent to USAID, provide oversight
and guidance; and advise the research projects and ABSP management. Two positions stipulated by the 1991 RFA
were not filled, possibly due to budget constraints: a Commercialization
Specialist (not hired) and a Biosafety Specialist (supplied via a consultant
contract).
In 1994, the TAG recommended a
revised management structure for Phase II, which was to shift from research to
application and delivery. During Phase
II (from October 1997), management included a Director and an Associate
Director. An External Board of
Directors was appointed, envisioned as having a stronger role than the
TAG. The Board was to meet annually to
review work-plans and strategic direction of research and policy activities,
review effectiveness of specific program elements, and provide recommendations
to USAID and ABSP. Its members
represent private biotechnology sector, U.S. regulatory agencies, development
agencies, environmental groups, and the food industry. The MSU Internal Board of Directors
continued, but with MSU membership only, and a new role--liaison between ABSP
and the host organization, MSU.
Achievements
1. Balanced maintainence
of research and policy development activities throughout the project: When ABSP began in 1991, activities consisted entirely of
research projects. However, in 1993,
ABSP held its first biosafety workshop and an internship in IPR, initiating
what was to become an active program.
As the project progressed and opportunistic external funding
opportunities favored research (see section on “Budget and Buy-ins”),
management balanced by investing proportionately more core funds and management
staff time into policy-related activities.
In Phase II, a "new generation" of policy support activities
began, with a more regional focus, in
North, Eastern, and Southern Africa. While ABSP's activities to maintain
balance were largely successful, the cost in terms of management over-extension
was high (see below).
2. Good working relations
with the host institution and the USAID global program: Establishment of
excellent working relations with the host institution in MSU and the USAID
global program was an early and sustained accomplishment of program
management. These good working
relations were important in allowing ABSP to survive the drastic budget cut in
the second year of the project, to be followed by further cuts and delays.
The MSU Office of Intellectual
Property (OIP), founded the year after ABSP began, provided expertise needed by
ABSP for developing contracts between private companies and developing country
national programs that complied with Federal Regulations and also met company
needs. The management strength is that
ABSP obtained this support based on individual shared interests. The management weakness is that this
critical expertise was not ensured through a formal link to an OIP office, or a
person on staff with this expertise. As
a result, IPR support to ABSP was reduced after the personnel change at the OIP
office that occurred in Phase II, just when FTO issues were becoming
“burning”.
Close links with other parts of MSU expertise
-- economics and business, food laws, grades and standards -- of particular
relevance to agricultural biotechnology in general, and to the ABSP project in
particular, could have been established earlier. For example, this would have been particularly relevant to the
commercialization of biotechnology products generated by AGERI.
Good communication with USAID in
Washington enabled ABSP to link up with other USAID activities, such as support
to ASARECA, to add value to existing investments.
3. Contacts with the
private sector; expertise in managing public-private collaboration: ABSP management was able to establish contact with appropriate
persons in the US private sector who were key to such successes as the
AGERI-Pioneer internships, which resulted in useful scientific discoveries, and
new professional contacts and professional perspectives for staff of both
institutions. Although an early
disappointment occurred in ABSP relationships with the private sector, in the
ICI Seeds-CRIFC Indonesia maize project (see section on Research), thanks to
the long-term nature of USAID support for ABSP, ABSP management was able to use
this experience to achieve successes in subsequent cooperative agreements.
ABSP is currently assisting USAID,
Monsanto, and a national institute in India, TERI, in making arrangements necessary to implement a new
project which intends to increase nutritional value of mustard seed oil, a
widely-used cooking oil in northern India.
USAID’s contribution to the project is financed under its child survival
mandate. The partners turned to ABSP
when they needed experience in the details of managing international
public-private cooperation and assistance in complying with USAID
administrative requirements. This
purely pragmatic development highlights the value of ABSP’s unique experience
for allowing creative partnerships to happen
(--and the importance of documenting ABSP’s experience before it
dissipates).
4. Exploration of modes of
involving national partners in planning project direction (Phase II): The successful joint planning workshop at AGERI in 1998, and the
support to ASARECA through the inventory of biotechnologies corresponding to
expressed ASARECA priorities, are examples of Phase II’s increasing exploration
of ways to involve country partners directly in planning and responding to
national priorities.
5. Achievement of
international visibility for ABSP and its unique goals: International visibility was created initially through BioLink,
the Phase I newsletter, and heightened throughout project duration through
energetic participation in wide-ranging meetings at which ABSP speakers
"spread the word". The
several meetings and workshops organized by ABSP itself were effective means of
making ABSP and its goals visible.
Shortcomings
1. Lack of capacity in
business development: This aspect is discussed in
both the management and technology transfer sections. Lack of business expertise resulted in an early failure to
develop a culture and mechanism of effective "go/no-go" decisions
about which research to continue. As a result, significant resources were spent
on disappointing collaborations (see sections on Research and Technology
Transfer and Commercialization).
Consequently, the decision not to hire the business development
specialist mentioned in both the initial RFA and the Phase II proposal
document, though no doubt carefully considered, was costly to project
success. A future project should make
it a priority to include business development expertise. If hiring a full-time expert is impractical
or too costly, various means of access could be explored, such as "in
kind" contributions from a private sector participant (if conflict of
interest is not a factor), or financing long-term consultancies (similar to
sabbaticals) for practicing professionals.
Collaborative projects with the Business School at MSU could have
provided interesting mutual benefit experiences at low cost.
2. Unclear roles and
responsibilities for research management; lack of effective accountability
mechanisms: Achieving clarity about roles and
responsibilities was a challenge for ABSP from the first (see "Response to
technical questions" from MSU to USAID, Sept 1991). A long-term multi-partner project, using
new technologies and having expectations for product delivery, had a particular
need for continuous review and accountability to ensure responsiveness as the
project developed. However, over time, no consistently effective mechanism
developed. Needs included:
·
Frequent (at least annual) reviews
of research progress and other issues related to ultimate project success.
·
"Go/no-go" decisions
regarding continuation of research that appeared unlikely to contribute to
ABSP's overall goals.
·
A sensitive mechanism for
incremental adjustments in project plans, in response to internal or external
developments.
·
Consistent attention to projects
running into delays, including analysis of reasons, and possible solutions or
alternate plans.
In Phase I, the leader of an ABSP
research project at MSU was designated ABSP Research and Institutional
Management Director. The individual, who was also an Assistant Professor
responsible for a tenure-track research program, most likely with teaching
responsibilities, had taken the lead in developing the successful proposal for
ABSP, proving initiative and energy.
Yet the heavy work-load, the relatively junior status of the incumbent
at the time of project initiation, and the conflict of interest (as a
researcher funded by ABSP), were handicaps, and these project responsibilities
were eventually rolled into the position of the full-time Managing Director.
The review team had no evidence that
an ABSP director in fact reviewed overall ABSP research. Similarly, there is no
record (perhaps due to the arson in ABSP offices during Phase II?) that the MSU
Internal Board of Directors reviewed overall ABSP research, or what impact
their reviews had. Available documents
suggest that ABSP relied on the TAG to assess research progress, and that the
TAG met only in 1993, 1994, and 1997. The external Board of Directors, which
succeeded the TAG in Phase Two, is in composition, more of a management and
implementation board than a scientific review board.
Project reports were compiled and
provided to USAID on a quarterly, later semi-annual, basis. It is not clear how
USAID used the reports -- they were lengthy and lacked summaries for quick
grasp of progress, expectations, problems, and adjustments. The review team believes that staff
shortages limited USAID's ability to digest and respond to the reports and may
have forced USAID to rely on ABSP’s own mechanisms for research monitoring,
despite problems with those mechanisms.
Some of factors that hampered ABSP's
ability to require accountability stemmed from USAID circumstances (see also
Section 7, Budget and Buy-Ins, below), including major budget cuts beyond
USAID’s control. For example, according
to the TAG report from its 1997 meeting, an attempt was made to institute
“incentive-based funding to reward ... research ... which met timely
milestones.” However, due to the yearly
anemic funding cycle (which has averaged ... 20% to 35% budgetary reductions
since year two) that initiative was terminated. During Phase II, it appears that a majority of the research
conducted under ABSP was funded by USAID/Cairo. The mission’s criteria for project selection was different (more
science-oriented, less product-oriented) than ABSP's, making it difficult for
ABSP management to ensure that the overall research portfolio was appropriate
to ABSP's goals (this was noted as early as 1997 TAG report).
3. Missed opportunities
to develop a shared sense of responsibility to a common goal: A goal of all ABSP projects was to demonstrate benefits of
biotechnology for sustainable agriculture in developing countries--through
products created with, and in, the countries themselves. ABSP management would have been well-served
by an inter-connected, multidisciplinary network in which all participants
interacted, critiqued each other's work, and developed a sense of shared responsibility
toward this common goal. Networking in
ABSP is discussed in Section 6 on Communication and Networking; however,
management aspects are mentioned here.
An interconnected network of ABSP
projects would have created an atmosphere of positive peer pressure and
constructive competition, motivating each project and member to excel in:
·
Quality of research
·
Rate of progress
·
Staying on target
Since quality and motivation are
always among management’s main challenges, a group that self-motivates its
members is a support to management. For
example, peer pressure from other ABSP projects might have helped motivate
AGERI to recommend projects for USAID/Cairo support that were targeted to the
goal of getting a product on the market. Interactive networks also generate
spin-off projects with similar goals, often with diversified sources of
funding. This empowers participants
with confidence to proceed on their own paths at the end of a project -- a
fundamental goal of development assistance.
Such an environment could have been
achieved through regular meetings of all participants, from interns to
directors. The cost could have been allayed by using the meetings as occasions
for break out groups in which each multi-institutional project reviewed its
work plans together. This would have
been similar to the successful joint planning workshop at AGERI in 1998, but
with the added benefit of immediate critical scrutiny by peers in other ABSP
projects.
4. Over-extension of
management staff in Phase II: The Phase
II Directorship of two persons was responsible for a range of activities that
had been covered by three to four persons in Phase I. TAG intended ABSP management in Phase II to focus on fewer
projects, but this did not happen. Although the Indonesia buy-in ended, and
with it, most of the activity in that country ABSP management took on new
activities, mostly in Africa, in Phase II.
The technology transfer component expanded (possibly to maintain balance
with research activities, see section on Budget and Buy-ins), to include such
things as several IPR and biosafety workshops; participation in meetings
organized by various groups; and support to specific implementation-related
activities such as Kenya’s field trials of transgenic sweet potatoes.
The new activities are important for
their forward-looking nature, such as support to ASARECA decision-makers via a
review of available technology relevant to ASARECA priorities, and the Southern
Africa Regional Biosafety initiative.
However, they left no time for management to cover other needs, such as
seeking alternate ways to obtain business development expertise. USAID biotechnology project staff are
equally overextended and therefore unable to use their time and attention to
compensate for ABSP over-extension, even were that appropriate (see comments
and recommendation under accountability mechanisms).
An additional consequence of
management over-extension was the confusion that surrounded the final review,
probably because so little time was available to prepare for it. The written Scope of Work for the review was
highly detailed, yet the project information presented to the team was very
general. Verbal instructions were to
ignore the Scope of Work and provide a simple review on major achievements and
shortcomings. However, later, much of
the detailed content of the original Scope of Work was described as needed. In
addition, instructions were received at some times that the review was only on
ABSP’s achievements and shortcomings and recommendations for the close out
phase, and at other times that recommendations for an eventual follow-up
project were sought. The written Scope of Work should have included specific
comments on how much detail is expected in the review, and the intended use of
the final recommendations. Any changes
in the level of detail and scope of the review should be documented in writing
immediately, so that no time is lost to confusion and mis-directed effort.
A complex project such as ABSP
should be documented for reviewers, and for other purposes, by a master table
or simple uniform database. This table
should list by title all ABSP research (sub) projects, their start and stop
dates, the institutions and collaborators, objectives, and sources and amounts
of funds spent per year or by phase. A
similar summary should be kept for all short-term activities such as workshops,
internships, and policy papers prepared.
This information is essential for assessing the effectiveness of
ABSP. Lack of compiled information
resulted in many hours of addition “detective” work for the review team.
Information provided to a review
team should correspond to the level of detail on which the team is expected to
comment.
5. Challenges regarding country coordinators: The positive role of ABSP country national coordinators, particularly
in Indonesia and Kenya, showed that this position can be a key to success. An in-country coordinator represents the
project; maintains an overview of national activities; keeps the vision alive
between major events such as meetings; and handles local opportunities or
problems as they arise. A country coordinator with a modest budget for office
equipment, travel, communications, and clerical support is able to be more
effective than a coordinator who is asked to fulfill the function by stretching
pre-existing (already scarce) resources.
Recognizing these benefits, and the need to allow a modest cost, is in
fact a strength of ABSP.
As with management at the lead
institution, there is a need for clear definition of communication lines, roles
and responsibilities for country coordinators. For a country with more than one
ABSP project, an independent coordinator would function better than a member of
one of the funded institutions.
There is a need to consider how conflict of interest will be
avoided. For example, in Egypt, the
in-country coordinator is director of the main ABSP partner research institute.
The same institute is the Secretariat of the National Biosafety Committee,
responsible for biosafety reviews of products of other institutes or companies.
RECOMMENDATIONS
·
Any future project should assign
research monitoring and directing duties to a research director having time,
authority and effective mechanisms to require accountability. More frequent monitoring and decision-making
steps would better serve any future project, particularly a project oriented
toward eventual product commercialization (see also “Research”).
·
Responsibility for designing the
monitoring system should be joint between both the lead institution and USAID,
in order to take into account circumstances of both which will affect the
project’s ability to require accountability.
· External Advisory Boards should meet at least annually and consist of sufficient experts in research, management, implementation, so as not to overload any individual to the point of reducing quality of input.
· Information should be obtained when results funded by ABSP are the basis of work that continues after association with ABSP has ended. For example, a project might continue to develop varieties using material developed with ABSP funding. This information is needed to assess long-term impact.
·
Given the many responsibilities of the USAID
Biotechnology Officer, above and beyond liaison with ABSP, there is a clear
need for additional staff support for this USAID position. USAID has relied on a career-entry
fellowship position as support for the Biotechnology Officer. Additional
well-qualified and experienced support has been needed for the past ten years, and
is urgent now, as the responsibilities placed on the Biotechnology Officer are
increasing rapidly.
Section 7. BUDGET AND BUY-INS
BUDGET
The major cuts in USAID's overall
budget for agricultural development that occurred during the 1990s was a severe
blow to many activities (including the CGIAR, the system of international
research centers with whom ABSP originally intended to partner, see Response to
Technical Comments, Sept. 1991). ABSP
did not escape: its core budget was drastically cut in the second year, just at
the time that activities were scheduled to expand. Given the magnitude of this initial cut ($800,000, the equivalent
to 80% of an anticipated single-year budget, or about 13% of the total budget
anticipated by the RFA for the first six-year project), and subsequent
cuts ("averaged ... 20% to 35%
budgetary reductions since year two"-TAG 1997 report), it is most
remarkable that ABSP was able to accomplish as much as it did, relative to the
original goals.
Altogether, the total loss over
ABSP's duration was roughly equivalent to about a two-years' worth of resources
cut from the original six-year project.
In addition, funding was frequently late in arriving, and subsequent
resulted in further work delays in the project. ABSP management clearly
expended enormous personal energy, persistence, and persuasion to have been
able to attract and retain capable partner institutions, especially in the
private sector, in such a situation of financial retrenchment and
unpredictability.
The review team concurs with the TAG
report of 1997, that USAID seek ways to better protect core budgets for its
projects, particularly once commitments have been made and collaborators have
begun their expenditures. This is
necessary to ensure that the best possible partners will remain interested in collaborating
with USAID, and to ensure returns on public investment. Models might be sought in other federal
grant programs that have authority to award funds for multi-year projects.
BUY-INS
1. An anticipated resource
which funded diverse efforts: A
significant degree of opportunism was built into ABSP from the start, with the
expectation that country mission "buy-ins" would be sought, to
support additional research or policy development objectives (see RFA, 1991). It was also anticipated in the RFA that each country mission
participating via a buy-in would have objectives appropriate to its local
situation, and therefore possibly different from the objectives of existing
ABSP activities.
In general, the program has
benefited from the additional funds contributed by the USAID missions in the
different countries. For example, in
both Egypt (Pioneer) and Indonesia (Fitotek and ICI), buy-ins made possible
(Pioneer, ICI), or enhanced (DNAP/Fitotek) the development of private sector
collaboration.
These buy ins were generally for
research ($8.6 million) but at least $1 million was obtained for policy
development activities (Morocco) and/or planning activities (Africa Bureau).
When buy-in funding in Phase II, in particular, strongly emphasized research,
ABSP management compensated by organizing and conducting ten new
policy-development activities (workshops or internships), equivalent to two per
year. ABSP management's achievement in
maintaining a balance between research and policy development again shows an
enormous investment of personal energy and persistence.
2. Divergence between goals of USAID country missions and the
global program: The RFA did not, however,
foresee a situation in which the country-based objectives of a
"buy-in" partner would lead to funding of research under the ABSP
umbrella that yet diverged from the underlying goal of product delivery within
the ABSP time frame. This occurred in
the case of research intended to support the work at AGERI. The USAID/Cairo mission, in addition to
their support of product-oriented projects such as tomato research at
ILTAB/SCRIPPS, potato transformation at MSU, and cucurbit transformation and
pathology/breeding at MSU and Cornell, also supported basic science that was
high quality but could not be expected to yield a product within the ABSP time
frame. This was particularly the case
in Phase II with research at Ohio State University and the University of
Texas/Dallas. In addition,
USAID/Cairo's supplementary support of two ABSP core-funded projects (potato
and cucurbit transformation) was significantly greater in Phase II than ABSP
core support. The financial
contribution was welcome, however, it put ABSP management in a difficult
situation. Management's ability to
require accountability for technical progress and adherence to ABSP's goals of
product development was undermined.
Moreover, the Cairo mission does not have technical capacity to review
biotechnology research. Although the
potato project appears to have stayed largely on track, the cucurbit project
showed slow technical progress at MSU, and poor coordination between all
institutional partners (within the U.S. and between the U.S. and Egypt), yet
was insulated from accountability to ABSP management.
This review team recognizes that
USAID has decentralized its decision-making structure in order to allow the
country missions to act on their better knowledge of each local situation. However, for best use of taxpayers' money in
the service of sustainable development, there needs to be more serious effort
at coordination, to harmonize the country mission's knowledge of local needs
and opportunities, with the overall goals of global programs selected for
buy-in. Projects that demonstrate exceptional
synergy between country/mission objectives and global goals should be
recognized.
In this, the present review team
concurs with the recommendation of the TAG in 1997 (see the TAG's report of its
1997 meeting, section VI. Management.
1. "Dr. Ives has inherited
a difficult situation with regard to the large budget buy-ins from Egypt and
Indonesia. Because those programs are
largely supported from country mission funds, they operate somewhat
independently of ABSP management.
Recommendation: Reporting
guidelines, work-plan development and authorization, and budgetary controls for
country-buy in programs should be parallel to those of programs supported by
the core budget of ABSP".
(The TAG, in its 1998 report,
considered a danger that core funds would be reduced commensurate to the amount
of buy-in funds. This would have been
inconsistent with the 1991 RFA, which contemplated buy-ins as additional rather
than substitutionary. This review team
agrees; however, there is no evidence available to this team that cuts occurred
in response to significant buy-ins).
3. USAID funding and
sustainability of AGERI: The review team was unable to
determine with confidence the proportion of AGERI’s operating budget that is
received from USAID sources, however, it is certainly substantial. USAID currently anticipates reducing its
involvement in Egypt in general and therefore, in supporting AGERI, although
AGERI management is sanguine that USAID support will continue.
For several reasons, the review team
would like to see AGERI continue, achieve success with marketed biotech
products, and become sustainable.
·
AGERI has achieved technical
excellence; it is capable of conducting biotechnology research largely
independent of external technical advice -- this is a major accomplishment for
U.S. (and Egyptian) investment.
·
AGERI’s labs and scientists, and the
understanding of biosafety issues that it has been able to share, are resources
for Egypt and the region.
·
AGERI has symbolic importance for
the developing world:
Ø
If AGERI succeeds, it will be a clear
case that developing countries can achieve their own biotech capacity, for
their own benefit.
Ø
If AGERI fails, the effect will be
to strengthen--at least for a time--the voices of pessimism that try to
reinforce that biotech can only be a technology imposed by and for economically
powerful countries.
RECOMMENDATIONS
·
To assist in maintaining coherence
of projects and obtaining maximum benefits from its investments, USAID should
develop agency-wide guidelines for best practice for interactions between global
units and country missions within USAID.
These guidelines should include mechanisms for setting priorities and
objectives and for resolving conflicts of interest. They should also cover work plan development and approval,
reporting requirements, model project contracts with guidance for IP
negotiations, biosafety issues, or other relevant regulatory or safety
concerns, and project evaluation criteria.
·
The review team notes the precedent
set when USAID closed its aid to research in Costa Rica. The team recommends that USAID identify
close out funds to be used for establishing a foundation for long-term
competitive funding of biotechnology research and policy initiatives and needs
in Egypt. This would be similar to the
CR-USA foundation established in Costa Rica.
AGERI is well qualified to compete for a significant proportion of the
grants that such a foundation would award, and this would therefore be a
mechanism for support to sustainability of AGERI. At the same time, a foundation would create a new mechanism to
give opportunities for excellence in other Egyptian institutions such as the
universities. As the process of establishing a foundation takes time, USAID
should begin the planning process now.
Section 8. REFERENCES CITED
Covenent, B. 2000. The Role of the
Private Sector in Providing Biotechnology Access to the Poor. In: M. Qaim, A.F.
Krattiger and J. von Braun, eds. Agricultural Biotechnology in Developing
Countries: Towards Optimizing the Benefits for the Poor, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Dordrecht, The Netherlands
Frey, K. J. 2000.
National Plant Breeding Study-IV.
Future priorities for plant breeding.
Iowa State University/ Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment
Station; USDA/CSREES and ERS cooperating.
National Research Council (NRC) Board on Science
and Technology for Development. 1990.
Plant Biotechnology Research for Developing
Countries. National Academy Press,
Washington, D.C. 44p.
Interagency Working Group (IWG) on
Plant Genomes, National Science and Technology Council, Committee on
Science. Nov. 2000. Progress report, National Plant Genome
Initiative. Executive Office of the
President of the United States, Washington, D.C. Available at www.reeusda.gov/nri/pubs/pubs.htm
Stockstad, E. 2001. First light on genetic
roots of Bt resistance. Science, 293, 778
Section 9. LIST OF ACRONYMS
AARD: Agency for Agricultural
Research and Development
ABSP: Agricultural Biotechnology
Support Project
ACR: Agribiotechnologia de Costa
Rica
AGERI: Agriculture Genetic Research Institute
ASARECA: Association for
strengthening agricultural research in Eastern and Central Africa
BIO-EARN: East African Regional
Programme and Research Network for Biotechnology, Biosafety and Biotechnology
Policy Development
CRIFC: Central Research Institute
for Food Crops
DNAP: DNA Plant Technologies
FTO: Freedom to Operate
ILTAB: International Laboratory for
Tropical Agricultural Biology
IP: Intellectual Property
IPR: Intellectual Property Rights
ISAAA: International Service for the
Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications
ISNAR: International Service for
National Agricultural Research
KARI: Kenya Agriculture Research Institute
KIAT: Technology Transfer Office,
Indonesia
LDC: Least developed country
MD: Management Director
MSU: Michigan State University
MTA: Material Transfer Agreement
NARS: National Agricultural Research
Systems
NGO: Non Governmental Organization
NRC: National Research Council
NSTC: National Science and
Technology Council
OIP: Office of Intellectual Property
OSU: Ohio State University
OTTIP: Office of Technology Transfer
and Intellectual Property, Egypt
PVP: Plant Variety Protection
RFA: Request for Application
SARB: Southern Africa Regional
Biosafety
TAG: Technical Advisory Group
TCCP: Tissue Culture for Crops
TERI: Tata Energy Research Institute
TRIPS: Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
UPOV: International Union for the
Protection of New Varieties
USAID: U.S. Agency for International
Development
USDA: US Department of Agriculture
WTO: World Trade Organization
APPENDIX B - BIOTECHNOLOGY AND BIODIVERSITY INTERFACE (BBI)
COMPETITIVE GRANTS PROGRAM
Competitive
Grants Program on Biotechnology and Biodiversity Interface (BBI)
Request For Application, Fiscal Year 2001
I.
Background and
Program Description
USAID has gained significant experience in the area of agricultural biotechnology through support of collaborative research and technical assistance programs over more than ten years. Past programs include scientific training, research and technology development, biosafety regulatory development and training, building institutional management capacity in intellectual property rights and technology transfer, and promoting collaboration with the private sector. As part of USAID’s efforts to scale up activities and address a broader agenda in agricultural biotechnology a new competitive grants program in biosafety is being initiated this fiscal year.
Agricultural
crops improved through genetic engineering offer important benefits including
the potential of enhanced agronomic, nutritional, and marketing qualities. Similarly, genetically engineered livestock
vaccines can improve disease control and surveillance, improve productivity and
marketability of dairy and animal products and thus economic growth. Genetically engineered biotechnology
applications, however, also raise safety concerns, particularly concerns about
their impact on health and biodiversity.
Data generated to evaluate and regulate concerns about the food safety
of genetically engineered products are generally applicable across countries
and thus developing countries will be able to assess risks in this area drawing
from regulatory studies conducted in the U.S., Europe, or elsewhere. The interactions between agriculture and its
surrounding environment, however, differ from country to country due to
different crop systems and differences in biodiversity; thus the interactions
between the two will not be directly applicable in all countries. Environmental risks must therefore be
assessed on a case-by-case basis.
The
Biotechnology and Biodiversity Interface (BBI) competitive grants program is a
five year program in biosafety research aimed at addressing the interface
between the use of agricultural biotechnology, particularly genetically engineered
crops, and natural biodiversity as it occurs in developing countries that are
rich in biodiversity.
This
program will support research that provides information needed to assess the
potential risks to natural biodiversity associated with agricultural
biotechnology and to design risk management strategies appropriate to
developing country agricultural systems.
The
primary goals of this program are:
·
To
assist regulatory bodies in making science-based decisions about the effects on
biodiversity of introducing genetically engineered organisms into the
environment.
·
To
begin generating scientific data on potential risks associated with
particular applications of
biotechnology on specific aspects of biodiversity in developing countries.
·
Develop
strategies for managing potential risks in the context of agroecosystems found
in developing countries.
· Build collaboration between agricultural research and environmental conservation communities in the U.S. and developing countries.
· To build capacity among developing countries in risk assessment and risk management research.
It
is estimated that $1.8 million will be available in Fiscal Year 2001 to fully
fund four to six grants. New rounds of
awards in future years are subject to availability of additional funding.
Proposals
are sought that conduct research on risk assessment and risk management associated with the usage of agricultural
biotechnology products in developing countries. In particular, proposals should address research on the
quantification of specific risks, determination of the consequence of
identified risks, and strategies for managing such risks in one or more of the
following areas:
·
Gene flow: The movement of transgenes
(e.g. genes engineering into a plant) from genetically engineered products to
wild species through out-crossing or DNA uptake, consequence of gene flow on
related wild species in terms of changes to the balance or function of that
species in the environment. This is of
particular concern in the developing world which contains the centers of
origins (and thus many wild related species) of the major food crops.
·
Ecological fitness of GE
crops: The
effect of genetically engineered traits on the ability of crops to survive or
compete in wild ecosystems or become
weeds.
·
Impact on non-target
species: Effect
of engineered traits on harmless or beneficial organisms such as plants,
insects, birds, herbivores, or soil microbes.
·
Pest resistance management: Development of crop
management, trait expression, and integrated pest management strategies for the
use of GE crops in developing country farming systems to help deter or postpone
development of pest resistance. Some systems are being developed for U.S.
agricultural systems but these will likely need adaptation and monitoring to
address differences in developing country agricultural systems.
·
Compatibility with other
agricultural practices: Integration with or
potential impact on the efficacy of other biocontrol, integrated soil, or
nutrient management practices.
·
Other risk management
strategies:
for example to address gene flow through planting borders which buffer crops
from the surrounding environment.
·
Monitoring: collection of data from the
environment around field tests and commercial-scale production systems to
monitor potential impacts such as gene flow, pest resistance, or harm to
non-target species.
Proposals are open to all eligible applicants. Eligible applicants may be from U.S.
universities and research institutions, International Agricultural Research
Centers (IARCs), international environmental conservation groups, private
sector seed and biotech companies, developing country agriculture or
environmental research institutions, and developing country regulatory
bodies. In addition, collaborations
between U.S. or international research institutions and developing country
research or regulatory institutions, and collaborations between agriculture and
environment communities are encouraged.
Applicants must use the following guidelines for
preparing grant applications:
·
Proposed
research must address the effects on biodiversity of transgenic or genetically
engineered organisms such as crops, animal vaccines, microbes etc.
·
Proposed
research may include either plant or animal biotechnology products that have
agricultural applications.
·
Proposed
research may take place in one country or be a regional activity. Research activities can take place in all
countries where there is no legal provision against USAID assistance.
·
Proposed
research must address the interface between agricultural biotechnology and
natural biodiversity.
·
Proposed
research must further the regulatory decision making process.
The
proposal should be no longer than 10 pages (either single or double spaced),
including title page, but excluding the CVs.
It should be in the following format.
An
original and six copies of a proposal must be submitted. Proposals should be typed, single or double
spaced, on one side of the page only.
The text of the proposal should be prepared using type no smaller that
12 point font size and one-inch margins.
All copies should be sent to the following address:
Grants Program on Biotechnology and Biodiversity
Interface
U.S. Agency for International Development
G/EGAD/AFS/AEMD
Washington, D.C. 20523-2110.
Proposals
submitted via facsimile (fax) or e-mail will not be accepted.
PROPOSALS MUST BE RECEIVED
AT USAID BY AUGUST 10, 2001.
B.
Acknowledgment of Proposal
Receipt
The
receipt of all proposals will be acknowledged via the Internet (e-mail) or
fax. Therefore, it is important to
include the e-mail address and/or fax number of the principal contact on the
title page. This acknowledgement will
contain a proposal identification number.
Once your proposal has been assigned a proposal number, please cite that
number in future correspondence.
Proposals
will be evaluated and ranked according to the following criteria:
1)
POTENTIAL
APPLICATION OF PROPOSED RESEARCH TO THE REGULATORY PROCESS (40 POINTS)
·
Degree
to which proposed research specifically addresses priority regulatory
questions.
·
Degree
to which the technologies studied are likely to be applied in the near term.
·
Degree
to which research builds capacity building among regulatory systems to
undertake science-based risk assessment.
2)
TECHNICAL FEASABILITY (40 POINTS)
·
Elaboration
of research design.
·
Experience
level and demonstrable ability of researchers to carry out the proposed
research.
·
Available
resources.
3)
DEGREE
OF COLLABORATION (20 POINTS)
·
Collaboration
between U.S. or international research institutions and developing country
research or regulatory institutions.
·
Collaboration
between agriculture and environment communities.
Proposals
will be evaluated by a committee that consists of experts in agricultural and
environmental issues surrounding the use of genetically engineered organisms
and/or ecosystem/biodiversity management.
These experts will be drawn from U.S. government agencies such as USAID,
USDA, EPA and State Department, and U.S. universities and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs).
Selection
of awards will be made by August 31, 2001.
In
accordance with a Federal Regulation 22 CFR 216, all grants will be required to
submit to an environmental review. In
addition, under the new USAID biosafety policy all grants which involve the
field testing or use of genetically engineered products will be required to
submit a biosafety proposal to USAID for external review and demonstrate host
country biosafety approval for the specific experiment or use proposed. This external biosafety review will be
incorporated into an environmental review.
APPENDIX C –CERTIFICATIONS
U.S. Agency for International
Development
CERTIFICATIONS, ASSURANCES, AND OTHER STATEMENTS OF
RECIPIENT[3] [4]
PART
I - CERTIFICATIONS AND ASSURANCES
1. ASSURANCE
OF COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING NON‑DISCRIMINATION IN
FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS
(a) The recipient hereby assures that no person in the United States
shall, on the bases set forth below, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to discrimination under, any
program or activity receiving financial assistance from USAID, and that with
respect to the grant for which application is being made, it will comply with
the requirements of:
(1) Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub. L. 88‑352, 42 U.S.C. 2000‑d), which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin, in
programs and activities receiving Federal financial assistance;
(2) Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794), which prohibits discrimination on
the basis of handicap in programs and activities receiving Federal financial
assistance;
(3) The Age
Discrimination Act of 1975, as amended (Pub. L. 95‑478), which prohibits
discrimination based on age in the delivery of services and benefits supported
with Federal funds;
(4) Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681, et seq.), which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex in education programs and activities
receiving Federal financial assistance (whether or not the programs or
activities are offered or sponsored by an educational institution); and
(5) USAID regulations
implementing the above nondiscrimination laws, set forth in Chapter II of Title
22 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
(b) If the recipient is an institution of higher education, the
Assurances given herein extend to admission practices and to all other
practices relating to the treatment of students or clients of the institution,
or relating to the opportunity to participate in the provision of services or
other benefits to such individuals, and shall be applicable to the entire
institution unless the recipient establishes to the satisfaction of the USAID
Administrator that the institution's practices in designated parts or programs
of the institution will in no way affect its practices in the program of the
institution for which financial assistance is sought, or the beneficiaries of,
or participants in, such programs.
(c) This assurance is given in consideration of and for the purpose of
obtaining any and all Federal grants, loans, contracts, property, discounts, or
other Federal financial assistance extended after the date hereof to the recipient
by the Agency, including installment payments after such date on account of
applications for Federal financial assistance which were approved before such
date. The recipient recognizes and
agrees that such Federal financial assistance will be extended in reliance on
the representations and agreements made in this Assurance, and that the United
States shall have the right to seek judicial enforcement of this
Assurance. This Assurance is binding on
the recipient, its successors, transferees, and assignees, and the person or
persons whose signatures appear below are authorized to sign this Assurance on
behalf of the recipient.
2. CERTIFICATION
REGARDING DRUG‑FREE WORKPLACE REQUIREMENTS
(a) Instructions for Certification
(1) By signing and/or
submitting this application or grant, the recipient is providing the
certification set out below.
(2) The certification
set out below is a material representation of fact upon which reliance was
placed when the agency determined to award the grant. If it is later determined that the recipient knowingly rendered
a false certification, or otherwise violates
the requirements of the Drug‑Free Workplace Act, the agency, in
addition to any other remedies available to the Federal Government, may take
action authorized under the Drug‑Free Workplace Act.
(3) For recipients
other than individuals, Alternate I applies.
(4) For recipients who
are individuals, Alternate II applies.
(b) Certification Regarding Drug‑Free Workplace Requirements
Alternate
I
(1) The recipient
certifies that it will provide a drug‑free workplace by:
(A) Publishing
a statement notifying employees that the unlawful manufacture, distribution,
dispensing, possession or use of a controlled substance is prohibited in the
applicant's/grantee's workplace and specifying the actions that will be taken
against employees for violation of such prohibition;
(B) Establishing
a drug‑free awareness program to inform employees about‑‑
1. The
dangers of drug abuse in the workplace;
2. The
recipient's policy of maintaining a drug‑free workplace;
3. Any
available drug counseling, rehabilitation, and employee assistance programs;
and
4. The
penalties that may be imposed upon employees for drug abuse violations
occurring in the workplace;
(C) Making it a
requirement that each employee to be engaged in the performance of the grant be
given a copy of the statement required by paragraph (b)(1)(A);
(D) Notifying
the employee in the statement required by paragraph (b)(1)(A) that, as a
condition of employment under the grant, the employee will‑‑
1. Abide
by the terms of the statement; and
2. Notify
the employer of any criminal drug statute conviction for a violation occurring
in the workplace no later than five days after such conviction;
(E) Notifying
the agency within ten days after receiving notice under subparagraph
(b)(1)(D)1. from an employee or otherwise receiving actual notice of such
conviction;
(F) Taking one
of the following actions, within 30 days of receiving notice under subparagraph
(b)(1)(D)2., with respect to any employee who is so convicted‑‑
1. Taking
appropriate personnel action against such an employee, up to and including
termination; or
2. Requiring
such employee to participate satisfactorily in a drug abuse assistance or
rehabilitation program approved for such purposes by a Federal, State, or local
health, law enforcement, or other appropriate agency;
(G) Making a
good faith effort to continue to maintain a drug‑free workplace through
implementation of paragraphs (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(D),
(b)(1)(E) and (b)(1)(F).
(2) The recipient
shall insert in the space provided below the site(s) for the performance of
work done in connection with the specific grant:
Place of Performance
(Street address, city, county, state, zip code)
Alternate II
The recipient certifies
that, as a condition of the grant, he or she will not engage in the unlawful
manufacture, distribution, dispensing, possession or use of a controlled
substance in conducting any activity with the grant.
3. CERTIFICATION
REGARDING DEBARMENT, SUSPENSION, AND OTHER RESPONSIBILITY MATTERS ‑‑
PRIMARY COVERED TRANSACTIONS[5]
(a) Instructions for Certification
1. By signing and
submitting this proposal, the prospective primary participant is providing the
certification set out below.
2. The inability of
a person to provide the certification required below will not necessarily
result in denial of participation in this covered transaction. The prospective participant shall submit an
explanation of why it cannot provide the certification set out below. The certification or explanation will be
considered in connection with the department or agency's determination whether
to enter into this transaction.
However, failure of the prospective primary participant to furnish a certification
or an explanation shall disqualify such person from participation in this
transaction.
3. The certification
in this clause is a material representation of fact upon which reliance was
placed when the department or agency determined to enter into this
transaction. If it is later determined
that the prospective primary participant knowingly rendered an erroneous
certification, in addition to other remedies available to the Federal
Government, the department or agency may terminate this transaction for cause
or default.
4. The prospective
primary participant shall provide immediate written notice to the department or
agency to whom this proposal is submitted if at any time the prospective
primary participant learns that its certification was erroneous when submitted
or has become erroneous by reason of changed circumstances.
5. The terms
"covered transaction," "debarred," "suspended,"
"ineligible," lower tier covered transaction,"
"participant," "person," "primary covered
transaction," "principal," "proposal," and
"voluntarily excluded," as used in this clause, have the meaning set
out in the Definitions and Coverage sections of the rules implementing
Executive Order 12549.[6] You may contact the department or agency to
which this proposal is being submitted for assistance in obtaining a copy of
those regulations.
6. The prospective
primary participant agrees by submitting this proposal that, should the
proposed covered transaction be entered into, it shall not knowingly enter into
any lower tier covered transaction with a person who is debarred, suspended,
declared ineligible, or voluntarily excluded from participation in this covered
transaction, unless authorized by the department or agency entering into this
transaction.
7. The prospective
primary participant further agrees by submitting this proposal that it will
include the clause titled "Certification Regarding Debarment, Suspension,
Ineligibility and Voluntary Exclusion‑‑Lower Tier Covered
Transaction,"[7] provided by
the department or agency entering into this covered transaction, without
modification, in all lower tier covered transactions and in all solicitations
for lower tier covered transactions.
8. A participant in
a covered transaction may rely upon a certification of a prospective
participant in a lower tier covered transaction that it is not debarred,
suspended, ineligible, or voluntarily excluded from the covered transaction,
unless it knows that the certification is erroneous. A participant may decide the methods and frequency by which it
determines the eligibility of its principals.
Each participant may, but is not required to, check the Nonprocurement
List.
9. Nothing contained
in the foregoing shall be construed to require establishment of a system of
records in order to render in good faith the certification required by this
clause. The knowledge and information
of a participant is not required to exceed that which is normally possessed by
a prudent person in the ordinary course of business dealing.
10. Except for
transactions authorized under paragraph 6 of these instructions, if a
participant in a covered transaction knowingly enters into a lower tier covered
transaction with a person who is suspended, debarred, ineligible, or
voluntarily excluded from participation in this transaction, in addition to other
remedies available to the Federal Government, the department or agency may
terminate this transaction for cause or default.
(b) Certification Regarding Debarment, Suspension, and Other
Responsibility Matters‑‑Primary Covered Transactions
(1) The prospective
primary participant certifies to the best of its knowledge and belief, the it
and its principals:
(A) Are not
presently debarred, suspended, proposed for debarment, declared ineligible, or
voluntarily excluded from covered transactions by any Federal department or
agency;
(B) Have not
within a three‑year period preceding this proposal been convicted of or
had a civil judgment rendered against them for commission of fraud or a
criminal offense in connection with obtaining, attempting to obtain, or
performing a public (Federal, State or local) transaction or contract under a
public transaction; violation of Federal or State antitrust statutes or
commission of embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or
destruction of records, making false statements, or receiving stolen property;
(C) Are not
presently indicted for or otherwise criminally or civilly charged by a
governmental entity (Federal, State or local) with commission of any of the
offenses enumerated in paragraph (1)(B) of this certification;
(D) Have not
within a three‑year period proceeding this application/proposal had one
or more public transactions (Federal, State or local) terminated for cause or
default.
(2) Where the
prospective primary participant is unable to certify to any of the statements
in this certification, such prospective participant shall attach an explanation
to this proposal.
4. CERTIFICATION
REGARDING LOBBYING
The undersigned certifies,
to the best of his or her knowledge and belief, that:
(1) No Federal appropriated funds have been paid or will be paid, by
or on behalf of the undersigned, to any person for influencing or attempting to
influence an officer or employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an
officer or employee of Congress, or an employee of a Member of Congress in
connection with the awarding of any Federal contract, the making of any Federal
grant, the making of any Federal loan, the entering into of any grant, and the
extension, continuation, renewal, amendment or modification of any Federal
contract, grant, loan, or grant.
(2) If any funds other than Federal appropriated funds have been paid
or will be paid to any person for influencing or attempting to influence an
officer or employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or employee
of Congress, or an employee of a Member of Congress in connection with this
Federal contract, grant, loan, or grant, the undersigned shall complete and
submit Standard Form‑LLL, "Disclosure of Lobbying Activities,"[8]
in accordance with its instructions.
(3) The undersigned shall require that the language of this
certification be included in the award documents for all sub-awards at all
tiers (including subcontracts, sub-grants, and contracts under grants, loans,
and grants) and that all sub-recipients shall certify and disclose accordingly.
This certification is a
material representation of fact upon which reliance was placed when this
transaction was made or entered into.
Submission of this certification is a prerequisite for making or entering
into this transaction imposed by section 1352, title 31, United States
Code. Any person who fails to file the
required certification shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than
$10,000 and not more than $100,000 for each such failure.
Statement for Loan
Guarantees and Loan Insurance
The undersigned states, to
the best of his or her knowledge and
belief, that: If any funds have
been paid or will be paid to any person for influencing or attempting to influence
an officer or employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or
employee of Congress, or an employee of a Member of Congress in connection with
this commitment providing for the United States to insure or guarantee a loan,
the undersigned shall complete and submit Standard Form‑LLL,
"Disclosure Form to Report Lobbying," in accordance with its
instructions. Submission of this
statement is a prerequisite for making or entering into this transaction
imposed by section 1352, title 31, U.S. Code. Any person who fails to file the required
statement shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $10,000 and not
more than $100,000 for each such failure.
5. Prohibition
on Assistance to Drug Traffickers for Covered Countries and Individuals (ADS
206)
USAID reserves the right to terminate this
[Agreement/Contract], to demand a refund or take other appropriate measures if
the [Grantee/Contractor] is found to have been convicted of a narcotics offense
or to have been engaged in drug trafficking as defined in 22 CFR Part 140. The undersigned shall review USAID ADS 206
to determine if any certification is required for Key Individuals or Covered
Participants.
If there are COVERED PARTICIPANTS: USAID reserves the
right to terminate assistance to, or take or take other appropriate
measures with respect to, any participant approved by
USAID who is found to have been convicted of a narcotics offense or
to have been engaged in drug trafficking as defined in 22 CFR Part 140.
6. CERTIFICATION
OF RECIPIENT
The recipient certifies
that it has reviewed and is familiar with the proposed grant format and the
regulations applicable thereto, and that it agrees to comply with all such
regulations, except as noted below (use a continuation page as necessary):
Solicitation No.
Application/Proposal No.
Date of
Application/Proposal
Name of Recipient
Typed Name and Title
Signature
Date
PART
II
OTHER
STATEMENTS OF RECIPIENT
1. AUTHORIZED
INDIVIDUALS
The recipient represents
that the following persons are authorized to negotiate on its behalf with the
Government and to bind the recipient in connection with this application or
grant:
Name Title Telephone
No. Facsimile No.
2. TAXPAYER
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (TIN)
If the recipient is a U.S.
organization, or a foreign organization which has income effectively connected
with the conduct of activities in the U.S. or has an office or a place of
business or a fiscal paying agent in the U.S., please indicate the recipient's
TIN:
TIN:
3. CONTRACTOR IDENTIFICATION NUMBER--DATA UNIVERSAL NUMBERING SYSTEM
(DUNS) NUMBER
(a) In the space provided at the end of this provision, the recipient
should supply the Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number applicable to
that name and address. Recipients
should take care to report the number that identifies the recipient's name and
address exactly as stated in the proposal.
(b) The DUNS is a 9‑digit number assigned by Dun and Bradstreet
Information Services. If the recipient
does not have a DUNS number, the recipient should call Dun and Bradstreet
directly at 1‑800‑333‑0505.
A DUNS number will be provided immediately by telephone at no charge to
the recipient. The recipient should be
prepared to provide the following information:
(1) Recipient's name.
(2) Recipient's address.
(3) Recipient's telephone
number.
(4) Line of business.
(5) Chief executive
officer/key manager.
(6) Date the organization
was started.
(7) Number of people
employed by the recipient.
(8) Company affiliation.
(c) Recipients located
outside the United States may obtain the location and phone number of the local
Dun and Bradstreet Information Services office from the Internet Home Page at
http://www.dbisna.com/dbis/customer/custlist.htm. If an offeror is unable to
locate a local service center, it may send an e‑mail to Dun and
Bradstreet at [email protected].
The DUNS system is distinct
from the Federal Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) system.
DUNS:
4. LETTER OF
CREDIT (LOC) NUMBER
If the recipient has an
existing Letter of Credit (LOC) with USAID, please indicate the LOC number:
LOC: 72‑00‑
5. PROCUREMENT
INFORMATION
(a) Applicability. This
applies to the procurement of goods and services planned by the recipient
(i.e., contracts, purchase orders, etc.) from a supplier of goods or services
for the direct use or benefit of the recipient in conducting the program
supported by the grant, and not to assistance provided by the recipient
(i.e., a sub-grant or sub-agreement) to a sub-grantee or sub-recipient in
support of the sub-grantee's or sub-recipient's program. Provision by the recipient of the requested
information does not, in and of itself, constitute USAID approval.
(b) Amount of Procurement.
Please indicate the total estimated dollar amount of goods and services
which the recipient plans to purchase under the grant:
$
(c) Nonexpendable Property.
If the recipient plans to purchase non-expendable equipment which would
require the approval of the Agreement Officer, please indicate below (using a
continuation page, as necessary) the types, quantities of each, and estimated
unit costs. Non-expendable equipment
for which the Agreement Officer's approval to purchase is required is any
article of non-expendable tangible personal property charged directly to the
grant, having a useful life of more than one year and an acquisition cost of
$5,000 or more per unit.
Type/Description (Generic)
Quantity Estimated Unit Cost
(d) Source, Origin, and Componentry of Goods. If the recipient plans to purchase any
goods/commodities which are not of U.S. source and/or U.S. origin, and/or does
not contain at least 50% componentry which are not at least 50% U.S. source and
origin, please indicate below (using a continuation page, as necessary) the types
and quantities of each, estimated unit costs of each, and probable source
and/or origin, to include the probable source and/or origin of the components
if less than 50% U.S. components will be contained in the commodity. "Source" means the country from
which a commodity is shipped to the cooperating country or the cooperating
country itself if the commodity is located therein at the time of
purchase. However, where a commodity is
shipped from a free port or bonded warehouse in the form in which received
therein, "source" means the country from which the commodity was
shipped to the free port or bonded warehouse.
Any commodity whose source is a non‑Free World country is
ineligible for USAID financing. The
"origin" of a commodity is the country or area in which a commodity
is mined, grown, or produced. A
commodity is produced when, through manufacturing, processing, or substantial
and major assembling of components, a commercially recognized new commodity
results, which is substantially different in basic characteristics or in
purpose or utility from its components.
Merely packaging various items together for a particular procurement or
re-labeling items does not constitute production of a commodity. Any commodity whose origin is a non‑Free
World country is ineligible for USAID financing. "Components" are the goods which go directly into the
production of a produced commodity. Any
component from a non‑Free World country makes the commodity ineligible
for USAID financing.
Type/Description Estimated Probable Source Probable Origin
(Generic) Quantity Unit Cost Goods Components Goods Components
(e) Restricted Goods.
If the recipient plans to purchase any restricted goods, please indicate
below (using a continuation page, as necessary) the types and quantities of
each, estimated unit costs of each, intended use, and probable source and/or
origin. Restricted goods are
Agricultural Commodities, Motor Vehicles, Pharmaceuticals, Pesticides, Rubber
Compounding Chemicals and Plasticizers, Used Equipment, U.S. Government‑Owned
Excess Property, and Fertilizer.
Type/Description
Estimated Probable
Probable (Generic) Quantity Unit Cost Intended Use Source Origin
(f) Supplier Nationality.
If the recipient plans to purchase any goods or services from suppliers
of goods and services whose nationality is not in the U.S., please indicate
below (using a continuation page, as necessary) the types and quantities of
each good or service, estimated costs of each, probable nationality of each non‑U.S.
supplier of each good or service, and the rationale for purchasing from a non‑U.S.
supplier. Any supplier whose
nationality is a non‑Free World country is ineligible for USAID
financing.
Type/Description
Estimated Probable Supplier Nationality Rationale (Generic) Quantity Unit Cost (Non-U.S. Only)
for
non-U.S.
(g) Proposed Disposition. If the recipient plans to purchase any
non-expendable equipment with a unit acquisition cost of $5,000 or more, please
indicate below (using a continuation page, as necessary) the proposed
disposition of each such item.
Generally, the recipient may either retain the property for other uses
and make compensation to USAID (computed by applying the percentage of federal
participation in the cost of the original program to the current fair market
value of the property), or sell the property and reimburse USAID an amount
computed by applying to the sales proceeds the percentage of federal
participation in the cost of the original program (except that the recipient
may deduct from the federal share $500 or 10% of the proceeds, whichever is
greater, for selling and handling expenses), or donate the property to a host
country institution, or otherwise dispose of the property as instructed by
USAID.
Type/Description (Generic) Quantity Estimated Unit Cost Proposed Disposition
6. PAST
PERFORMANCE REFERENCES
On a continuation page,
please provide a list of the ten most current U.S. Government and/or privately‑funded
contracts, grants, grants, etc., and the name, address, and telephone number of
the Contract/Agreement Officer or other contact person.
7. TYPE OF
ORGANIZATION
The recipient, by checking the applicable box, represents that ‑
(a) If the recipient
is a U.S. entity, it
operates as [
] a corporation
incorporated under the
laws of the
State of ,
[ ] an individual, [ ] a partnership, [ ] a non-governmental nonprofit organization, [ ] a state or loc al governmental
organization, [ ] a private college or
university, [ ] a public college or
university, [ ] an international organization,
or [ ] a joint venture; or
(b) If the recipient is a non‑U.S. entity, it operates as [ ] a corporation organized under the laws of (country), [
] an individual, [ ] a
partnership, [ ] a non-governmental
nonprofit organization, [ ] a
non-governmental educational institution, [ ] a governmental organization, [ ]
an international organization, or [ ] a joint venture.
8. ESTIMATED COSTS OF COMMUNICATIONS PRODUCTS
The following are the
estimate(s) of the cost of each separate communications product (i.e., any
printed material [other than non-color photocopy material], photographic
services, or video production services) which is anticipated under the
grant. Each estimate must include all
the costs associated with preparation and execution of the product. Use a continuation page as necessary.
Attachment A
Page
1 of 2
Certification
Regarding Debarment, Suspension, Ineligibility and Voluntary Exclusion
Lower
Tier Covered Transactions
(a) Instructions for Certification
1. By signing and
submitting this proposal, the prospective lower tier participant is providing
the certification set out below.
2. The certification
in this clause is a material representation of fact upon which reliance was
placed when this transaction was entered into.
If it is later determined that the prospective lower tier participant
knowingly rendered an erroneous certification, in addition to other remedies
available to the Federal Government, the department or agency with which this
transaction originated may pursue available remedies, including suspension
and/or debarment.
3. The prospective
lower tier participant shall provide immediate written notice to the person to
which this proposal is submitted if at any time the prospective lower tier
participant learns that its certification was erroneous when submitted or has
become erroneous by reason of changed circumstances.
4. The terms
"covered transaction," "debarred," "suspended,"
ineligible, "lower tier covered transaction,"
"participant," "person," "primary covered
transaction," "principal," "proposal," and
"voluntarily excluded," as used in this clause, has the meanings set
out in the Definitions and Coverage sections of rules implementing Executive
Order 12549. 1/ You may contact
the person to which this proposal is submitted for assistance in obtaining a
copy of those regulations.
5. The prospective
lower tier participant agrees by submitting this proposal that, should the
proposed covered transaction be entered into, it shall not knowingly enter into
any lower tier covered transaction with a person who is debarred, suspended,
declared ineligible, or voluntarily excluded from participation in this covered
transaction, unless authorized by the department or agency with which this
transaction originated.
6. The prospective
lower tier participant further agrees by submitting this proposal that it will
include this clause titled "Certification Regarding Debarment, Suspension,
Ineligibility and Voluntary Exclusion‑‑Lower Tier covered
Transaction," 2/ without modification, in all lower tier covered
transactions and in all solicitations for lower tier covered transactions.
7. A participant in
a covered transaction may rely upon a certification of a prospective
participant in a lower tier covered transaction that it is not debarred,
suspended, ineligible, or voluntarily excluded from the covered transaction,
unless it knows that the certification is erroneous. A participant may decide the method and frequency by which it
determines the eligibility of its principals.
Each participant may, but is not required to, check the Non procurement
List.
8. Nothing contained
in the foregoing shall be construed to require establishment of a system of
records in order to render in good faith the certification required by this
clause. The knowledge and information
of a participant is not required to exceed that which is normally possessed by
a prudent person in the ordinary course of business dealings.
9. Except for
transactions authorized under paragraph 5 of these instructions, if a
participant in a covered transaction knowingly enters into a lower tier covered
transaction with a person who is suspended, debarred, ineligible, or
voluntarily excluded from participation in this transaction, in addition to
other remedies available to the Federal Government, the department or agency
with which this transaction originated may pursue available remedies, including
suspension and/or debarment.
1/ See ADS Chapter 303, 22 CFR 208.
2/ For USAID, this clause is entitled "Debarment, Suspension,
Ineligibility, and Voluntary Exclusion (March 1989)" and is set forth in
the USAID grant standard provision for U.S. non-governmental organizations
entitled "Debarment, Suspension, and Related Matters" (see ADS
Chapter 303), or in the USAID grant standard provision for non‑U.S.
non-governmental organizations entitled "Debarment, Suspension, and Other
Responsibility Matters" (see ADS Chapter 303).
Page
2 of 2
(b) Certification Regarding Debarment, Suspension, Ineligibility
and Voluntary Exclusion‑‑Lower Tier Covered Transactions
(1) The prospective
lower tier participant certifies, by submission of this proposal, that neither
it nor its principals is presently debarred, suspended, proposed for debarment,
declared ineligible, or voluntarily excluded from participation in this
transaction by any Federal department or agency.
(2) Where the
prospective lower tier participant is unable to certify to any of the
statements in this certification, such prospective participant shall attach an
explanation to this proposal.
Solicitation No.
Application/Proposal No.
Date of
Application/Proposal
Name of Applicant/Sub-grantee
Typed Name and Title
Signature
Date
KEY
INDIVIDUAL CERTIFICATION NARCOTICS OFFENSES AND DRUG TRAFFICKING
I hereby
certify that within the last ten years:
1. I have
not been convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or
regulation of the United States or any other country concerning narcotic or
psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances.
2. I am
not and have not been an illicit trafficker in any such drug or controlled
substance.
3. I am
not and have not been a knowing assistor, abettor, conspirator, or colluder
with others in the illicit trafficking in any such drug or substance.
Signature:
________________________
Date:
_______________________
Name:
___________________________
Title/Position:
____________________________
Organization:
_____________________________
Address:
________________________________
___________________________________
Date of
Birth: ______________________________
NOTICE:
1. You
are required to sign this Certification under the provisions of 22 CFR Part
140, Prohibition on Assistance to Drug Traffickers. These regulations were
issued by the Department of State and require that certain key individuals of
organizations must sign this Certification.
2. If you
make a false Certification you are subject to U.S. criminal prosecution under
18 U.S.C. 1001.
PARTICIPANT
CERTIFICATION NARCOTICS OFFENSES AND DRUG TRAFFICKING
1. I
hereby certify that within the last ten years:
a. I have
not been convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or
regulation of the United States or any other country concerning narcotic or
psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances.
b. I am
not and have not been an illicit trafficker in any such drug or controlled
substance.
c. I am
not or have not been a knowing assistor, abettor, conspirator, or colluder with
others in the illicit trafficking in any such drug or substance.
2. I
understand that USAID may terminate my training if it is determined that I
engaged in the above conduct during the last ten years or during my USAID
training.
Signature:
___________________________________
Name:
______________________________________
Date:
_______________________________
Address:
______________________________
_______________________________
Date of
Birth: __________________________________
NOTICE:
1. You
are required to sign this Certification under the provisions of 22 CFR Part
140,Prohibition on Assistance to Drug Traffickers. These regulations were
issued by the Department of State and require that certain participants must
sign this Certification.
2. If you
make a false Certification you are subject to U.S. criminal prosecution under
18 U.S.C. 1001.
[1] See Hector Quemada’s consulting report
[2] Under TRIPS countries have the choice to provide sui generis protection to a plant cultivar usually through an UPOV(International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants) like legislation
[4]When
these Certifications, Assurances, and Other Statements of Recipient are used
for grants, the term "Grant" means "Grant".
[5]The
recipient must obtain from each identified subgrantee and (sub)contractor, and
submit with its application/proposal, the Certification Regarding Debarment,
Suspension, Ineligibility and Voluntary Exclusion ‑‑ Lower Tier
Transactions, set forth in Attachment A hereto. The recipient should reproduce additional copies as necessary.
[7]For
USAID, this clause is entitled "Debarment, Suspension, Ineligibility, and
Voluntary Exclusion (March 1989)" and is set forth in the grant standard
provision entitled "Debarment, Suspension, and Related Matters" if
the recipient is a U.S. nongovernmental organization, or in the grant standard
provision entitled "Debarment, Suspension, and Other Responsibility
Matters" if the recipient is a non‑U.S. nongovernmental
organization.